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ABSTRACT
Threats to individual privacy from computer information, database, and
surveillance technologies of the mid-20th century prompted the formation of a privacy
epistemic community that informed and influenced privacy policy and legislation in the
United States and the European Union. Because the United States was more advanced in
computer technology than the European nations, awareness of privacy issues, and the
privacy epistemic community, emerged first in the United States---and migrated to
Europe a generation later. The United States legislated the Privacy Act of 1974, which
became the benchmark for individual privacy protection in the United States. While
several European nations passed privacy legislation in the 1970s, there was no common
privacy policy and law among European nations. In the early 1970s, the Council of
Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) created privacy data-protection committees that became important networking
organizations for privacy epistemic community experts from the United States, European
nations, and other OECD member nations. The influence of the trans-Atlantic privacy
data-protection epistemic community can be seen in the similarities among the Fair
Information Principles/Practices (FIP) found in privacy studies, guidelines, conventions,
and laws in the U.S., the CoE, the OECD, and the European nations.
ii

Two case studies describe the role and influence of the privacy data-protection
epistemic community members in influencing privacy studies, policy, and legislation in
the United States and Europe. The United States enacted narrow “sectoral” legislation to
protect individual privacy from government computers and databases in the Privacy Act
of 1974. More than two decades later, the European Union enacted broad “omnibus”
data-protection legislation that effectively limits the collection and aggregation of
personal data on EU citizens. Why two such dramatically different privacy dataprotection laws could have been enacted when influenced by the same privacy dataprotection epistemic community leads to analysis of economic, socio-cultural, and
political influences on privacy data-protection legislation. Evidence suggests that privacy
data-protection epistemic community influence, filtered through different socio-cultural
visions of the relationship of the government and the citizen, lead to dramatically
different privacy data-protection legislative results.
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Chapter One
Introduction and Overview
“In reality, a society devoid of individual privacy makes the very basis
of democracy---individualism---difficult to attain. An individual who
is constantly under surveillance, or one who knows that at any time he
may be observed, will limit his external conduct to prescribed
standards of safe conformity. Internally, if there is no outlet for one’s
own individualistic tendencies, the mind comes to fit into a conformist
mold much the same as one’s external actions. An absence of privacy
is crucial for totalitarian government to subsist.”1
R. H. Clark,
Historical Antecedents of the
Constitutional Right of Privacy
Introduction
Public awareness and concern for “privacy” of the individual have dramatically
increased across the developed world over the past century.2 With each generation, new
privacy issues and topics have emerged in response to ever-new dimensions of the
creation, accumulation, and distribution of information. Although concerns for privacy
can be found in some of civilization’s oldest documents and stories, privacy in law was
distinctly a development of late 19th century American society. While several
amendments to the Constitution of the United States did enshrine basic common law
concepts of individual privacy, it was not until the last half of the 19th century that
individual privacy became a public concern and gained permanent stature in law.3
Scholars note a direct correlation between the development of new technologies
and the growing threat to the privacy of the individual over the past one and one-half
1

centuries.4 Initial realization in the United States of the threat of technology to individual
privacy came with the newspaper, the telegraph, the box camera, and the telephone.
These were the technologies that facilitated the privacy interlopers of which Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis famously complained in The Right to Privacy in 1890.5 Their
Harvard Law Review essay created a new area of law, and almost immediately privacy
found a new traction in law journals, the courts, and journalism. For the next halfcentury, privacy law slowly expanded in scope based largely upon the insights of Warren
and Brandeis. However, after the early information revolution of the mid-20th century,
threats to individual privacy accelerated at an alarming rate.
Creation of automated data processing (ADP) centers by the federal government
and large business in the 1950-60s presaged a growing danger to individual privacy by
collecting, storing, and integrating small bits of data and information concerning the life
and activities of all citizens.6 Images of universal surveillance and government databases
described by Aldus Huxley in Brave New World,7 and George Orwell in Nineteen EightyFour,8 were frequently invoked to illustrate the threat to citizens from these new
technologies. Government and private organizations, as well as private individuals,
recognized the dangers of collection, storage, and manipulation of personal information
by ADP centers and initiated studies of the privacy of individuals in the face of ever more
capable computer-based information technology.
Initial studies by organizations such as the RAND Corporation,9 the Association
for Computing Machinery (ACM),10 and the American Federation of Information
Processing Societies (AFIPS)11 produced much of the early technical security-privacy
2

literature based on their proximity to government and industry main-frame computing
database work prior to the 1970s. What began as concern regarding the security of data
within government and industry quickly evolved into concern for the privacy of the
individual. This technical computer data-processing environment also produced the first
influential members of the privacy epistemic community.12 Subsequent conceptual
studies based on a proposal from the Social Sciences Research Council in the mid-1960s
regarding the feasibility of a National Data Center13 created a groundswell of
Congressional, academic, and legal interest in the prospects and problems associated with
the creation of centralized, integrated, government data banks. Initial interest in privacydata protection issues and threats based on the proposed government databanks of the
1960s has continuously grown, based on the rapid evolution of digital technologies in the
past half-century and the subsequent multiplication of threats to privacy. As the
technological threats to privacy have grown, the privacy epistemic community has
blossomed as academics, lawyers, business-persons and legislators have been motivated
to investigate and respond to the new privacy problems---and a cascade of privacy-related
literature, organizations, and law have subsequently been created.
Purpose of Study
My purpose in this study is to focus on the role of the privacy data-protection
epistemic community in influencing privacy policy and legislation from the mid-1950s to
the mid-1990s. This forty-year period was the era of identification of the privacy-data
protection problem posed by computer, database, and surveillance systems, the
characterization of key issues in individual privacy, and the creation of major privacy
3

policy and legislation which laid the groundwork for all subsequent privacy discussions.
I will define what is meant by the key terms such as privacy and epistemic community
and will then employ two case studies to as a means of demonstrating the role of the
privacy epistemic community in influencing privacy policy and legislation. Finally, I
will evaluate the four intervening variables: 1) privacy epistemic community; 2)
economic issues; 3) socio-cultural issues; and 4) political issues, to ascertain influences
that resulted in significantly different privacy data-protection policy and legislative
outcomes in the United States and the European Union.
Limitations, Research Questions, and Approach
My research efforts focus on the key individuals and organizations that initiated
and perpetuated the privacy movement and formed the privacy data-protection epistemic
community that has informed, influenced, and motivated the creation of privacy policy
and legislation in the United States and the European Union. I have chosen to limit my
investigation to the epistemic community approach to policy making because I believe it
represents the most compelling construct of the several popular current policy network
approaches, that include the advocacy coalition framework,14 the multiple stream
framework,15 and the transnational advocacy network.16 As described in Chapter Three,
the epistemic community approach has been employed to study decision-making and
policy formulation in disciplines ranging from the environment to public administration,
business, criminology, and banking. This study is the first to employ the epistemic
community approach using comparative case studies of privacy policy formulation and
legislation in the United States and the European Union.
4

Three Research Questions
1) Does a single privacy data-protection epistemic community exist?
This is important because the privacy data-protection community must exist
before I can show that it had influence on privacy policy and legislation. Six objective
criteria are identified in Chapter Three by which I will identify the existence of the
privacy data-protection epistemic community.
2) Did the privacy epistemic community influence privacy data protection in the
United States and the European Union?
Evidence from the case studies in Chapter Four and Chapter Five provide both
direct and indirect evidence of the influence of the privacy data-protection epistemic
community. This is important because over the past two decades epistemic communities
have been identified as playing important roles in educating, organizing, and motivating
action on a variety of other local, regional, and global problems. This study will extend
epistemic community influence to privacy policy and legislation, laying the groundwork
needed to answer the third research question.
3) Why did the influence of the same privacy data-protection epistemic community
result in dramatically different legislation in the United States (The Privacy Act of
1974) and the European Union (directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Personal
Data)?
If the influence of the same privacy-data-protection community produced
different results, then there are other forces at work influencing the policy and legislative
decision. Economic, socio-cultural, and political intervening variables are analyzed in to
5

determine their possible influence on privacy data-protection policy and legislative
decision in the United States and the European Union.
Key Concepts and Definitions
The following are key concepts that are central to this study need to be defined at
the outset before one can discuss the impact of the privacy data-protection epistemic
community on privacy policies and legislation in the United State and the European
Union.
Privacy: The rather broad, social construct, usually seen as a fundamental
human right, that is often characterized as: 1) the right “to be let alone;” 2) freedom from
unreasonable search, seizure, or intrusion; and, 3) as protection and control of personal
information. An expanded definition and discussion of the evolution of the concept of
privacy are found in Chapter Two.
Epistemic community: “. . . a network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area,”17 and having 1) a shared set of
normative and principled beliefs; 2) shared causal beliefs; 3) shared notions of validity;
and, 4) a common policy enterprise.18 Chapter Three provides a discussion of the
evolution of the history of the concept of the epistemic community, limitations of the
concept, and objective criteria by which the existence of an epistemic community can be
ascertained.
Privacy data-protection epistemic community: An epistemic community that
focuses on privacy and data-protection as its domain or issue-area. Addition of the
6

phrase “data-protection” identifies the primary threat, and therefore the primary focus, of
most privacy policy and legislation of past several decades. The phrase also
differentiates present policy and law from previous periods in U.S. law that historically
focused on privacy issues of family, body, or home, 19 or the privacy torts of intrusion,
public disclosure, false light, and appropriation.20

The Theoretical Model
Figure 1.1: The Epistemic Community, Intervening Variables, and Privacy
Policy/Law.
Intervening
Variables:
Economic
Issues
+
Socio-Cultural
Issues
+
Political
Issues
Independent
Variable:
The Privacy
Epistemic
Community

Dependent
Variable:
Privacy
Policy
&
Law
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The Epistemic Community as Independent Variable
The independent variable of the privacy epistemic community exerts influence to
inform, educate, and advise policy makers and legislators to mollify threats to the
dependent variable, privacy. Scholars suggest that the convergence of privacy policy and
law over the past half century has been a direct result of the continuing activities and
influence of the privacy data-protection epistemic community.21
Intervening Variables
The intervening variables in this study are the economic issues, socio-cultural
issues, and political issues. Comparative policy studies suggest that these intervening
variables, characterized as part of the “environment,” “external conditions,” or
“socioeconomic variables,” influence priorities, and thus possible choices for any specific
privacy problem, and therefore the privacy policy and law that are implemented to
resolve the privacy problem.22 This study focuses on the privacy-data protection
epistemic community, that network of national and transnational knowledge-based
technology and privacy experts with authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge
within the domains of technology and privacy. The privacy-data protection epistemic
community gives rise to public awareness of the problem and promotes constructive steps
through its ability to educate and influence policymakers and legislators in order to
contain, control, or limit the loss of privacy,23 but is subject to the environmental
constraints imposed by the intervening variables.24

8

Privacy as Dependent Variable
As will be discussed in Chapter Two, the concept of privacy arose in numerous
contexts, but not as a unique and stand-alone right until the past half-century. Privacy
was normally associated with personal liberty, freedom of association, or property rights
and reputation. Aristotle described human beings as “political animals” who needed both
public intercourse with other people and privacy for ourselves. He reasoned that the
concept of privacy was directly related to society because without the presence of others
in society, there would be no need for privacy.25 John Locke associated the concept of
privacy directly with property, considering that the right to property was based on natural
law. When added to the Constitution of the United States, the Fourth Amendment also
reflected the property aspect of privacy when it stated that: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.”26 The privacy of property was a rather narrowly
defined right based on English Common law and the experience of the Constitutional
Framers.
Scholars observe that the modern concept of privacy was “invented” by Boston
lawyers Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis as a result of their 1890 arguments for
privacy in the Harvard Law Review.27 Warren and Brandeis argued that the right to
privacy was separate and apart from the property rights to which privacy had been
associated under common law.28 Of interest to the study of the relationship of privacy
9

and technology is not only the substance of their legal logic and rationale, but also the
environment that produced the Warren and Brandeis article in the first place—the issue
of technology (the independent variable) and its effect on privacy (the dependent
variable). The proximate motivation to author “The Right to Privacy” mentioned in the
early pages of their essay was the fact that “instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that “what is whispered in the
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.”29 The Warrens, a prominent Boston
family, were favorite targets of the press gossip. The then recent inventions of the
telegraph, the telephone, inexpensive portable cameras (such as the Kodak “Box”
Camera), sound recording devices and even improved window glass all made the process
of acquiring and processing gossip much easier.30 Based in part on the groundbreaking
article by Warren and Brandeis, and stoked by a growing awareness that there was such a
thing as “privacy,” the period from 1890 to 1965 was one of continuous but erratic
development in the social and legal refinement of the new “right of privacy.”
The burst of technological innovation in computers, databases, and surveillance
that followed the Second World War created new threats to individual privacy that
galvanized privacy concerns across the nation and promoted the creation of the nascent
privacy data-protection epistemic community. The privacy data-protection epistemic
community originated with members of the technical computer and database services
industry supporting government and industry computers and databases in the late 1950s.

10

Study Overview
Chapter Two: The Concept of Privacy
To provide background for the two case studies, Chapter Two provides an
overview of the evolution of the concept of privacy from antiquity to the post-Civil War
era, when technological advances in newspapers, telegraph, telephone, and individual box
cameras brought changes in the concept of privacy that resulted in Warren and Brandeis
“inventing privacy law”31 through their essay The Right to Privacy.32 For more than a
half-century following Warren and Brandeis’ addition of a new privacy chapter to law,
the privacy concepts enunciated by Warren and Brandeis grew, expanded, and were
tested in courts across the United States. It was only after the explosion of technological
innovation in computers, databases, and surveillance that followed the Second World
War had created new threats to individual privacy, and galvanized privacy concerns
across the nation, that the nascent privacy data-protection epistemic community
coalesced to provide education, guidance, expert advice and policy options to the public
and policy-makers.
Chapter Three: The Epistemic Community
Chapter Three reviews antecedents of the epistemic community. This concept can
be found embedded in ideas that long predate the work of Peter Haas on epistemic
communities in the 1980s. For example, the idea of an invisible college, consisting of a
group of scientists with common motivation and purpose, was first introduced in the mid17th century in London, and is said to be the predecessor of the Royal Society.33 The idea
of the invisible college reappeared in the 1970s in Invisible Colleges: Diffusion of
11

Knowledge in Scientific Communities,34 and in 2008 in The New Invisible College:
Science for Development.35 The literature of the past two decades has produced
numerous journal articles either testing or commenting on the invisible college concept.
Another antecedent of the epistemic community can be found in the work of
Arthur Bentley, who in 1908 published the Process of Government: A Study in Social
Pressures.36 Bentley’s contention was that, “All politics and all government are the result
of the activities of groups.”37 In Bentley’s mind, the epistemic community, or knowledge
community of experts, would be just one of many groups vying for position and influence
in the political process. One might hope that the expert knowledge of the epistemic
community provides them an edge in the negotiation for their desired political solution,
but Bentley believed that all policies and legislation are the result of constantly
competing interests and the groups that represent them.
The role of “experts” in government policy making has been a popular theme ever
since the Second World War, when “experts” in many fields were credited with the
technical breakthroughs that provided the Allies the edge to win the war. In the early
1960s, Harvey Brooks identified government reliance on “experts” to solve the
increasingly complex and technical policy and operational problems that confronted
government. Brooks described the technical, (epistemic community) “experts” as taking
a larger and larger role in government.38
In the late 1960s, Thomas Kuhn popularized the term paradigm, as he described
the shared paradigms of scientists conducting “normal” science. In terms very close to
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those used by Peter Haas in describing the epistemic community, Kuhn described the
shared paradigm of normal science in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.39
The concept of the epistemic community as popularized by Peter Haas in the late
1980s was thus built on a broad basis of knowledge experts influencing government
policy and legislation that spans nearly a century. Over the past two decades numerous
other disciplines outside international relations have adopted the term epistemic
community including public administration, criminology, business, and banking in order
to explain the formation and influence of knowledge communities in corporate, public,
and government organizations. At the same time, journal articles have addressed the
formation of counter-epistemic communities as well as competing epistemic
communities, and identified limitations and problems with operationalizing Haas’
definition of the epistemic community.
Recognizing the inherent limitations of the subjective attributions that Haas
assigns to members of the epistemic community (such as shared normative and principled
beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shred notions of validity and intersubjective, internally
defined criteria),40 I identify six objective and observable criteria by which I will identify
the epistemic community in this study.
Chapter Four: United States Privacy Case Study
The United States Case Study focuses on the origin of the privacy epistemic
community in the late 1950s, its growth in the 1960s and 1970s, and its influence on the
U.S. Privacy Act of 1974. The origins of the privacy epistemic community can be traced
from early technical papers authored by the computer scientists who worked for large
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companies that provided mainframe computer and database services to the Federal
Government, the Department of Defense, and defense-related industries in the 1950s and
1960s. By the mid-1960s, the early privacy epistemic community members had begun to
transition from writing about problems of security to writing about problems of privacy,
and often wrote about both in the same paper. Most of these security-privacy papers
were authored for the frequent conferences that were conducted by the electroniccomputer technical societies. Societies such as the Association for Computing
Machinery (ACM), and others, sponsored several regional conferences each year at
which technical special interest groups conducted break-out sessions, several of which
focused on issues of data and information security, information privacy, and the impact
of computers on society.
By the mid-1960s, academics and lawyers had joined computer scientists in the
privacy epistemic community and were authoring popular books on the threat to privacy
posed by technology such as computers, data processing, and databanks. Proposals for a
National Data Center that would collect, store, and process data from all government
agencies drew attention from Congress, and privacy-data protection hearings were
initiated in 1965.
The congressional hearings provided a natural networking, educational, and
indoctrination venue for the privacy epistemic community from which dozens of key
privacy protection epistemic community members emerged over the next decade.
Several major privacy studies were conducted in the early 1970s, each of which was
directed by members of the privacy epistemic community. These studies produced
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recommendations that that were ultimately folded into the Privacy Act of 1974.
Heightened awareness by the American public and Congress of privacy threats following
the Watergate Scandal created a window of privacy policy opportunity into which the
Privacy Act legislation conveniently fell. Political concerns led to a negotiated
compromise in the creation of the Privacy Act such that it applied only to the federal
government and did not create a privacy oversight body. The privacy policy window of
opportunity had closed by the time that the privacy epistemic community was next able to
make substantive recommendation to Congress in 1977 regarding amendments of the
Privacy Act of 1974. Thus, the American people are left with narrow, sectoral, privacy
protection that applies only to federal agencies and not private sector organizations.
Chapter Five: The European Union Case Study
The European Union Case Study focuses on the origin of privacy awareness and
the growth of the privacy epistemic community that influenced privacy legislation, not
only in key national data-protection legislation, but also in the crafting of the European
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. Prominent European privacy data-protection
epistemic community members, including Spiros Simitis, Frits Hondius, and Hans Peter
Bull from Germany; Jan Freese from Sweden, and Paul Sieghart from the UK, addressed
privacy issues in Europe that were the same as those in the United States. Europeans
observed the congressional privacy hearings of the mid-to-late 1960s and became aware
of the threat posed to individual privacy by automatic data processing and databanks.
Key academics, lawyers, and bureaucrats from Europe joined the privacy data-protection
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epistemic community in publishing privacy literature, participating in conferences and
testifying in government hearings and meetings.
The Committees of Experts in the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) played important roles by creating
trans-Atlantic networking opportunities for members of the privacy data-protection
epistemic community. These committees drafted fair information practices/principles
resolutions, guidelines, and covenants, which shaped the privacy data-protection debates
in the U.S. and the EU.
Finally, the role of the privacy-data protection epistemic community is identified
in the five-year long process by which the European Union Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC was ultimately passed in 1995.
Chapter Six: Analysis and Conclusions
In Chapter Six I draw upon my criteria for identifying an epistemic community
and the evidence presented in the two case studies to respond to the three research
questions posed in Chapter One:
1) Does a single privacy data-protection epistemic community exist?
The six criteria identified in Chapter Three will be employed to identify the
privacy data-protection epistemic community.
2) Did the privacy epistemic community influence privacy data protection in the
United States and the European Union?
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Evidence from the case studies in Chapter Four and Chapter Five will be
presented to provide both direct and indirect indication of the influence of the
privacy data-protection epistemic community.
3) Why did the influence of the privacy data-protection epistemic community result
in dramatically different legislation in the United States (The Privacy Act of 1974)
and the European Union (directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Personal
Data)?
In answering the third research question, I analyze evidence for economic, sociocultural, and political intervening variables that may be responsible for differences in
privacy policy and legislation in the United States and the European Union in the context
of comparative policy studies and empirical evidence.
Chapter Summary
This first chapter has introduced key issues and described the purpose of the
study, identified the hypotheses and theoretical model, outlined the primary research
questions, and provided the framework for the remaining chapters. This study is meant to
break new ground in employing comparative case study analysis of the influence of the
privacy data-protection epistemic community on policy and legislation in the United
States and the European Union.
I will now proceed to Chapter Two with a review of the background of the
concept of privacy as a basis for introduction of the epistemic community approach in
Chapter Three.
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Chapter Two
The Concept of Privacy
I do not have even an every-day definition of “privacy,” or of the
“right of privacy.” Some may define “privacy” as the sum of all
“private rights.” Many, however, obviously contemplate a discrete
private right of privacy, though they may differ widely as to its
character and content. So we find innumerable references to the
“right to be let alone”; some contemplate a right to be alone, to be
free from unwanted intrusion, to be secreted and secretive; a right to
be unknown (“incognito”), free from unwanted information about
oneself in the hands of others, unwanted scrutiny, unwanted
“publicity”; a right of “intimacy” and a freedom to do intimate
things. Some offer another kind of definition, a right to be free from
physical, mental, or spiritual violation, a right to the “integrity” of
one’s “personality.” 1
Louis Henkin
Privacy and Autonomy (1974)
Over the past century, public awareness and concern for “privacy” have
dramatically increased---not only in the United States---but also across the
developed world. New privacy issues and topics have periodically emerged in
response to ever-new technological means of creating and distributing data and
information about individuals while the dimensions, role, and importance of
privacy have simultaneously evolved within the public consciousness.
The concept of “privacy” is not a new, or even a relatively recent, phenomena.
Privacy has been an inherent human concern that has been valued for thousands of years.
Yet while the concept of privacy has deep historical roots, personal physical and
psychological privacy expectations and attributes have varied widely across societies and
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cultures. In the past century and one-half, the concept of privacy has expanded
dramatically in the United States as the result of several simultaneous movements:
1) technological innovation that has permitted intrusion, collection, maintenance and
integration of ever smaller pieces of more disparate data on the activities and
characteristics of individual citizens; 2) the growing awareness of the concept of privacy
as a fundamental individual right; and, 3) the legal privacy response in courts and
legislatures which have had the effect of structuring, expanding and explicating the right
of individual privacy.
As the quotation by Louis Henkin at the beginning of this chapter reflects, even
today a concise definition of “privacy” has proven remarkably elusive. This is because
the concept of privacy has had no common definition, no agreed upon parameters, and
the many facets of privacy are deeply embedded in temporal, social, and cultural
contexts. At some times, and in some cultures, privacy has even been viewed as an
antisocial characteristic and a negative value because it conflicted with the public values
and cohesiveness of society.2 The very concept of privacy has varied over time and
across cultures and has grown to reflect an evolving variety of new perceived threats and
incursions into the “privacy” of the individual over the past century. Up until the end of
the nineteenth century, privacy was primarily a physical concept having to do with
intimacy, concealment of the person and possessions, or the retreat of the individual
relative to the outside, or public dimension. Within the past century, the concept of
privacy has flourished and blossomed to encompass not only the physical domain, but
also the unseen psychological and information-data domains.
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This chapter provides an overview of the origins of the concept of privacy and the
evolution of the concept of privacy in the United States in order to provide the basis for
further discussion of the role of the privacy epistemic community in influencing privacy
legislation in the last half of the twentieth century. It will trace the evolution of the
concept of privacy in the United States over the past two centuries as privacy has grown
from a loose common-law concept, to a constitutional property-based concept, and finally
to a constitutionally derived right of the individual.
Antecedents of American Privacy Concepts
American concepts of privacy have been influenced and informed by religious
tradition and historical experience of more than two thousand years. Perhaps the earliest
documentation of the concern for privacy comes from Hebrew history found in the
Pentateuch, part of the Torah, which later became the foundation of the Old Testament in
the Christian Bible. In the Book of Genesis are several stories that exhibit awareness and
concern for privacy in the earliest of times. The first recounting of concern for privacy
occurs when Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit and “Then the eyes of both of them
were opened, and they realized they were naked; so they sewed fig leaves together and
made coverings for themselves.”3 This earliest awareness of the need for physical or
body privacy was reinforced shortly thereafter, when, in recognition of their need for
personal privacy, “The Lord God made garments of skin for Adam and his wife and
clothed them.”4 Similarly, later in the Book of Genesis, privacy of the person was again
the subject in the story of Noah’s nakedness and the response of his sons:
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When (Noah) drank some of the wine, he became drunk and lay
uncovered inside his tent. Ham, the father of Canaan, saw his
father’s nakedness and told his two brothers outside. And Shem
and Japheth took a garment and laid it across their shoulders; then
they walked in backward and covered their father’s nakedness.
Their faces were turned the other way so that they would not see
their father’s nakedness.5
With these several examples of the concern for physical or body privacy coming
so early in the Old Testament, one would expect that the ancient Hebrews would have
been highly sensitive to privacy issues, however, as with many biblical sources, the
scholar finds conflicting evidence of the concept of privacy in the Old Testament. In his
study of Privacy, Barrington Moore describes a distinct lack of the concept of individual
privacy, or even a clear conflict between the “public” and the “private,” in early Hebrew
history.6 Because the central character of early Judaism as both religion and social
organizing authority is the single, monolithic Yahweh, from whom no secrets can be hid,
Moore finds “the very notion of an area of social and individual life marked off as private
and immune to divine interference would be an impossible absurdity . . . .”7 By the time
of Moses, Yahweh had become exclusive to the Hebrews and intolerant of all deviation
from his commandments within the Hebrew population. The Hebrew people became the
agents of Yahweh in punishing errant attitudes and activities within their families and
their tribes. Prophets such as Isaiah and Jeremiah spoke in the name of Yahweh and
admonished the people to have no secrets because privacy from God could only serve
evil purposes. Thus, “Secrecy from God was equated with wickedness,”8 and as Isaiah
said, “Woe to those who hide deep from the Lord their counsel, whose deeds are in the
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dark, and who say ‘Who sees us? Who knows us?’”9 The closeness of the family, the
tribe, and the overarching religious community created an environment without
discernable privacy. Moore says of the relationship between private and public in ancient
Hebrew society:
“It was public in the sense of constituting a system of shared ritual
and doctrine, and as the external source of morality and social
obligation. As such, it confronted the individual in all the
decisions of daily life. It was also a public from whom no secrets
were hid and which left little or no autonomous area for private
existence.”10
Thus, for the ancient Hebrews there was little if any distinction between private
and public, for what the modern world would consider to be in the “private” realm was an
integral part of Hebrew law and society tightly bound by strict religious norms.11 Moore
does note that the Tenth Commandment, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house; you
shall not covet your neighbor’s wife, or male or female slave, or ox, or donkey, or
anything that belongs to your neighbor,”12 established a de facto right of private property
which was invoked by prophets such as Nathan and Elijah against the authority of the
kings to have subjects killed and take their property.13 However, this limitation on the
taking of private property by the kings was exceptional because it was communicated
directly to the kings by the Lord through the prophets, and did not establish a privacy
precedent for all of Jewish society beyond the coveting property prohibition found in the
commandments.14
In the world of the 5th century BCE Greeks, the concept of individual privacy
received mixed reviews. For Plato, the ideal society had no need for privacy, and this
was reflected in Plato’s major political treatises. In the model society Plato described in
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The Republic, the private sphere would be subordinated in the common community of
wives, children, and education. Likewise, for the soldiers who would be housed in
common facilities that “have nothing private for anybody but are common for all.”15
Barrington Moore observed that although ancient Athens Greece acknowledged
the public and the private domain, “Privacy cannot be the dominant value in any society.
Man has to live in society, and social concerns have to take precedence.” Moore notes
that “the words employed for private convey(ed) some hint of the antisocial in their
meaning.”16 The esteem with which public life was held in Greece leads to the
observation that: “In ancient Athens . . . private life was generally seen as a
manifestation of antisocial behavior, although . . . (the) culture recognized the private as
well as the public realm.”17
Perhaps the most important influence on the American concept of privacy came
from the English philosopher John Locke (1632-1704). To John Locke, “ . . . privacy
was one of the presocietal or “natural rights” which was preserved when individuals, by
social contract, agreed to form a society. Furthermore, when society, by a second social
contract, agreed to form a government, privacy was one of the rights the government was
expected to preserve and protect.”18 However, Locke recognized the tension between the
private and the public of the individual and believed that: “The person is the source of
privacy, but the person is also a public figure, a social being.”19 Thus, Locke recognized
the same tension between the public and the private that was displayed in early Hebrew
and Greek thought.
Westin credits the philosophy of John Locke with guiding the crafting of the
Constitution of the United States and the establishment of a republican form of
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government with specified individual rights that produced enumerated freedoms and
inherent privacy for the individual. There were three critical dimensions of Locke’s
political thought that informed the founding fathers---individualism, limited government,
and private property:
First was the concept of individualism, with its component ideas
of the worth of each person, private religious judgment, private
economic motives, and direct legal rights for individuals. Second
was the principle of limited government, with it corollaries of
legal restraints on executive authority, the rule of law, and the
moral primacy of the private over the public sphere of society.
Third was the central importance of private property and its
linkage with the individual’s exercise of liberty; to protect these
twin values, property owners required broad immunities from
intrusion onto their premises and from interference with their use
of personal possessions.20
These three assumptions laid the philosophical basis for creating a society that
freed “citizens from the unlimited surveillance and control that had been exercised over
“subjects” by the kings, lords, churches, guilds, and municipalities of European
society.”21 The influence of John Locke on privacy, however, would not be fully felt
until the creation of the Constitution and the founding of the United States as a nation in
the late eighteenth century. For the two centuries spanning the late sixteenth century to
the late eighteenth century American colonists held a more restricted or limited concept
of privacy.
Colonial Era Privacy
The rudimentary concept of privacy, that is, the separation of the individual from
society, was understood through tradition and custom in the early American colonies, and
privacy was expected and generally observed in daily activities. When privacy was
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violated, measures were usually immediately taken to redress and punish its breach at the
local or community level.22 Recourse to formal law was rarely invoked for violations of
privacy, in part because privacy law was rather thin---if it existed at all---but more
importantly because the formal mechanisms of the law were generally not available in the
early colonies.
The concept of privacy in the early American colonies is illustrated by one of the
earliest documented cases of what we would today consider an “invasion of privacy.” In
1624, when Plimoth Plantation was only four years old, Governor William Bradford
suspected two relative newcomers to the colony (Lyford and Oldham) of undermining his
leadership and the future welfare of the Plimoth Plantation. Bradford intercepted
numerous incriminating letters written by Lyford and Oldham and addressed to friends in
England on board the ship Charity just before the ship sailed. “So the Governor called a
court and summoned the whole company to appear. And then charged Lyford and
Oldham with such things as they were guilty of; but they were stiff and stood resolutely
upon the denial of most things, and required proof.”23 Then Governor Bradford had
several of the intercepted letters of Lyford and Oldham read to the assembled court.
While Lyford was mute following the reading, “Oldham began to rage furiously because
they had intercepted and opened his letters, threatening them in very high language . . .”24
Following Oldham’s outburst, Governor Bradford turned to Lyford and “asked him if he
thought they had done evil to open his letters; but he was silent , and would not say a
word . . . “25 Lyford’s lack of response when asked about the “evil” of reading of his
letters is explained by colonial historian Thomas O’Connor who says that:
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At least one of the reasons why the defendants could say nothing
was that the concept of privacy as a legal entity in the seventeenth
century simply did not exist---either for the administration of
justice or for the defendant who found himself before the bench.
The concept was not to be found either in English common law or
in the Biblical law of the Puritans---nor in the curious mixture of
both traditions, which became common during the colonial period
in Massachusetts.26
The society, environment, and technology of the colonies made privacy
expectations significantly different than in later centuries. For most colonists, a small,
simple house and a large family made for limited psychological and physical privacy of
the individual within the dwelling. For the average family, “Crowded and noisy living
conditions and poverty, which subordinate privacy to basic family needs, forced
readjustments in the balance of privacy that individual colonists sought.”27 Having a
refuge of privacy in one’s own room or place of escape was for the relatively few wealthy
colonists. Settlements were densely built to provide security in the wilderness of the
New World with the result that the density of homes within the community allowed for
only limited privacy among families. Flaherty points out that: “The colonial concept of
privacy, like so many rights and privileges, was essentially a negative one. The colonists
expected to be left alone in their homes and families.”28 Even within their homes and
with their families,
Privacy was a luxury undreamed of in that day, and you had little of
it. From childbirth to deathbed one’s life was shockingly open to
one’s family, friends, relatives, neighbors, enemies, clergymen, and
the curious. It was not a matter of social position. At Buckingham,
the young King of England, George III, had little more privacy than
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a Boston artisan. Nor Louis XV at Versailles. They seemed to
have had no more conception of privacy as a desirable thing than
they had of electricity, and did not miss either.29
The lack of concern over privacy, qua privacy, in the seventeenth century
colonies has been echoed by other scholars who note that the concept of privacy was not
found in English common law of the time, was not found in the Biblical law of the
Puritans, or even in the founding documents of the United States except for what passed
as personal property protection in the Fourth Amendment. If the concept of privacy
existed at all it was simply accepted as a “given” because the homogeneity and rural
nature of American society offered little opportunity for invasions of privacy.30
Privacy was, however, always available within an environment consisting of great
stretches of fields surrounding towns and wilderness between settlements---providing
nearly unlimited individual privacy in great open spaces.31 An individual could easily
step away from the community and find both physical and psychological privacy in the
vast solitude of forests and fields. Thus, the balance of individual privacy for many
colonists was often achieved outside the home and away from the family and community.
Unlike centuries later, the limited technology of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries meant that seeing, hearing, and saying were the key privacy issues for most
colonists. The spy (or peeper), the eavesdropper, and the gossip were the central threats
to privacy. Spying or peeping constituted intrusion by voyeurism; eavesdropping
(literally standing under the eaves of the house in order to listen) constituted interception
of the spoken word; and gossip constituted divulging that was heard to others.32 Because
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opportunities to be seen and heard varied greatly within the community, individual
privacy could only be ensured by acting or speaking beyond the sight or ear-shout of
others.
The written letter and the printed book or pamphlet were rare, cherished, and
closely guarded by the owner.33 This level of security and privacy was in direct contrast
with conditions regarding the transport and delivery of mail and parcels. Because there
was no regular postal service in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when
letters and parcels were sent, they were usually carried by friends, itinerant peddlers,
ships captains, or people hired for the specific purpose of delivering items.34 The security
and privacy of letters and parcels was always in question. The sending, transport, and
delivery of mail was often haphazard for there were no generally accepted rules regarding
the mails until the early eighteenth century. The Post Office Act of 1710, enacted in the
Reign of Queen Anne, finally sought to ensure the security, privacy, and timeliness of the
mails by declaring that: “No person or Persons shall presume wittingly, willingly, or
knowingly, to open detain, or delay, or cause, procure, permit, or suffer to be opened,
detained or delayed, any Letter or Letters, Packet or Packets.”35 Under the leadership of
Benjamin Franklin, who was Postmaster-General from 1753 to the Revolution, security
and privacy of the American mail became a central issue. All persons who worked in the
post office or had anything to do with the receipt, transport, or delivery of the mail were
required to take the “Oath required by the Act of the Ninth of Queen Anne” which bound
the individual to the Act of 1710. The only exception to this oath was a Warrant in
Writing signed by a Secretary of State, under which the mails could be opened and
inspected.36
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When privacy was violated, the offense was usually dealt with at the scene, or the
community employed sanctions and public chastisement to punish the offender.37 Only
rarely were legal measures invoked in cases involving privacy, “for privacy as a part of
English common law did not exist in the seventeenth century. Neither was the concept to
be found in the Biblical law of the Puritans, nor in the mixture of both traditions that was
prevalent in colonial Massachusetts.”38 Recourse to the law for issues of privacy were
based on extensions of property rights that individuals have in themselves such as
intrusion and material wrongs, such as damage to reputation (property).
In additional to the lack of privacy-specific law, the vagaries of formal common
law in the colonies made the law and the expected outcome questionable:
The conditions of settlement and of development within each colony
meant that each evolved its own individual legal system, just as each
evolved its individual social and political system. Geographical
isolation, the date and character of the several settlements, the
degree of absence of outside supervision or control---all had their
effect in ultimately developing thirteen different legal systems.39
The law of each colony was thus unique to that colony, and generally consisted of
an agglomeration of three sources: 1) remembered elements of English law; 2) law based
on special problems and issues that the settlers came upon in their new home, and which
were not part of their previous law experience; and 3) the ideological aspect of law based
on who they were—for example the Puritans who were guided by a strict set of religious
beliefs that influenced their law.40 The vagaries of law among the 13 colonies thus
ensured differences in the observation and enforcement of privacy infractions at law. But
“(b)ecause privacy was not seriously threatened, it was taken for granted---recognized
and revered by custom and circumstances.”41
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Pamphlets, and later newspapers, found only in the few largest communities in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, did not generally intrude upon the privacy of
colonists until well after the founding of the nation because: “Until the 1830s, a
newspaper provided a service to political parties and men of commerce . . . . ”42 It was
only in the 1830s, when papers expanded in numbers, content, readers, and competition
that a revolution in newspapers took place. “That revolution led to the triumph of “news”
over the editorial and “facts” over opinion, a change which was shaped by the expansion
of democracy and the market . . . .”43 That change generated great changes in the concept
of privacy in the United States.
Privacy at the Founding of the Nation
Although the word “privacy” is not found in any “founding documents” of the
United States, protections for property, and thus for some dimension of privacy of the
individual, were incorporated as an afterthought to the constitution. In fact, many of the
issues surrounding privacy that were experienced in the American Colonies under British
rule prior to the Revolution were addressed in the Bill of Rights in 1791. Over the past
century legal scholars have argued that numerous “privacy” protections are embedded or
implied in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.44
Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances. 45
Amendment III
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.46
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Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Amendment IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.47
Today, it is generally acknowledged that privacy was implied in these several
amendments to the Constitution. But in the nineteenth century courts routinely found that
the Fourth Amendment with its guarantee of “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” was the
only constitutionally guaranteed privacy for the individual. Recognition of implied
privacy rights inherent in amendments beyond the Fourth Amendment were identified
and developed only in the late twentieth century by privacy scholars. With the exception
of the Fourth Amendment, there is no indication that these amendments were ever
thought to grant any specific right of “privacy” outside the context of “property” to
individual citizens prior to the Warren and Brandeis “creation” of the right of privacy in
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1890. In fact, as one legal scholar observed, “The Constitution does not confer private
rights; they are antecedent to and independent of the Constitution. The Constitution does
not even command that government grant, promote or extend private rights; it only places
limits on the infringement of private rights by government, both the rights specified and
all others “retained by the people”.”48
The Concept of Privacy in the 19th Century
Following the founding of the United States, privacy remained a vague concept
for citizens of the new United States---an extension of colonial privacy concepts based on
custom and common law property rights such as trespass or intrusion---and not associated
with a distinct legal doctrine. The Constitution of the United States had been modified in
1791 to add ten amendments called the Bill of Rights.49 As noted previously, one of
these, the Fourth Amendment, did explicitly guarantee “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures,”50 but there was no explicit right of privacy that legal scholars could draw upon.
It’s true that scholars could point to the influence of John Lock and the implicit privacy
nuances incorporated in the First Amendment, protecting the privacy of not having to
speak, the privacy of opinion, the privacy inherent in freedom of association, and the
privacy right of anonymous or pseudonymous expression. The Third Amendment
guaranteed the privacy of the home from troops being quartered without the
homeowner’s consent during peacetime but quartering of troops in private homes ceased
to be an issue in the new United States. The Fourth Amendment explicitly guaranteed
security, and implicitly privacy, against unwarranted searches and seizures of “persons,
houses, papers, and effects,” which were effectively the technology of the era. The Fifth
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Amendment carried the implied privacy right inherent in the privilege against selfincrimination. Between the establishment of the nation and the Civil War one noted
privacy scholar, Alan Westin, wrote that American society: “had a thorough and
effective set of rules with which to protect individual and group privacy from the means
of compulsory disclosure and physical surveillance known in that era.”51 Working within
the construct of the Fourth Amendment, cases with privacy implications did occasionally
appear on court dockets, and the dimensions of the property-related right of privacy were
occasionally explored by the judiciary. The technology of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries essentially limited privacy issues to the written word, direct speech,
and direct sight. The only means for physical surveillance was by use of the eyes and the
ears, the only means of extracting information from the mind was by use of torture, and
there was little documentation or record keeping about individuals.
Additionally, in the decades following the founding of the United States, the
population was relatively sparsely distributed across the nation’s land, and the same
factors of wilderness and open space that provided individual privacy for the early
American colonists continued to provide a great degree of privacy for the population into
the early nineteenth century. The expansion of the western frontier echoed in Greeley’s
advice to “Go west, young man, and grow up with the country,” was as much an
admonition to distribute the population and ensure privacy as for economic reasons of
exploiting the new wilderness of the west.52 O’Connor notes that the “element of
distance” was an important factor in securing privacy on the American frontier saying
that: “privacy in early America was in many ways much more of a geographical fact than
a constitutional theory.”53 In the early nineteenth century America was a rural, agrarian,
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nation with its population sparsely distributed on homesteads, farms, and many small
towns, but the dynamics of immigration and large families quickly changed population
numbers and concentrations.
At the time George Washington became President there were
just under 4 million inhabitants in the country. By 1810 this
population had grown steadily to 7 million. But between 1810
and 1850, the American population leaped to 23 million---a
three-fold increase of the entire population in only 40 years; and
by the turn of the century the population had risen to 76 million--more than tripling the population once again!54
These dramatic increases in population decreased the physical distances between
and among them and impinged upon their privacy, even on the frontiers. Other factors
were also at work that influenced privacy perceptions. As the population of the United
States increased in the nineteenth century, the concentrations of population changed too.
The rise of industry and manufacturing, improvements in agriculture, and the creation of
improved road, rail, and water infrastructure conspired to initiate the transition from a
rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrial society in the United States. The
urbanization of the country is illustrated by recognizing that:
Even as late as 1820 there were only 13 communities in the
United States which could boast of more than 8,000 inhabitants;
but the widespread appearance of manufacturing, the building of
roads, and the advent of the railroad brought about such a rapid
growth in large cities that by 1860 there were over 140 urban
communities in the nation, and by 1900 the figure had risen to
547---with one out of every three Americans already living in
crowded urban conditions.55
A concept of privacy based on a sparse population, widely distributed in small
rural, agrarian settlements in the early nineteen century slowly evolved and produced a
cognitive dissonance of privacy perception within society that reached its height in the
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last decades of the century. Wilderness and geographical separation, constitutional
protections, and statutory laws worked well to protect the privacy of citizens into the first
half of the nineteenth century. However that rapidly changed as population, technology,
urbanization and concomitant social changes conspired to create new threats to individual
privacy. As O’Connor observed:
Even at the very moment when individual liberties and the
undefined by substantially real sense of personal privacy seems
to have reached an historical climax, the physical and
philosophical conditions which created such a climate of opinion
were already swiftly disappearing. From the middle of the
nineteenth century on, the entire political, social, economic, and
cultural structure of the United States underwent a complete and
significant change.56
The first major change in the landscape of privacy in the early nineteenth century
was brought about by the growth and popularity of newspapers. The decade of the 1830s
is generally identified as when the revolution in American journalism began. In that
decade the American newspapers transformed themselves from small, expensive,
commercial and political party papers that were read by only business and political elites,
to larger distribution “penny press” papers that sought out not only commercial and
political information to print, but also local and social news that appealed to an
increasingly varied middle-class urban population.57
Technological developments were also important to the increasing number, reach,
and circulation of the penny press newspapers. The first of many advances in printing
took place in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Wood hand presses were
replaced with iron presses that were easier to operate and produced higher quality
impressions.58 In 1814, the steam powered cylinder press was introduced, which
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produced about ten times the imprints per hour as the hand operated pressed. By midcentury the double cylinder “Hoe Type Revolving Machine” had revolutionized the
speed, output, and cost of printing, making it possible to sell newspapers cheaply.59
Breakthroughs in the production of paper and improvements in railroad and canal
transportation also facilitated the expansion and reach of newspapers in the first half of
the nineteenth century.
For the first time, the new penny press newspapers sought out “news” as the
mainstay of their appeal to their readers. They hired reporters who reported on local
events even though “The institution of paid reporters was not only novel but, to some,
shocking.” 60 The penny press actively sought out “news,” and often actively
compromised the privacy of those about whom they wrote, and in so doing, “ . . .ushered
in a shared social universe in which “public” and “private” would be redefined.”61
By the middle of the nineteenth century new technologies augmented the newspaper
ability to capture, publish, and distribute information. The entire landscape of privacy
changed once again with the invention of new technologies such as long-distance
telegraph and telephone communications,62 fast, portable Kodak photography,63 faster
high-quality newspaper printing,64 and sound-voice recording capability.65 These new
technologies suddenly exposed individuals to numerous new threats to their privacy
because of the ability to intercept, “capture,” and preserve the spoken word and the exact
photographic image of a person or event, and then print them in a relatively permanent
form and widely distribute them to distant places in the newspaper. One legal scholar
noted that the concept of privacy in modern law is directly linked to the technology of
printing, saying, “Privacy, like copyright and obscenity, had no direct legal ancestor in
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the preprint era. As a legal concept, privacy is something new, a field of law whose
origin is linked to printing, although the relationship is more complex . . . .”66 Because
there was no clear legal doctrine that addressed the publication of personal information
by media empowered by First Amendment “freedom of the press,” there was little to
restrain newspapers from printing all “news,” whether fit to print or not.67
Growth of Concern Over Newspapers and Privacy
Concern for the proliferation of newspapers and changes in their news focus
alarmed many social observers because of the advent of new issues of invasion of privacy
by the press. One of the first to recognize the threat posed by the rise of the penny press
newspapers was the author James Fenimore Cooper. Cooper had left the United States to
write in Europe for seven years (1826-1833). When he returned to the United States, he
was struck by the changes in American journalism that had occurred during his absence.
Cooper attacked the new penny press newspapers for creating a “press-ocracy” by
seeking their own ends and not those of the community. He vilified the press in books
such as Homeward Bound (1838), Home as Found (1838), and The American Democrat
(1838).68 In The American Democrat Cooper wrote:
If newspapers are useful in overthrowing tyrants, it is only to
establish a tyranny of their own. The press tyrannizes over
publick men, letters, the arts, the stage, and even over private
life. Under the pretence of protecting publick morals, it is
corrupting them to the core, and under the semblance of
maintaining liberty, it is gradually establishing a despotism as
ruthless, as grasping, and one that is quite as vulgar as that of
any Christian state known. With loud professions of freedom of
opinion, there is no tolerance; with a parade of patriotism, no
sacrifice of interests; and with fulsome panegyrics on property,
too frequently, no decency.69
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Cooper was one of the first to identify the threat that new newspaper business
ethics posed to individuals and to society. Although press tyranny over “private life” was
listed as one of several domains into which newspapers intruded, Cooper was responding
more generally to the new power of the penny press and the influence it wielded in
society. “The new journals reflected political, social, and technological changes that a
thoughtful man might well have been alarmed about.”70
The issue of individual privacy attracted the attention of Judge Thomas McIntyre
Cooley on the Michigan Supreme Court, who wrote in his Treatise on Constitutional
Limitations in 1868 that: “It is sometimes better that crime should go unpunished than
that the citizen should be liable to have his premises invaded, his desks broken open, his
private books, letters, and papers exposed to prying curiosity, and to the misconstructions
of ignorant and suspicious persons.”71 Later, in his Treatise on the Law of Torts (1888)
Judge Cooley insisted that: “The right to one’s person may be said to be a right of
complete immunity: to be let alone.”72 Cooley’s phrase was subsequently made immortal
in the privacy literature by Warren and Brandeis in The Right to Privacy when they
characterized their concept of privacy as the right “to be let alone.”73
The journalist, editor, and founder of The Nation, E. L. Godkin, was particularly
sensitive to the issue of individual privacy and authored an article entitled The Rights of
the Citizen. IV. To His Own Reputation in the July 1890 issue of Scribner’s Magazine.74
Just five months before Warren and Brandeis published The Right to Privacy Godkin
provided his readers a summary of the threats posed by the press to the privacy of
individuals. Godkin declared that, “Privacy is a distinctly modern product, one of the
luxuries of civilization, which is not only unsought but unknown in primitive or
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barbarous societies.”75 Although the awareness and need for privacy varied among
individuals, it was integral to personal dignity, and had to be protected. Godkin
suggested that: “The chief enemy of privacy in modern life is that interest in other people
and their affairs known as curiosity, which in the days before newspapers created
personal gossip.”76 The worst thing about gossip published in newspapers was that what
would have been between neighbors in the past was now broadcast to the world. As
Godkin characterized it:
In other words, gossip about private individual is now printed,
and makes its victim, with all his imperfections on his head,
known hundreds or thousands of miles away from his place of
abode; and what is worst of all, brings to his knowledge exactly
what is said about him, with all its details. It thus inflicts what
is, to many men, the great pain of believing that everybody he
meets in the street is perfectly familiar with some folly, or
misfortune, or indiscretion, or weakness, which he had
previously supposed had never got beyond his domestic circle.77
Godkin did not believe that the law could protect the individual against invasion
of privacy and suggested that the only remedy was “ . . . to be found in attaching social
discredit to invasions of (privacy) on the part of conductors of the press.”78 He
immediately realized, however, that such discredit would often be nullified by the fact
that newspapers often greatly profit from invasions of privacy. When Godkin
summarized the threats to privacy in July 1890 he could not have know that only five
months later Warren and Brandeis would publish The Right to Privacy, citing Godkin’s
Scribner’s Magazine article, and suggesting legal remedies to just the invasions of
privacy of which Godkin wrote.
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The Concept of Privacy From 1890 to 1965
The first major turning point in the development of the concept of privacy took
place following the publication of an article in the Harvard Law Review entitled The
Right to Privacy in 1890.79 Two Boston law partners, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, both recent graduates of Harvard Law School, authored what various legal
scholars have called “the most influential law review article of all,”80 an unquestioned
“classic,”81 and an “outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals upon the
American law.”82 Warren and Brandeis are credited with “inventing” the right to
privacy83 by authoring “a pearl of common-law reasoning” in an essay “that singlehandedly created a tort.”84 The long-term impact of The Right to Privacy on the
evolution of privacy theory and jurisprudence would be hard to overestimate. Within two
decades of its publication, an article in the American Law Review called it “one of the
most brilliant excursions in the field of theoretical jurisprudence which the recent
literature of the law discloses.”85 Shortly thereafter, the Columbia Law Review noted that
The Right to Privacy “enjoys the unique distinction of having initiated and theoretically
outlined a new field of jurisprudence.”86
The invention of the right to privacy, initiation of a new field of jurisprudence,
and creation of a new tort was based on Warren and Brandeis’ extension of previous
privacy rights, based on property law, to encompass the damage to the individual’s
feelings, personality and private life based on intrusion and exposure of personal
information. Warren and Brandeis cited Godkin’s then recent article on privacy, and
borrowed Judge Cooley’s now famous definition of privacy as the right “to be let
alone.”87
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Warren and Brandeis elegantly articulated an argument that had been nascent in
American society for several decades---that the privacy of the individual was being
compromised by new technologies and innovations---and Warren and Brandeis suggested
that a solution rested with a new law of privacy. Many legal scholars have suggested that
the proximate cause of Warren and Brandeis’ concern over privacy was the result of
intrusions into the Samuel Warren’s personal life by Boston newspapers, because Warren
and Brandeis wrote that:
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the
idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued
with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of
the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion
upon the domestic circle.88
While the proximate subject of Warren and Brandeis’ treatise was the newspapers
that intruded upon, or invaded the privacy of prominent citizens such as Samuel Warren,
they acknowledged that the culprits that allowed the newspapers this invasion of privacy
were really the underlying and enabling technologies that had been created in the second
half of the nineteenth century. Warren and Brandeis openly identified these technologies
and then blended them with the act of newspaper reporting, in The Right to Privacy when
they said that: “Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten
to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops.’”89 Thus, Warren and Brandeis responded to the results of the
employment of these recent technologies by newspapers---the publication of alleged
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personal information in the form of “gossip” for the “prurient tastes” of newspaper
readers---and outlined a new facet of privacy law that would rest on injury to the feelings
and injury to one’s “inviolate personality,”90 suggesting that there is “a general right to
privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations, (and) these should receive the same
protection (at law), whether expressed or in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in
attitudes, or in facial expression.”91
The new legal right of privacy advanced by Warren and Brandeis in The Right to
Privacy did not meet with universal accolades. Some argued from a practical standpoint
that the right of privacy did not exist as a specific legal right, and that the arguments in
favor of a right of privacy were based on a misunderstanding of the authorities that
Warren and Brandeis had cited. They believed that inconvenience or injury that persons
might suffer connected with the enjoyment of possession of property was the only basis
for redress, and that there was no equity concern for the feelings of the individual or with
considerations of moral fitness as expressed by Warren and Brandeis.92
The privacy discussion initiated by Warren and Brandeis began almost
immediately in the courts and then entered the law journals as the privacy theory debate
quickened. One of the first significant challenges to the Warren and Brandeis new right
to privacy came in 1902 from the Court of Appeals of New York in the case of Roberson
v. Rochester Folding Box Co.93 Without the consent of the plaintiff, the defendant used a
picture of the young girl to advertise their flour with the tag-line “The Flour of the
Family.” In a three-to-four decision the court declared that a right to privacy in this case
did not exist, thus rejecting the privacy arguments of Warren and Brandeis. The court
based its decision on “the lack of precedent, the purely mental character of the injury, the
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“vast amount of litigation” that might be expected to ensue, the difficulty of drawing a
line between public and private figures, and the fear of undue restriction of the freedom
of the press.”94 Following the Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. decision the storm
of negative public reaction motivated one of the concurring judges, Judge Denis O’Brien,
to take the unusual step of defending the court’s decision by publishing a law review
article in the Columbia Law Review.95 O’Brien concluded his defense of the court’s
decision by noting New York did not have a positive law that applied to the unauthorized
use of Roberson’s picture. In response to the public clamor regarding the Roberson
decision, the New York Legislature enacted the nation’s first statutory right to privacy.96
Just three years later, in 1905, a similar case was considered by the Supreme
Court of Georgia in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.97 The defendant
employed not only the plaintiff’s picture but also a specious testimonial, allegedly from
the defendant, in praise of the New England Life Insurance Company. Even though
Paolo Pavesich was a well-known artist, and a public figure, the court said that, “It is not
necessary to hold that the mere fact that a man has become what is called a public
character, either by aspiring to a public office, or by exercising a profession which places
him before the public, gives to every one the right to print and circulate his picture.”98 In
a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the Roberson case,
endorsed the views of Warren and Brandeis, recognized the existence of a right of
privacy, and established a precedent case in support of the recognition of expanded
privacy rights. “For the next thirty years there was a continued dispute as to whether the
right of privacy existed at all, as the courts elected to follow the Roberson or the Pavesich
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case. Along in the thirties, with the benediction of the Restatement of Torts,99 the tide set
in strongly in favor of recognition, and the rejecting decisions began to be overruled.”100
The next milestone in the dispute over whether a right to privacy existed, and in
what form, came in 1928 in the case of Olmstead v. United States.101 Olmstead is
considered to be a pivotal privacy case of the early twentieth century not only because the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the idea that privacy was a separate constitutional right that
was protected by the “unreasonable search and seizure” clause of the Fourth Amendment,
but because of the elegant dissenting arguments made by Associate Justice Louis
Brandeis. Roy Olmstead, and more than 50 others were convicted of violating the
National Prohibition Act, challenged his conviction claiming that the evidence of
wiretapped private telephone conversations was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.102
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the court, reasoned that privacy protection of the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to telegraphic and telephonic messages as it did to
sealed letters in the mail. Taft reasoned that there was no searching or seizing and no
entry into personal or private places to secure evidence. The evidence had been obtained
in public places that were not part of petitioner’s houses or offices, and were therefore not
protected under the Fourth Amendment.103
Associate Justice Louis Brandeis authored an elegant dissenting opinion to the
majority (5-4) in which he argued that technological advances had made it possible for
the government to invade privacy in more ways, and by more subtle means, than the
limited physical search and seizure activities imagined by the authors of the Fourth
Amendment. Additionally, the use of transcribed telephone conversations without the
speaker’s consent violated the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Just as
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the mail was a public service provided under the authority of the government, the
telephone was also a public service provided under the authority of government.
Brandeis therefore reasoned that there was no difference between a private telephone
conversation and a sealed letter in the mails. “The evil incident to invasion of the privacy
of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails,” Brandeis
declared.104 The Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections are broad in scope and the
framers:
“ . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone — the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding,
of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a
violation of the Fifth.105
Brandeis thus laid the philosophical groundwork for an understanding of
constitutional privacy that was in keeping with the rapidly advancing technology of the
twentieth century and presaged the expansion of the Fourth Amendment privacy law to
include wiretapping that would occur nearly four decades later in Katz v. United States
(1967).
In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed the Olmstead v. United States (1928)
decision in Katz v. United States. Charles Katz was convicted in California of illegal
gambling based on the FBI electronically recording his conversations in a public pay
telephone booth. In a 7-1 decision the Supreme Court held that so long as an individual
can justifiably expect his conversation to remain private, his conversation is protected by
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the Fourth Amendment “unreasonable search and seizure” clause. Additionally the court
for the first time said that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and the
rights of the individual are therefore protected in the absence of physical intrusion.
Justice Potter Stewart wrote: “No less than an individual in a business office, in a
friend’s apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.”106
This ruling was important for two reasons: 1) the court enunciated privacy
protection based on the individual’s “reasonable expectation” of privacy; and 2) the
Fourth Amendment was declared to protect people, not places, extending privacy
protections beyond the physical home or office. As an adjunct, Justice John Harlan
authored a two-part test which subsequently became the most common formulation cited
by the courts for determining whether police activity constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment: “ . . . first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as “reasonable”.”107
While Supreme Court decisions acted to expand and define the concept of
privacy, academic legal analysis played an important part in expanding the recognition of
privacy protections in other arenas. In 1960, William Prosser, Dean of the University of
California School of Law, authored “what is considered to be the second most important
tract on privacy,”108 after that of Warren and Brandeis. Prosser analyzed more than three
hundred privacy cases, noting that, “It is only in recent years, and largely through legal
writers, that there has been any attempt to inquire what interests are we protecting, and
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against what conduct,”109 and then went on to identify and explicate the following four
privacy torts:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which placed the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness.110
Prosser noted that a careful reading of Warren and Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy
reveals that they were primarily concerned only with the second form of tort, having to
do with public disclosure of embarrassing private facts by the newspapers.111 Yet in a
period of only 65 years, this single article by Warren and Brandeis---focusing on only a
single privacy tort---had ramified into several privacy torts and a growing number of ever
more specific privacy rights. Prosser’s scholarly discussion of privacy torts was written at
the beginning of what became an explosion in privacy concerns in the following several
decades as science and technology provided the means for privacy to be compromised by
government, business, and individuals in an information, biological, and physical
technology explosion.
Privacy After 1965
Wars generate technological change, and World War II engendered more
technological change than any previous conflict. Following World War II, the
momentum of scientific discovery and technological innovation generated during the war
was harnessed to produce new breakthroughs in all dimensions of American life.112
Although much of the work in fields such as biology, medicine, and information
technology took place in prior decades, the impacts of new knowledge and technology on
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privacy had matured, and began to be felt in society, by the 1960s. Thus, the 1960s saw a
plethora of social and legal discussions regarding privacy issues as new technologies
from contraceptives and advanced medical procedures to computers and databases
changed the privacy landscape in the United States.
Laws in the United States are created in one of two ways, by federal or state
legislative action or by Supreme Court decisions---thus privacy law in the United States
consists of an admixture of legislated law and court-decision created law. While the
threat to privacy posed by computers and databases was recognized early by some in the
information technology field, the legal profession, and academia,113 the first, and most
significant changes in the evolving concept of privacy took place as a result of issues
surrounding individual reproductive rights or reproductive choice. Three high-profile
cases, Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), and Roe v. Wade
(1973) changed the concept and scope of privacy and are generally credited with not only
finally establishing a definitive constitutional right of personal physical or privacy of the
body, but also creating a solid consciousness or awareness of “privacy” in the minds of
the American people.
In 1965, the Griswold v. Connecticut decision by the Supreme Court suddenly
brought the issue of privacy to the consciousness of the American public and is credited
with finally establishing a general constitutional right to privacy. Griswold v.
Connecticut addressed a Connecticut law that prohibited the use of “any drug, medicinal
article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception . . . ” by married
couples.114 In a 7-2 decision the Supreme Court ruled that the Connecticut law was
unconstitutional and violated the “right to marital privacy.” Justice William O. Douglas
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authored a majority opinion in which he wrote that the right to privacy was found in
“penumbras” and “emanations” of other constitutional protections found in the First,
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. Three additional justices wrote concurring opinions,
Justice Goldberg basing his decision on the Ninth Amendment, while Justices Harlan and
White based their decision on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.115
Together they identified “a composite right to privacy, drawing its substance from a
number of the Bill of Rights’ guarantees in language which appeared to indicate a strong
constitutional presumption against any manner of governmental infringement.”116
With the Griswold v. Connecticut decision a broad right to personal privacy was
recognized for the first time based on “penumbras” and “emanations” of five
amendments. Justice Douglas established the pedigree of the right to privacy by saying
that, “We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”117 Griswold v.
Connecticut represents one of the major turning points in privacy law and has
subsequently been cited as a benchmark in cases that have further expanded the bounds
of privacy in the United States.
In 1972, Eisenstadt v. Baird 118 expanded the concept of individual privacy when
it established the right of unmarried couples to have and use contraception the same as
married couples. In a 6-1 decision, the Court recognized the rights of single people to
procreate vel non (or not), and by implication sanctioned the ability of unmarried couples
to engage in sexual relations. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan held that the right
of privacy established by Griswold v. Connecticut extended to unmarried couples, saying,
“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally
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affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”119 The effect of
Eisenstadt v. Baird was to extend the right of privacy enunciated in Griswold v.
Connecticut to the individual, and, “A person could carry this right anywhere; it was a
freedom that would no longer be confined to one’s bedroom or house.”120
In 1973, the Supreme Court, in a decision that has since proven to be one of its
most contentious, expanded the right of privacy by striking down bans on abortion in Roe
v. Wade. Basing it decision on the constitutional right to privacy emanating from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that a woman could abort
her pregnancy for any reason, up to the point at which the fetus became viable, which
was defined as the ability to live outside the womb. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority, declared:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.121
The Court’s Roe v. Wade decision elicited a national debate that continues to the
present day regarding the right of abortion in the United States. Although the debate has
at times been acrimonious, it has been one of the principal generators of privacy
awareness for the American public and catapulted the issue of privacy into the spotlight,
as it had never been before.122
At the same time that issues of personal body privacy issues were being
adjudicated, parallel privacy issues were being recognized in the realm of information
and data privacy as it affected the privacy of the individual. Beginning with the Title III
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of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,123 the Freedom of
Information Act of 1966,124 the Fair Credit reporting Act of 1970,125 the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,126 and the Privacy Act of 1974, the United
States Congress created laws to protect information and data privacy of individuals. The
evolution of the concept of privacy, and the growth and influence of the privacy
epistemic community in creating privacy legislation in the two decades prior to the
passage of the Privacy Act of 1974 is the subject of the Chapter Four case study.
Chapter Summary
Privacy in the United States can trace its conceptual lineage to some of the earliest
peoples in Western Civilization, to include the Hebrews and the Greeks. However, it was
the English philosopher John Locke who had the greatest influence in associating the
right of property to the liberty of the individual. Locke’s philosophy regarding liberty of
property and person influenced the Founders to include specific property and person
protections in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, although the word “privacy” was not
used in any of the founding documents.
In 1890, Warren and Brandeis elegantly argued that technological and social
changes had severely compromised the privacy of individuals and they outlined common
law arguments for the right “to be let alone.” Their article ignited philosophical and legal
debates in the United States that continue to rage today regarding the definition,
characteristics, types, and contexts of individual privacy. Supreme Court decisions in the
six decades following Warren and Brandeis’ article were often contradictory, but, in
general, the concept of privacy implicit in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments was
expanded and clarified.
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In the 1960s, the issue of privacy once again became a major topic of
philosophical and legal interest in the United States because of technological changes that
dramatically impacted the reproductive and informational domains. In 1965, the
Supreme Court finally established a general constitutional right to privacy in their
Griswold v. Connecticut decision. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
significantly expanded the personal and physical privacy bounds created in Griswold v.
Connecticut. Supreme Court expansion of Fourth Amendment “search and seizure”
privacy protections in decisions such as Katz v. United States (1967), were expanded and
clarified by Congress in legislation such as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.
In Chapter Three, I will introduce the concept of the epistemic community as an
intervening variable in influencing legislative outcomes. I will identify the characteristics
of the epistemic community, limitations of the epistemic community, and provide the
criteria by which the presence and influence of an epistemic community can be measured.
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Chapter Three
“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world.
Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”1
Margaret Mead
The Epistemic Community
The definition, characteristics, and criteria for identifying the existence or
presence of an epistemic community are the subjects of this chapter. In this chapter, I
trace the lineage of earlier “cognitive” or “expert” groups or communities whose
contributions to knowledge and decision-making made them valuable to policy makers
and legislators of the past. I then employ Peter Haas’ conceptualization of the epistemic
community as my starting point, noting subsequent scholarship that identifies weaknesses
or limitations in his epistemic community concept. Finally, I identify criteria by which I
can operationalize the epistemic community concept and objectively identify the presence
of an epistemic community in the subsequent United States and European Union Privacy
Case Studies.
The term “epistemic community” is less than a half-century old, having been
invented by Michel Foucault.2 Because the phrase “epistemic community” is relatively
new, it is important to understand that the epistemic community has had a number of
antecedents---and although not termed epistemic communities, they have often behaved
in the manner, and with the characteristics attributed to, the epistemic community.
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Elements of the epistemic community concept can be found in the idea of an
invisible college, consisting of a group of networked scientists with common motivation,
purpose, or common policy enterprise. The concept of the invisible college was first
introduced in the mid-seventeenth century in London, and said by some to be the
predecessor of the Royal Society.3 The idea of the invisible college reappeared in the
1970s in Invisible Colleges: Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities,4 and in
2008 in The New Invisible College: Science for Development.5 The literature of the past
two decades has produced significant research either building on, or testing, the epistemic
community organized in the form of invisible colleges. Ernst Haas, in When Knowledge
is Power for example, describes epistemic communities that “take the form of “invisible
colleges,” networks of the like-minded not employed in the same university, laboratory,
or think tank.”6 These distributed, networked, like-minded scientists and scholars
develop a common enterprise or purpose and influencing decision-makers and legislators
through their knowledge expertise.7
More than a century ago, one of the most influential books on government of the
twentieth century drove home the idea that, “All politics and all government are the result
of the activities of groups.”8 Arthur F. Bentley’s voluminous book, The Process of
Government: A Study of Social Pressures, focused on the role of interest groups and the
importance of ideas that motivated the group, as well as the conflict among groups within
society and government, that results in government policy and law.9 For Bentley, the
interaction and conflict of interest groups constituted politics. There was no “public
opinion” because there was no “public”---there were only many different kinds of groups,
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each of which had its own interests.10 To Bentley’s mind, the epistemic community, or
knowledge community of experts, would be just one of many groups vying for position
and influence in the political process. One might hope that the expert knowledge of the
epistemic community provides them an edge in the negotiation for their desired political
solution, but Bentley believed that all policies and legislation are the result of constantly
competing interests and the groups that represent those interests.
Nearly half a century after the appearance of “The Process of Government,”
Harvey Brooks described the important role that technical experts played in the
increasingly complex machinery of government.11 The role of “experts” in government
policy making has been a popular theme ever since the Second World War, when
“experts” in many fields were credited with the technical breakthroughs that provided the
Allies the edge to win the war. In the early 1960s, Harvey Brooks identified government
reliance on “experts” to solve the increasingly complex and technical policy and
operational problems that confronted government. Brooks described the trend toward
technical, (epistemic community) “experts” taking a larger and larger role in government,
saying:

In most of the western world the first instinct of statesmanship is to turn
intransigent problems over to “experts” or to “study groups.” There
appear to be an almost naïve faith that if big problems can be broken
down sufficiently and be dealt with by experts and technicians, the big
problems will tend to disappear or at least lose much of their urgency.12
Brooks noted that: “Much of the history of social progress in the twentieth
century can be described in terms of the transfer of wider and wider areas of public policy
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from politics to expertise.”13 The trend toward depending upon the knowledge of experts
was not just confined to the United States, Brooks said, but even more pronounced in
Europe. “The trend towards the acceptance of expertise has been especially striking in
Europe where both ideology and the apolitical professional bureaucracy have been
stronger than in the United States.”14
Origins of the Epistemic Community Concept
As previously noted, Michel Foucault is credited with inventing the term
“epistemic community,” in his book The Order of Things in 1971.15 Foucault’s original
use of the term is considered by some to be indistinguishable from “ideological
communities.”16 In the past four decades, Foucault’s original term has been adopted, and
its definition significantly expanded, by a multitude of scholars. For example, in
Knowledge Application: the Knowledge System in Society, Holzner and Marx say that an
epistemic community:
. . . thus designates those knowledge-oriented work communities in which
cultural standards and social arrangements interpenetrate around a primary
commitment to epistemic criteria in knowledge production and
application. In these terms, science is not the only epistemic community.
Any special way of knowing, whose development and elaboration requires
the establishment of an autonomous social space, will tend toward the
structure of an epistemic community. In fact, certain esoteric knowledge
traditions associated with various groups of serious astrologers must be
considered epistemic communities, just as much as the officially
recognized and discipline-based modern professions.17
Holzner and Marx go on to say that: “The establishment of a common frame of
reference with shared epistemic criteria provides all members of such a community
access to a consensually validated perspective for the construction of reality.”18 Thus, the
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epistemic community serves to socialize new members into the knowledge, identity, and
worldview of the community.
Ernst Haas, in When Knowledge is Power, builds upon Holzner and Marx’s
definition of the epistemic community, saying that their definition does not go far
enough. Ernst Haas says:
For me, an epistemic community is composed of professionals (usually
recruited from several disciplines) who share a commitment to a common
causal model and a common set of political values. They are united by a
belief in the truth of their model and by a commitment to translate this
truth into public policy, in the conviction that human welfare will be
enhanced as a result.19
In the late 1960s, Thomas Kuhn popularized the term paradigm, as he described
the shared paradigms of scientists conducting “normal” science. In terms very close to
those used by Peter Haas in describing the epistemic community, Kuhn described the
shared paradigm of normal science in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.20
Peter Haas acknowledged this relationship when he said of his own definition of an
epistemic community:
It also somewhat resembles Kuhn’s broader sociological definition of a
paradigm which is “an entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques,
and so on shared by members of a given community” and which governs
“not a subject matter but a group of practitioners. 21
Peter Haas popularized the most widely quoted definition of the epistemic
community in the international relations community in the early 1990s. Haas assembled
ten representative essays on the influence of epistemic communities in a special issue of
International Organization in 1992, and published the essays as an edited collection the
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same year.22 His survey of epistemic communities has made Peter Haas’ definition the
most referenced and most often quoted in the epistemic community literature. Haas
wrote that:
An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.
Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a
variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of
normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale
for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs,
which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing
to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the
basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions
and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity---that is,
intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy
enterprise---that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of
problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably
out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a
consequence.23
Over the past two decades numerous scholars have suggested that epistemic
communities have played a major role in both national and international decision-making
and policy formulation in a wide rage of disciplines including public administration,24
criminology,25 business,26 and banking.27 Scholars employ the term epistemic
community in order to explain the formation and influence of knowledge communities
that influence decision-making and policy in corporate,28 public,29 and government
organizations.30 Within the discipline of international relations, studies describing the
role and importance of epistemic communities have been conducted in such areas as
nuclear arms control;31 international food aid;32 the creation of international economic
regimes;33 and numerous facets of the environment, to include protection of stratospheric
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ozone;34 management and protection of whales;35 and international environmental
policy.36
As the world becomes more technical and complex, the problems and issues to be
addressed by government have become equally complex and technical. The fact that
policy makers at all levels have welcomed knowledge experts, or an epistemic
community, to assist with the process of identifying problems, identifying possible
solutions, and then selecting the best decision is well documented.37 In the growing
complexity of national, regional, and international problems, one has to only remember
H.L. Mencken’s aphorism that: “There is always a well-known solution to every human
problem--neat, plausible, and wrong,”38 to appreciate government’s need for expert
counsel when making complex decisions that affect humans, the environment, or the
planet. Because government decision makers and bureaucrats are not generally
technically sophisticated, and are rarely faced with decisions within their limited field of
competence, their need for expert, technical, or professional advice on complex issues
would seem to be the normal state of affairs. Thus, one concludes that decision-makers
have always sought the advice and recommendations of subject-matter-experts in
complex areas in which change was contemplated.
The Nature of the Epistemic Community
Once the historical existence and activities of epistemic communities have been
identified under numerous appellations, one of the first things that a researcher of
epistemic communities must do is to parse the concept so as to be capable of
operationalizing and objectively applying the concepts to the identification of epistemic
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communities within the privacy domain or issue-area. Peter Haas has provided us with
several key characteristics of an epistemic community in his seminal essay. There are
five characteristics that Peter Haas lists that would appear central to identifying and
defining an epistemic community. Presumably, each of these plays an integral part in the
creation of, activities of, and identification of an epistemic community. In order to fully
understand and operationalize the concept of the epistemic community, I believe that
each of the five defining characteristics must be thoroughly investigated. For analysis
purposes, I renumber them as:
(1) A network of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area;
(2) A shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a
value-based rationale for the social action of community members;
(3) Shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of
practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their
domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple
linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes;
(4) Shared notions of validity---that is, intersubjective, internally
defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of
their expertise; and,
(5) A common policy enterprise---that is, a set of common practices
associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence
is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be
enhanced as a consequence.39
Examining each of these five characteristics of an epistemic community in
isolation, I should first note that many authors who have worked from Peter Haas’
epistemic community definition have focused primarily on the last four characteristics of
an epistemic community, to the exclusion of the first.40 Perhaps this is because Hass
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numbered the last four, where the first was the topic sentence of his definition. Second, I
should note that a careful reading finds that several of the key concepts and phrases of the
definition are difficult to operationalize in a research program, because they impute
subjective criteria described in terms of normative and principled beliefs, causal beliefs,
and notions of validity that do not lend themselves to objective characterization and
observation by an external observer, and perhaps not even by the epistemic community
actors themselves.
Limitations of the Epistemic Community Approach
Some scholars who have employed the epistemic community approach have
observed that Haas’ criteria are overly specific, subjective, and “. . . actually identifying
these communities can . . . be a very difficult process.”41 Numerous scholars have
identified limitations or weaknesses in Haas’ epistemic community approach. These
limits or weaknesses must be understood in order to bound the concept and operationalize
those objective characteristics of the approach that are observable.
On the issue of objectively operationalizing a research program, Claire Dunlop
says of Haas’ epistemic community framework that:
Wright correctly highlights the basic methodological complexity of
operationalising such a micro-level approach . . . It seems likely that the
practical obstacles entailed in the approach, such as identifying, locating
and gaining access to those believed to be members of any epistemic
community (this is before any attempt can be made to discern their
importance), may have frustrated some scholars’ attempts to use and test
the thesis effectively, if at all.42

74

Additional examples abound in the literature. For example, even while
employing Haas’ epistemic community construct in the analysis of European Union
processes, “Verdun (The role of the Delors Committee in the creation of EMU: an
epistemic community?) criticizes Haas’ definition for being too rigid ever to apply to any
given community of experts, since his conditions are simply extremely difficult to
meet.”43
Because Haas’ lead essay, Introduction: epistemic communities and international
policy coordination, is just that---an introduction that lays the basis for understanding and
evaluating the nine exemplar essays that follow it---Haas does not offer detailed evidence
or empirical testing in his essay. Rather, Haas makes general assertions that in many
policy areas epistemic communities have framed issues for debate, and thus influenced
outcomes that were consistent with the community preferences.44
The size of Haas’ “network of professionals” is undefined. No minimum or
maximum size, number, or extent of the network is offered, nor does Haas define any
formal criteria for the construction or organization of the network.45 Thus, one infers that
the size, extent, or composition of the network is not important to the enterprise or
undertakings of the community. The limiting criteria are all laid upon those members
who make up the network . . . the experts, technicians, or professionals who share a
number of subjective qualities and understandings. They must possess “recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain.” But nothing is said about who
specifically evaluates the expertise and competence of the members of the community.
One is left to conclude that it is the decision-makers who will rely upon their counsel who
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must ultimately be the arbitrators of the expertise and competence that the members of
the epistemic community possess.
When Haas invokes “a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which
provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members” it implies a
common culture, education, training, and experience across a community that Haas says
“. . . need not be made up of natural scientists or of professionals applying the same
methodology that natural scientists do.”46 This reflects the diversity of the scientific,
government, and social world from which members of the epistemic community are
drawn. While some core beliefs, for example, in the importance of individual privacy,
may be found to be held nearly universally, others, such as the priority in which the many
dimensions of privacy should be protected or how specific individual privacy rights can
be guarded or guaranteed, may be in conflict.
Haas’ discussion of “shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis
of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which
then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy
actions and desired outcomes”47 suggests a commonality of belief of causality—as well
as a static scientific and social view of the world---based upon an implied common
culture, education, training, and experience. As with any group that is called together to
address a new issue or new problem, there are initially many perspectives of both the
problem and possible alternative solutions. Haas does not discuss the complex processes
by which disparate views are debated and compromised within the epistemic community
in order to produce the final short-list of possible policy actions and probable outcomes.
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These are the decision-making processes within the community that ultimately produce
the common policy behind which the epistemic community can unite and agree on shared
beliefs, causal beliefs, and shared notions of validity. No evidence, documentation, or
suggestion of the process by which shared beliefs, causal beliefs, and shared notions of
validity are agreed upon by the members of the epistemic community is offered. The
community is assumed to adhere to a common faith in the applicability of particular
forms of truth and knowledge to the solution of specific issues or problems without the
internal contest of ideas, concepts, and alternatives.48
Similarly, Haas’ attribute of “shared notions of validity---that is, intersubjective,
internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their
expertise” relies on imputed and empirically untestable qualities of the community. No
documentation, evidence, or process is offered by Haas by which shared notions of
validity within an epistemic community can be positively observed or ascertained.49
Although the process of validating truth and knowledge claims within the domain of
expertise may be intersubjective and based on internally defined criteria, the outcomes
may vary.
When engaged in “a common policy enterprise---that is, a set of common
practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is
directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a
consequence,” the implication is that all community members agree upon the set of
problems and the possible solutions. As epistemic communities become institutionalized
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through the Internet, the range of policy enterprises that they address increases
significantly.
Are these the only criteria that one must entertain when one identifies or defines
an epistemic community? Are these five characteristics of an epistemic community in
themselves the only necessary, and simultaneously sufficient, attributes needed to bound
the totality of epistemic communities? Haas himself notes that, “The term ‘epistemic
communities’ has been used in a variety of ways, most frequently to refer to scientific
communities.”50 He then goes on to qualify his definition saying that, “Our notion of
‘epistemic community’ somewhat resembles Fleck’s notion of a ‘thought collective’---a
sociological group with a common style of thinking. It also somewhat resembles Kuhn’s
broader sociological definition of a paradigm, which is ‘an entire constellation of beliefs,
values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community’ and which
governs ‘not a subject matter but a group of practitioners.’”51
The Influence of the Epistemic Community
The narratives and discussions of epistemic communities by Peter Haas, et al., are
descriptive of successful instances of epistemic communities influencing regime
formation and/or legislation regarding issues/topics important to the international
community. But how does the epistemic community influence exert influence on policy
makers and ultimately, legislation? Adler succinctly summarizes the five mechanisms
identified by Adler and Haas by which influence is exerted:
First, by policy innovation they frame the issue, i.e. decide the nature of
the issue, the policy objectives, and at what level (in which forum) the
issue should be solved. These initial choices set the stage for defining
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national interests. Second, policy diffusion, which refers to the mechanism
with which members of epistemic communities communicate using
transnational links to make their views known. The acceptance of their
ideas by others across the globe, in turn, can be used to put pressure on
national governments. Third, policy selection can take place. In this case,
decision-makers seek support from a selected epistemic community which
they know will support their policies. This approach enables the decisionmakers to legitimize their policy choices by referring to the community of
experts who approve of their policy choices. Fourth, policy persistence,
the continuation of consensus of ideas, beliefs and goals over time among
the members of the epistemic community, contributes to their credibility,
and hence their authority, and thus it also determines how long an
epistemic community remains influential. Finally, by policy evolution as
learning. Epistemic communities can contribute decisively to the process
of learning, which is important as the final understanding of a policy issue
determines the policy outcome. (Italics in original)52
This raises the question: Are there any examples of unsuccessful epistemic
communities? When following this line of inquiry, the first thing one must do is define
what constitutes “successful” or “unsuccessful” in the activities of an epistemic
community. One can posit several epistemic community scenarios that might lead to an
“unsuccessful” conclusion, for example: 1) An epistemic community might exist, but
take no action (or be ignored) in informing decision makers . . . thus no “success” or
“failure” might be attributed to its “action” or “inaction;” 2) An epistemic community
may counsel decision makers, and decision makers may implement the advice, but
intervening variables may subsequently change the intended outcome; and, 3) Several
epistemic communities may exist, each with a competing view or paradigm in a given
policy area, with the result that a modified, compromised, or completely different
outcome might result when policy makers ultimately make their decisions. In this third
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instance, it is possible that no one epistemic community could claim complete “success”
in promoting its course of action.
Instances of all three of these less-than-successful epistemic community outcomes
can be found in the literature. For example, in his essay, Epistemic Communities and the
Diffusion of Ideas: Central Bank Reform in the United Kingdom, Michael King notes
that, “Good ideas or an academic consensus on a new paradigm, however, are not
enough. The present study discusses circumstances where the ideas of an epistemic
community were not adopted by politicians, and highlights that the electoral benefits of
adopting the reform must exceed the electoral cost for ideas to survive the political
process.”53 Thus King concluded that the policy maker’s perception of electoral or career
self-interest was the deciding factor in whether or not the counsel of a broad epistemic
community of economists and monetary experts would be acted upon.
In their essay, The Interest-Based Explanation of International Environmental
Policy, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta recognize the important role played by epistemic
communities, but then qualify the influence of such communities by noting that
intervening variables such as perceived political, domestic, or national interests may
override or mitigate the advice of the expert community and cause decision makers to opt
for an alternate or modified course of action. While not denying the importance of
knowledge and the influence of the epistemic community, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta argue
that policy outcomes are often based most heavily on political cost-benefit
considerations, and say that:

“ . . . epistemic communities in ecologically vulnerable

countries will exert stronger effects on governmental elites to seek international
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regulation as opposed to their impact in less ecologically vulnerable countries.”54 They
believe that while the role of knowledge-based experts is important in shaping a
country’s environmental policy, immediate national interest is a more important
intervening variable than the knowledge and influence of the epistemic community in
policy maker environmental decision-making. Thus, after counsel of the environmental
epistemic community, the course of action chosen, and the ultimate outcome, would be
evaluated as unsuccessful epistemic community influence.
In his essay entitled Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European
Security and Defense Policy, Jolyon Howorth provides an example of an unsuccessful
epistemic community as he recounts the story of the discursive search for a European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the decade following the disintegration of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Howorth describes how British, French, and
German leaders, diplomats, and bureaucrats came together to create an epistemic
community and put forth new ideas regarding a common EU paradigm for security and
defense via speeches, proclamations, and memos. The ESDP participants became “ . . .
part of a new international epistemic community that was to take up the new paradigm
and refine it.”55 After a decade of consultation and negotiation, the work of the ESDP
epistemic community was brought to ruin by the events subsequent to 11 September
2001, when the British, the French, and the German governments each refocused their
individual defense policies based on the new terrorist threat. Each nation subsequently
chose a different response to the American military invasion of Afghanistan, and later
Iraq.56
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Several scholars have observed the development of competing, or counter,
epistemic communities within the same policy area. In his essay South Africa, AIDS, and
the Development of a Counter-Epistemic Community,57 Youde develops the idea that two
or more legitimate epistemic communities may evolve simultaneously around a given
policy issue, each possessing the requisite network of professionals, credentials,
recognized expertise, competence, and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within a particular domain---but each possessing different world views and
thus espousing dramatically different courses of action. Youde admits that eventually the
influence of one of the epistemic communities can be expected to become dominant with
policymakers, but this does not mean that the second (or counter) epistemic community
will wither away and cease to exist as long as the policy issue remains active which
initially gave rise to the creation of the epistemic community.58
The Life-Cycle Of Epistemic Communities
Most epistemic community literature of the 20th century treats the formation and
activities of the epistemic community as a relative snapshot in time, and the numerous
examples cited by Peter Haas, are no exception.59 The community is formed in response
to a specific issue or problem; it accomplishes a specific purpose, and it dissolves. That
is, after its “success” of positively influencing treaties, agreements, or regimes, the
individuals who comprised the “epistemic community” all returned to their respective
vocations and the unique epistemic community that was so successful in influencing
national and international events essentially ceased to exist. Although the members of
the community were still active in their vocational specialty and available for
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consultation, there appears to have been no continuity of the epistemic community
through time, because once the treaty, agreement, or regime was concluded or created,
the epistemic community melted away. Realizing that the role of the epistemic
community is conditioned upon the perceived need on the part of its members to provide
information, courses of action, and probable outcomes to decision makers operating
under uncertainty and encountering complex problems surrounding seemingly timecritical policy issues, one can certainly see why this transience of the epistemic
community would historically be the norm. Once the work of the epistemic community
is completed with the resolution of the policy issue that gave it raison d’être, the
epistemic community dissolved.
In the world of the twentieth century, the members of the epistemic community
were often separated by distance and time from one another. When major international
or domestic policy issues arose, members of the community were sometimes alerted by
the news media, but more often communicated and coalesced using the technology of the
time: post mail, telephone, facsimile, and physical transport by automobile, train, ship, or
airplane. Professional conferences have always been an excellent venue for meeting,
learning, and sharing of information and ideas, but they also require considerable time
and resources to attend. Thus the convocation of epistemic community members took
considerable time and effort to execute. The effort and resources required to maintain
contact almost ensured that minor policy issues would rarely evoke the coalescence of the
epistemic community and a coordinated community response. In this first decade of the
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21st century, however, many of these constraints to the continuous networking of the
epistemic community have been overcome.
Institutionalizing the Epistemic Community
The advent of the Internet has produced a global infrastructure that facilitates the
permanency and continuity of epistemic communities. In many ways, the Internet has
institutionalized many epistemic communities by allowing for continuity in epistemic
community communication, activities, and relationships that extend beyond the issue or
problem that gave rise to the epistemic community in the first place. Internet presence is
essentially global, and 24 hours a day/7 days a week. The ability to permanently upload
or “post” digital data and information, including e-mail, digital books, issue studies,
opinion pieces, photos, graphics, digital video and electronic mailing lists gives the
epistemic community a permanent near-real-time global network---as well as a venue for
informing, educating, and proselytizing not only members, but also the global public and
decision-makers.60 As will be seen for the privacy epistemic community, a computer
search for any privacy issue will elicit dozens of permanent websites that support and link
members and topics across the privacy epistemic community.
A constellation of privacy organizations now forms the global privacy epistemic
community. Each organization offers a variety of information, education, and guidance
regarding issues of privacy. Each organization has a specialty or primary focus within
the broad field of privacy, but many have overlapping secondary or peripheral privacy
areas of interest. Although in most cases the alignment of these privacy organizations on
major privacy policy issues is similar, the number and breadth of privacy issues
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represented occasionally presents the opportunity for competing views on privacy policy
issues. When such competing views, advice, or courses of action are offered to decision
makers by the privacy epistemic community, it requires: 1) competition of ideas within
the privacy epistemic community to agree on a common position or course of action, or
2) the decision maker(s) to choose (and follow) what they feel to be their best counsel.
Within just the past decade the Internet has created an omnipresent global
network around which an epistemic community can grow and evolve as a permanent
presence. Thus, the privacy epistemic community has become a permanent fixture
through their Internet web sites, allowing privacy epistemic community members to meet
asynchronously around the clock and contribute to a constant dialogue in response to
issues and problems of even marginal saliency. They are capable of expressing wellresearched positions on even minor privacy issues, influencing all privacy legislation, and
are often important voices in advising decision makers and legislators on a multitude of
privacy issues over time.
Self-Aware Epistemic Community?
Is an epistemic community an epistemic community if the members of the
informal epistemic community network do not know, or understand, the concept of an
epistemic community? As demonstrated by the nine essays in the Peter Haas’ collection,
and the dozens of essays that have subsequently used the phrase “epistemic community”
in the last decade of the twentieth century to characterize a knowledge group meeting the
criteria established by Haas, most members had probably not intuitively self-identified as
being an epistemic community.61 But as the phrase and the concept of an epistemic
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community have become more well known in the past decade, it is probable that
members more readily identify themselves as being part of an epistemic community.
With the permanence of epistemic communities that has been created by the
advent of the Internet, it is likely that many members of epistemic communities have
become more self-aware today. Sociologist Howard Becker posited that for one to
distinguish any specific group from the others, one must attempt to understand how the
members of the group look at themselves, as well as how those on the outside see
members of the group.62 Becker would thus suggest that to truly be an epistemic
community, the epistemic community must be recognized by both the “ins” and the
“outs” of the community. Ultimately a group is recognized as a unique and separate
entity because both the members of the group (the epistemic community “ins”) and those
outside the group (the “outs”) recognize the distinct and unique nature of the group. This
is not to say that the members of the epistemic community define themselves and their
belief paradigm in terms of the five characteristics delineated by Haas. No more than the
Anglo-American economists and policy specialists described by G. John Ikenberry in
Haas’ collection of epistemic community essays as creating the post-World War II
Bretton Woods agreement would have described themselves as constituting an epistemic
community, or thought in terms of the five community characteristics described by
Haas.63
The Global Privacy Epistemic Community
Based upon Internet presence, studies, white papers, and public announcements of
support for privacy issues and legislation it appears that there has been a well-developed
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global privacy epistemic community represented by a large number of privacy
organizations for several decades.64 Evidence of the privacy epistemic community can be
found in periodic comment, advocacy, and support by both individual privacy
organizations as well as privacy issue-centered coalitions of organizations. As the
immediate privacy issues change, from health privacy, to tracking Internet privacy, to
digital surveillance in public areas for example, the composition of the active privacy
epistemic community coalition changes accordingly. There are significant differences in
the privacy concerns (and thus the composition and character of the epistemic
communities formed) among the sub-areas within the privacy issue-area. That is, some
organizations focus on individual privacy as a derived constitutional right, while other
privacy organizations focus on discreet, and often very technical issues such as data
privacy, surveillance/photography privacy, geo-location privacy, body DNA privacy, etc.
That raises the natural question of whether these differences in privacy focus or emphasis
by privacy organizations constitute a different epistemic community, or are these merely
variations on a common theme of privacy? When major privacy issues arise that cut
across many technical areas, such as government wire-tapping, the many privacy
organizations come together to offer their expertise and technical knowledge to
legislators and decision makers.
Operationalizing the Identification of the Epistemic Community
The discussion of limitations and weaknesses of the epistemic community
approach discussed earlier in this chapter highlights the difficulty of applying subjective,
soft, or “fuzzy” criteria based on shared normative and principled beliefs, shared causal
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beliefs, or shared notions of validity. I will therefore meet these inherent limitations and
weaknesses in the Haas epistemic community approach by identifying and employing the
following empirical, readily observed, criteria by which the epistemic community can be
characterized: 1) Recognized professional/technical expertise or “standing” in privacy
issues; 2) Privacy publications; 3) National and international organizations with a privacy
component; 4) Privacy websites on the internet; 5) Periodic privacy conferences; and,
6) Participation in government hearings, testimony, and other legislative meetings.
Each of these six criteria requires a more detailed discussion in order to
operationalize the characteristic to the point of being able to identify the epistemic
community. The first two criteria (1 and 2) are applicable to members of the epistemic
community, the next three criteria (3, 4, and 5) are integral to the epistemic “network,”
that facilitates the loose organization and continued interaction of the community which
would promote Haas’ four implicit and inter-subjective characteristics of (1) shared
normative and principled beliefs; (2) shared causal beliefs; (3) shared notions of validity;
and (4) common policy enterprise.65 Finally, the sixth criterion identifies the ability of
the epistemic community members to influence policy decision-making and legislation.
Identifying the Privacy Epistemic Community
In the following two chapters, I will apply the following six objective criteria in
order to identify the existence of, the role of, and the activities of, the privacy epistemic
community in influencing privacy legislation in the United States and the European
Union case studies:
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1) Professional/technical expertise and competence in privacy issues that are
recognized by members of the privacy epistemic community and by those outside the
community. The professional and technical expertise of members of the privacy
epistemic community will be ascertained and recognized by other community members
and those external to the community based on individual activities and/or membership in
the following five areas. Most importantly, the professional and technical expertise of
privacy epistemic community members must be recognized by policy decision-makers
and legislators who will entertain their expert opinion and enact legislation.
2) Privacy publications by members of the privacy epistemic community that address,
explicate, or amplify privacy concerns, issues, or problems for the epistemic community,
legislators, and the public establish, maintain, extend the authors’ “expertise and
competence “ and “authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain or
issue area.”66 Publications, which may include professional or technical authoritative
“blogs” in today’s virtual world of the Internet, extend the bounds of knowledge and
promote common beliefs and notions of validity.
Beginning in the late 1950s, individuals who became leaders of the epistemic
community authored essays, articles, and books describing threats to privacy. These
publications established the professional/technical expertise of the authors in the realm of
privacy and educated other members of the privacy epistemic community in specific
privacy issues, problems, and possible courses of action.
3) National and international organizations with a privacy component provide a
network framework for members of the privacy epistemic community to network,
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exchange knowledge, study issues and options in their professional/ technical area of
expertise, and educate (some might say proselytize) new members to the epistemic
community.
The two primary organizations that have facilitated networking across the privacy
epistemic community were the Council of Europe and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
4) Privacy websites on the Internet provide an ever-present virtual domain for members
of the privacy epistemic community to network, exchange knowledge and opinions,
educate new members of the epistemic community, and coordinate their “common policy
enterprise . . . (that) set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which
their professional competence is directed . . . .”67
5) Periodic privacy conferences and convocations provide important opportunities to
physically network and maintain epistemic community contact, knowledge, and
coordination as described in paragraphs three and four immediately above. The
importance of conferences is emphasized by Cogburn, who notes that conferences serve
different roles, and some international conferences are more important than others, saying
of conferences that:
Their influence on the epistemic community and components of an
emergent regime varies significantly. Some international conferences
plan an extremely important role in debating and articulating the
principles, values, and norms of a particular regime, but may not have
any rule-making, decision-making, or enforcement capabilities. Other
conferences may be more influential in decision-making and
enforcement, while having less influence on the generation of new
principles, values and norms for the issue area. High-level
conferences, at which formal conference ‘agreements’ containing
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principles and values for the particular issue area are tabled, debated
and adopted, are certainly more important in regime formation than
others. These conference agreements often serve as reference point for
policy-makers and other stakeholders who use these documents to
rally support for strategic plans and resource allocation in pursuit of
the conference objectives as codified in agreements.68
6) Participation in government hearings, testimony, and other legislative meetings is
necessary for the members of the epistemic community to share their epistemic
community knowledge with decision-makers and policy-makers, influence state interests
and thus influence decisions and national/international legislation.69
Most of the privacy epistemic community members identified as representatives
have authored privacy publications have been participants in government hearings,
testimony, and congressional legislative studies and have directly or indirectly played
active roles in influencing decision-makers and privacy legislation.
Following the two case studies recounting the role of the privacy epistemic
community in influencing privacy legislation in the United States (Chapter Four) and the
European Union (Chapter Five), the impact, effectiveness, and limitations of the privacy
epistemic community will be analyzed in Chapter Six.
Chapter Summary
While the concept of the epistemic community is really only about four decades
old, the characteristics of the epistemic community can be recognized in networks of
“professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”70 from
much earlier periods in history. Over the past two decades, the epistemic community
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scholarship of Peter Haas has dominated the literature and has become the benchmark for
its study. However, some scholars have identified limitations or weaknesses in Haas’
constructivist description of beliefs, values, validity, and “intersubjective, internally
defined criteria”71 on the part of epistemic community members who have made it nearly
impossible to operationalize Haas’ epistemic community definitions and create a viable
research program.72 I agree with those scholars who suggest that there is no reliable
method of measuring or gauging the beliefs, values, validity, or intersubjective, internally
defined criteria of members of an epistemic community and have therefore identified
what I consider to be six objective criteria for identifying the privacy epistemic
community.
In Chapter Four, I present the United States Case Study in which I trace the
activities of a nascent privacy epistemic community of computer scientists, academics,
lawyers, and legislators from the late 1950s to the creation an informal privacy network
that wielded influence through publications, conferences, classes, studies, reports, and
testimony at congressional committee hearings, that led finally to the passage of the
Privacy Act of 1974.
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Chapter Four
The Privacy Epistemic Community and the
United States Privacy Act of 1974: A Case Study
We are rapidly entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is
open to surveillance at all times; where there are no secrets from
government. The aggressive breaches of privacy by the Government
increase by geometric proportions. Wiretapping and "bugging" run
rampant, without effective judicial or legislative control.1
Justice William O. Douglas,
Osborn v. United States (1966)
Introduction
As recounted in Chapter Two, by the mid-1960s the advances in automated data
processing technology had made several communities aware of the threats posed by
computers to the privacy of individuals. Although privacy as a conceptual “right” had
been introduced in 1890 by Brandeis and Warren, it had most frequently been invoked in
the following half century in rather isolated cases addressing specific issues which
incrementally expanded the purview of the Fourth Amendment such as Weeks v. United
States,2 regarding illegally seized evidence, and Olmstead v. United States,3 addressing
wiretapping. In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965),4 the Court first identified individual
privacy a constitutional right that extended to the right of married couples to use birth
control. The general right of individual privacy regarding information collected,
processed, and stored by the government had not been addressed, because the nascent
threat of government computer databanks had not been openly discussed and the public
had not become conscious of the issue.
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Those on the forefront of awareness regarding the threats that advancing
technology posed to the privacy of individuals were the early data processing engineers
and operators who set up and operated the large mainframe computers. Engineers and
operators were often scientists and mathematicians who designed and installed the
hardware, uploaded unique software they wrote---and then maintained hardware,
firmware, and software, and operated processing capability for government agencies or
large industry. In the 1960s there were no computer degrees that trained one to build,
operate, and maintain a computer. The early, highly skilled cadre of data processing
specialists usually held advanced degrees in mathematics, engineering, or the physical
sciences—it was only later that they could rightly claim the moniker of data-processing
scientist and subsequently, computer scientist.5
Genesis of the Privacy Epistemic Community
The Path From Security to Privacy
It was only as an after-thought to the operation of the data processing “computer”
for classified government projects and business-sensitive industrial projects that many of
these early computer scientists became aware of problems of security---and eventually
privacy---in the context of computer operations. Thus it was that the first discussions
regarding the social and legal dimensions of computer data processing revolved around
issues of physical security, access, and control of the computer, its input, and its output.
This would appear to be natural because the relatively small number of mainframe
computers of post-World War II were employed by the federal government, the
department of defense, and defense-related industry. Early security-focused technical
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papers generally explored means and methods of securing and safeguarding critical data
from intrusion and theft. The primary concern was theft of military, government, and
industrial secrets. Only in the late 1950s and early 1960s did the issue of privacy begin to
appear in the literature of computer journals, conferences, and symposia.6
Technical Conferences and the Nascent Privacy Epistemic Community
Computer professional organizations became a primary catalyst in the formation
of the early privacy epistemic community in the United States. Beginning with the
formation of the first computing society, the Association for Computing Machinery
(ACM) in 1947, numerous associate and spin-off computer-centric societies were
established over the next two decades to network, explore, and institutionalize the new
technical computer field. Special Interest Groups, or SIGs, were established within the
ACM to focus on specific specialties and interests within the computer field. Two of
these SIGs appear to have been particularly important in generating security and privacyrelated discussion and papers in the frequent conferences hosted by the ACM. The ACM
Special Interest Group on Computers and Society (SIGCAS), and the ACM Special
Interest Group on Security, Audit, and Control (SIGSAC) both acted as fertile ground for
the gestation of computer security, and later, computer privacy concepts and discussions,
and the formation of the privacy epistemic community.7
Other technology-focused organizations such as the Institute of Radio Engineers
(IRE) and the American Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE) existed side-by-side
with the ACM and participated collectively in annual regional and seasonal joint
conferences. The ACM, IRE, and AIEE jointly sponsored technical conferences such as
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the Eastern Joint Computer Conference (EJCC), Western Joint Computer Conference
(WJCC), the Spring Joint Computer Conference (SJCC), and the Fall Joint Computer
Conference (FJCC). The proceedings of these conferences indicate that the early years
were dominated by highly technical computer sessions, however in the mid-1960s the
issues of information security and privacy in computing databases began to emerge.8
These frequent conferences created a natural environment for like-minded computer
professionals to gather in special interest groups, exchange information and ideas, and
identify problems or issues to be resolved. The SIGCAS and the SIGSAC became
special interest groups that promoted the growing issues of security and privacy in their
conference sessions.
In 1961, the ACM-IRE-AIEE triumvirate merged their organizations with eight
others to form the American Federation of Information Processing Societies (AFIPS).
The AFIPS was the single umbrella organization that represented the entire U.S.
computer field, “ . . . and computer field was the right phrase for the time, because it had
not yet broadened to the information-oriented one that we know today.”9 The AFIPS
continued to sponsor the same several annual computer conferences from 1961 through
1984, when AFIPS and its component organizations IRE and AIEE coalesced to become
the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). Under the IEEE the annual
conferences continued, and again featured sessions and special interest groups (SIGs) that
focused on security and privacy issues, continuing the growth, networking, and
reinforcement of the privacy epistemic community.
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Dr. Willis H. Ware and the Rand Corporation
A central figure in the early privacy epistemic community was Dr. Willis H.
Ware, who joined the RAND Corporation in 1952 after working with John von Neuman
developing early vacuum tube computer prototypes at the Princeton Institute for
Advanced Studies from 1946-1951.10 In the following decades Willis Ware became a
subject-matter-expert in the computer security and privacy epistemic community.11 The
RAND Corporation was founded in 1946 to support the United States Army Air Corps
and became an independent, nonprofit organization, in 1948 with the mission: “To further
and promote scientific, educational, and charitable purposes, all for the public welfare
and security of the United States of America.”12 Because the RAND Corporation
originated within the military, was chartered as a nonprofit, and focused on scientific
pursuits for public welfare, it became an early nexus for computing excellence within the
defense department, the federal government, and within the defense-related industries.13
Many computer scientists, including Willis Ware, worked to develop improved
automated data processing capabilities for the Department of Defense and the Federal
Government, where the largest concentration of, and users of, computers in the 1950s and
1960s were found.14 These technical computer pioneers were the first to confront the
issue of security of data and information---and the derived issue of privacy---in regard to
computer databanks. Ware became the chair of the RAND Corporation’s computer
Science Department and in 1967 led a Defense Science Board task force that investigated
computer security for the first time.15 Ware’s involvement in the security-privacy
epistemic community can be measured by the fact that of the 77 studies and reports listed
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by the RAND Corporation as being authored by Willis Ware between 1953 and 2008, 33
contain the words security or privacy in their title, and most address both security and
privacy.16
Ware was active in the promotion, development, and networking of computer
professionals as well as non-computer scientists who had interests in security or privacy.
He frequently took visible leadership roles in the regional joint conferences conducted by
the Association for Computing Machinery, the Institute of Radio Engineers, and the
American Institute of Electrical Engineers. In 1958, Ware was the Conference Chairman
for the Western Joint Computer Conference (WJCC).17 Subsequently, he was a founder
member, and first president, of the American Federation of Information Processing
Societies (AFIPS) in 1961.18 In 1961 he was also the Conference Chairman of the Eastern
Joint Computer Conference.19 The visibility and reputation that Ware achieved in the late
1960s and early 1970s, both as an active leader in computer professional organizations
and as the security and privacy subject-matter-expert at the RAND Corporation, made
him a natural choice to chair the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in January
1973.20
Privacy Awareness in the United States
The National Data Bank and Congressional Privacy Hearings
In the mid 1960s, at the same time that Willis Ware was authoring several of his
first papers on computer security and privacy at the RAND Corporation,21 other members
of the nascent privacy epistemic community were responding to the Social Science
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Research Council’s proposed creation of a National Data Center. The National Data
Center proposal “advocated a centralization of federal statistical programs based on new
computer techniques of data storage and retrieval.”22 The intent of the proposal was to
create a centralized national database that would facilitate social and economic statistical
research and lead to better understanding of national issues. Ultimately this statistical
research capability would lead to greater knowledge and understanding, and thus better
decisions by leaders and lawmakers. Studies were conducted for the Bureau of the
Budget to evaluate and define the proposal. The Social Science Research Council
Committee on the Preservation and Use of Economic Data began research in 1959 and
delivered its report to the bureau of the Budget in 1965. The “Ruggles Report” strongly
recommended the creation of the National Data Center and described the many benefits
that would accrue to government departments and agencies as a result of such a central
government databank.23 The Ruggles Report and its recommendations were
subsequently evaluated, critiqued, and refined in several additional studies and for a time
a National Data Center appeared to be on the path to realization.24
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when it was proposed that a National Data
Center would collect all government data for the use of statisticians and social
researchers, the American public still had a rather ambivalent relationship with the threat
of computers and their personal privacy. In 1971, the AFIPS and Time Magazine
conducted a national survey inquiring about public attitudes toward computers. Nearly
40% of the respondents felt that the computer posed a real threat to privacy. Yet at the
same time 85% of the respondents felt that their lives had been made better by inventions
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and technology in the previous 25 years.25 Thus, it was not the public that motivated
action in response to the issue of a National Data Center, but congressmen, academics,
and lawyers who recognized the emerging issues and were willing to take action.
Elevation of the proposal for a National Data Center for evaluation and analysis at
the department and agency level triggered intense interest in privacy issues by Congress.
That interest led to extended hearings and debate by numerous congressional committees
and subcommittees over the following several years.26 These congressional hearings on
computer, databanks, and privacy issues tapped the expertise of many individuals who
subsequently became identified as core members of the privacy epistemic community.
From 1965 when computer, databank, and privacy hearings began until 1974, when the
Privacy Act was passed into law, the many hearings, panels and reports generated
provided opportunity for the development of a well-informed and well-networked privacy
epistemic community.
Congressional Hearings and the Privacy Epistemic Community
The Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, chaired by
Senator Edward Long of Missouri, conducted hearings on Invasions of Privacy from
1965-1966.27 Arthur R. Miller, a lawyer and professor at the University of Michigan
Law School, was asked to testify at the Invasions of Privacy hearings about the effects
computers may have on individual privacy. In the preface to his very influential 1971
book The Assault on Privacy: Computer, Data Banks and Dossiers, Miller later wrote:
“Since that first appearance before a congressional subcommittee I have slowly been
devoured by the issue (of privacy), although I must confess that because of the inherent
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fascination of problems of interrelating law and technology I have done little to avoid this
detour from my more traditional research activities.”28 Miller went on to become a key
member of the privacy epistemic community, authoring one of the most often cited and
influential books on privacy, testifying numerous times at congressional hearings, and
serving on the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems
which authored the report that most privacy scholars credit with having the most
influence in the creation of the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974.29
Once congressional interest in privacy-related issues was piqued, the number of
hearings seemed to explode, with more than 30 privacy-related congressional hearings
between 1967 and 1974.30 For example, a Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional rights
held hearings on Psychological Tests and Constitutional Rights in the summer of 1965,
while a House Subcommittee chaired by Representative Cornelius Gallagher, began
hearings under the title of Special Inquiry on Invasion of Privacy that ran from the
summer of 1965 through the spring of 1966. A Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, chaired by Senator Sam Ervin, conducted hearings in the spring of 1971 on the
subject of Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill of Rights.
When describing the many individuals who were drawn to the privacy epistemic
community by the many hearings, studies, and meetings of the late 1960s and early
1970s, Priscilla Regan notes that:
Within the privacy community, personal relationships are critical;
the policy network is cemented by interpersonal relationships
rather than by institutional links. Congressional hearings, OTA
studies, executive agency committees, and privately funded
workshops and conferences provide important opportunities of the
109

privacy community to meet, discuss ideas and policy proposals,
and attract new members.31
Each of these hearings involved congressional legislators, congressional
staff, academic researchers, interest group members, journalists, and the public to
delving into the complex morass of technological, constitutional, and legal issues
that surrounds the evolving right of privacy in the United States. As a result of
many months of meetings involving privacy witnesses and privacy research over
the almost nine years of hearings by various committees from 1965 to 1974, a
large number of hearing participants were educated, motivated, and sensitized to
the issues surrounding the interplay of computer technology, databanks, and
privacy. Many of these hearing participants went on to become active members
in the privacy epistemic community and have continued their active association
with evolving privacy-related issues. Examples of this include privacy epistemic
notables such as Alan Westin, a lawyer and Professor of Law at Columbia
University, who participated in privacy hearings while completing his book
Privacy and Freedom,32 as well as Arthur Miller, mentioned earlier, who
participated in privacy hearings and went on to author the book The Assault on
Privacy. Hope Eastman, acting director of the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) office in Washington D.C.; John Shattuck, who had litigated in areas of
privacy, government secrecy, and political surveillance in 1971-1976 and was
legislative director for the ACLU from 1980-1984; Lewis Branscomb, IBM vice-
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president, author, and technologist; and Willis Ware, RAND Corporation Chief
Computer Scientist, chair of the HEW Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Automated Data Systems, participated in privacy hearings and went on to become
active privacy advocates and long-time privacy epistemic members. Robert
Gellman was an attorney-advisor on the House Information, Justice,
Transportation, and Agricultural Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations in the 1970s and participated in numerous congressional hearings
during which he became an information privacy expert and advocate. He has
become one of the most prolific authors of the privacy epistemic community and
has become a privacy and information policy consultant.33
Numerous academics participated in the privacy hearings of the 1960s and
1970s and became key leaders in the privacy epistemic community. “A number
of academics who wrote about privacy in the 1960s were instrumental in getting
privacy and technology issues on the public agenda and then in testifying and
crafting policy alternatives (became) privacy experts.”34 While Westin and Miller
were two of the earliest, and perhaps best known, academic participants in
congressional privacy hearings, committees, and studies who went on in the
following decades to advocate for privacy issues and legislation as part of the
privacy epistemic community, there have been many other notable privacy
advocates. James Rule, a sociologist specializing in privacy, authored numerous
books on privacy issues, including Private Lives & Public Surveillance: Social
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Contract in the Computer Age,35 The Politics of Privacy,36 and Privacy in Peril:
How We are Sacrificing a Fundamental Right in Exchange for Security and
Convenience,37 and has been active as a distinguished Affiliated Scholar at the
Center for the Study of Law and Society, UC Berkley.38 Marc Rotenberg, who
was an intern with the Privacy and Technology Project at the ACLU under Alan
Westin, later went on to lead the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
(CPSR), now specializes in Information Privacy Law as a law professor at
Georgetown University Law Center, serves as director of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), has authored and coauthored numerous books on
privacy, and has served on many national and international panels and
committees.39 David Flaherty, who studied under Alan Westin and was a
professor at the University of Western Ontario, has written several books on
privacy including Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies.40 “Flaherty
became an active member of the privacy (epistemic) community in this country
(US) as well as internationally and serves as the information and privacy
commissioner in the province of British Columbia, Canada.”41 George Trubow,
who represented the American Bar Association (ABA) at many hearings and
meetings, became the General Counsel to the Committee on the Right to Privacy,
Executive Office of the President, went on to become the Director of the Center
for Information Technology and Privacy Law at John Marshall Law School and
has authored numerous books and journal articles on issues of privacy,

112

information security and government privacy policy.42 That these many privacy
epistemic community members were important in influencing the eventual
passage of privacy legislation is without doubt. Priscilla Regan notes that:
In the case of information privacy, especially government collection and use of
personal information, privacy advocates were the core of the advocacy coalition,
working almost alone for passage of legislation and monitoring implementation
legislation. No other group or interest aligned itself directly with the information
privacy community.43
Congressional privacy hearings generated considerable media interest, and
resulted in an ongoing interest in the privacy issues that continues to the present. For
example, after following privacy hearings, New York Times reporter David Burnham
became part of the privacy epistemic community by following privacy issues and events
as his journalistic specialty and authoring The Rise of the Computer State.44 Motivated
by the important issues revealed in the privacy hearings, Robert Ellis Smith founded
Privacy Journal in 1974 as both an educational and networking medium for the privacy
epistemic community and also as an educational tool for academics, lawyers, and the
general public who wanted to know more about the issues surrounding privacy.45 In
1981 Evan Hendricks began publishing Privacy Times,46 which “provided sustained
coverage of privacy issues and facilitated the maintenance and growth of the privacy
community.”47
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Databanks in a Free Society Project
In 1968, the Russell Sage Foundation,48 a New York based social science research
organization, funded the Project on Computer Databanks for the National Academy of
Sciences Computer Science and Engineering Board. Dr. Alan Westin, who had
participated in congressional hearings and had just published his book Freedom and
Privacy, directed the study which was designed to examine the end-to-end government
and private use of computers for collecting, processing, and using information about
individuals to make decisions regarding the rights, benefits and opportunities of
individuals, and how computerized records might influence privacy and due process.
Michael Baker, Kenneth Laudon, and Robert Belair worked with Westin on the study and
subsequently became active in the privacy epistemic community as lawyers and authors.
The final report, Databanks in a Free Society, was published in 1972 and concluded that
the use of computers had not yet produced the exceptional data collection and
surveillance capabilities that many people concerned with privacy had suggested, but that
policies for computer use had not evolved along with the proliferation of computers. The
report recommended that compulsory data collection be limited and that a new set of “fair
information practices” be established to guide in the collection, processing, and use of
data on individuals.49
HEW Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems
Following the plethora of congressional hearings on technology, computers,
databanks, privacy, and civil rights in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, Elliot L Richardson, established the Secretary’s Advisory
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Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems in May 1972.50 The Committee,
chaired by Willis Ware of the RAND Corporation, included a second member of the
privacy epistemic community, Arthur Miller, who had previously testified at
congressional hearings on privacy and had authored one of the classic books on privacy,
The Assault on Privacy. The Committee was asked to analyze and make
recommendations about four areas of interest:
 Harmful consequences that may result from using automated personal data
systems;
 Safeguards that might protect against potentially harmful consequences;
 Measures that might afford redress for any harmful consequences;
 Policy and practice relating to the issuance and use of social Security
numbers.51
Many observers felt that the creation of the Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems was to serve as a palliative that would assuage the growing concern over
privacy rather than to actually identify policy courses of action that might mitigate the
problem. While “The committees’ membership encompassed a diverse range of expertise
and viewpoints, and the early meeting were conflictual,” the “output of the committee
was surprisingly coherent and influential.”52 The report essentially took the position of
Westin and Miller that technology was the intrusive force that has created an erosion of
personal privacy in society. This intrusive force of technology has created risk of abuse
in all personal information systems and that possibility of abuse requires action to be
taken to preclude injury of the individual. The report implies that the weaknesses of
modern computerized personal data systems are inherent in their structure and that
procedural corrections or controls must thus be implemented to protect society.53 Much
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of the report, therefore, consists of recommendations of the committee based on a tacit
acceptance that the personal-data systems are a fait accompli. Perhaps the most
important part of the report consists of a code of five principles of “fair information
practice” that “assure the individual a right to participate in a meaningful way in
decisions about what goes in records about him and how that information shall be
used.”54 These five principles are:
 There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.
 There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
 There must be a way an individual to prevent
information about him obtained for one purpose from being used
or made available for other purposes without his consent.
 There must be a way for an individual to correct or
amend a record of identifiable information about him.
 Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or
disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure the
reliability of the data for their intended use and must take
reasonable precautions to prevent misuse of the data.55
Some scholars note that these five “fair information practices” parallel the “fair
information principles” of several other countries of about the same time-frame which
suggests that there may have been communication of core privacy and data-privacy
principles over time through a privacy epistemic community among British, German,
Swedish, Council of Europe, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
privacy commissions and experts.56 (See Appendix D for comparison of fair information
practices/principles.) Colin Bennett devotes two chapters of his book Regulating Privacy
to discussions of privacy-data protection “policy convergence,” and suggests that:
“Tracking the genesis of ideas is an inherently difficult enterprise.” However, he says:
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“Nevertheless, one line of development can certainly be traced to the debates in the
United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s among the small number of data
protection experts.”57 These “fair information practices” that Bennett suggests were
generated as a result of the “debates . . . among the small number of data protection
experts,” and were embodied in the HEW Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens
report, are important because they became the core of the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974.
“The Privacy Act of 1974 was written to apply the principles of the HEW report to the
federal government’s use of personal data.”58

The Privacy Act of 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974 was passed at a fortuitous time for the privacy epistemic
community. Nine years of congressional privacy hearings, studies, and commission
reports were punctuated by the Watergate Scandal, a Nixon administration scandal that
stoked public concerns of surveillance, secrecy, and privacy. Surveillance became a
front-page news issue, and no one wanted to appear to be condoning government
surveillance of private persons. Distrust of the government for spying on private citizens
was at an all time high. The resignation of President Nixon appeared to confirm all the
charges of surveillance, spying, and breach of privacy by government in the eyes of
American citizens. Thus, when privacy bills were introduced in Congress in the spring of
1974 they held center stage and garnered exceptional interest both within Congress and
from the American public.
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. . . hearings on a number of privacy bills were held in both the
Senate and the House in 1974. In the Senate, the Committee on
Government Operations, through its Ad Hoc subcommittee on
Privacy and Information Systems, and the Judiciary Committee,
through its Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, held joint
hearings on five privacy bills. The major bill on which debate
focused was S. 3418 introduced by Senators Sam Ervin (D-N.C.),
Charles Percy (R-Ill.), and Edward Muskie (D-Maine).59
Senate Bill S.3418 was comprehensive in that it covered all automated and
manual information systems processing personal information in federal, state, and local
government and also the private sector. It provided for a Federal Privacy Board with full
regulatory authority . . . meaning the board had subpoena powers, the power to hold
hearings, and the power to issue cease and desist orders. The bill established a code of
“fair information practices,” modeled after the HEW committee recommendations, which
gave individuals the ability to see and change their files and to be informed when
information about them was disseminated.
Opposition to Privacy Legislation
Congressional hearings on the proposed bill focused on two contentious issues:
1) Applying the same privacy regulation to both public and private sectors; and 2) The
establishment of a Federal Privacy Board. Both these issues were opposed by federal
agencies and private-sector organizations, and in the end, the opposition was able to have
both issues removed from the final legislation, significantly weakening the final
protections afforded to personal data and information.
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The major argument to having the proposed privacy legislation apply to the
private sector was that there was little evidence to support the contention that there were
abuses in private sector information practices. Congressional hearings and commissions
had focused on government handling of personal data, not the private sector, so the
burden of proof fell to those advocating private sector control to demonstrate abuses of
personal data handling by the government. In the absence of conclusive proof, the
opposition suggested that the private sector companies should adopt voluntary protections
along the lines of codes of fair information practices. Such voluntary adoption of privacy
protection procedures would reduce government regulations that would unnecessarily
burden businesses. In the end, one of the key members of the privacy epistemic
community, Dr. Alan Westin, agreed that it was unwise, at that time, to impose statutory
privacy requirements on private organizations.60
The second major issue of debate was whether a Federal Privacy Board should be
established as part of the new privacy legislation. From the very first hearings, the idea
of a privacy board or a privacy ombudsman had been strongly supported by the privacy
epistemic community, but both the Databanks in a Free Society report under the direction
of Westin and Baker,61 and the HEW Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens
report created under the Chairmanship of Willis Ware, came out against regulation by an
oversight board. The HEW Committee report stated:
We doubt that the need exists or that the necessary public support
could be marshaled at the present time for an agency of the scale
and pervasiveness required to regulate all personal data systems.
Such regulation or licensing, moreover, would be extremely
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complicated, costly and might uselessly impede desirable
applications of computers to record keeping.62
In Senate hearings on S.3418, opposition to a privacy oversight board was again
voiced by both federal agencies and private sector organizations alike. Government
agencies argued against oversight claiming that it would be costly and that they could
accomplish oversight within each agency. The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and the Treasury Department both argued that an oversight agency was costly
and unnecessary, because agencies were accountable for implementing privacy policies
to both Congress and the public. From the private sector side, IBM argued against the
creation of an oversight agency, claiming that fair information practices would protect an
individual’s right of privacy.63 Additionally, President Gerald Ford expressed his
personal belief that the creation of a privacy oversight agency was not needed, stating:
I do not favor establishing a separate Commission or Board
bureaucracy empowered to define privacy in its own terms and to
second-guess citizens and agencies. I vastly prefer an approach
which makes Federal agencies fully and publicly accountable for
legally mandated privacy protections and which gives the
individual adequate legal remedies to enforce what he deems to be
in his own best privacy interest.64
On November 21, 1974, the House and the Senate each adopted separate versions
of the Privacy Act. The primary differences between the two versions were based on the
Senate provision for the creation of a Privacy Protection Commission and greater
restrictions on the use of information. With little time remaining in the legislative year,
the Senate and House Committees opted to have the committee staffs work out a
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compromise. The compromise bill leaned heavily toward the House version, which
applied only to federal agencies and had no oversight agency. A code of fair information
practices would apply to all federal agencies, which ensured that individuals would have
access and knowledge of information in their personal files and the ability to correct their
information. OMB was identified as the organization responsible for implementation and
oversight of the act. A Privacy Protection Study Commission was directed to be
established in order to investigate the need for additional legislation that applied to the
private sector and the need for an oversight organization for federal agencies. Both the
Senate and the House approved the compromise, and President Ford signed the Privacy
Act of 1974 into law on January 1, 1975.65 The Privacy Act was to enter into force on
September 27, 1975.66

Privacy Act Expectations
As passed, the Privacy Act of 1974 represented a compromise between the
privacy epistemic community and the opposition, the federal agencies and private sector
organizations that feared the costs and intrusiveness of additional privacy regulation and
oversight by the federal government. The Privacy Act reflected the minimum privacy
protection that was advocated at the time of its passage. Within the federal government
there was to be awareness and self-policing by agencies and oversight by OMB. But
outside of government there was little regulation, and essential privacy guidance rested
primarily on a code of fair information practice. In the end, even members of the privacy
epistemic community such as Dr. Alan Westin had agreed that it was not the right time to
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impose privacy regulation on private organizations. The argument that carried the day
had been that of cost and burdens of increased regulation and oversight to both the
government and to the private sector. While privacy had been shown to be important in
congressional hearings and reports, it was balanced by the political need to limit the costs
associated with implementing more stringent privacy protections for individuals.67
The privacy epistemic community was willing to “satisfice” for a first Privacy Act
with limited impact because most believed that this was just the first step in achieving
much broader privacy regulation in the future. Likewise, “Congressional advocates of
stronger privacy legislation knew the barriers they confronted, especially opposition from
President Ford. Privacy advocates spoke repeatedly of the Privacy Act as an “important
first step.”68 The privacy epistemic community expected a continuation of high level of
privacy interest that had been displayed over nearly a decade by Congress. The fact that
the Privacy Act included a Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) which was to
investigate the need for a privacy regulatory oversight body and the need to extend the
Privacy Act to cover all private sector organizations was seen as evidence that there
would be a continuing interest and effort on the part of both the wider privacy epistemic
community and Congress.
The privacy epistemic community was represented on the Privacy Protection
Study Commission (PPSC) by two experienced members of the earlier HEW Records,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens report. Willis Ware of the RAND Corporation was
the vice-chairman of the PPSC, while Carole Parsons, who had been the associate
executive director of the HEW Committee, became the executive director of the PPSC.
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In just over two years time the PPSC held 61 days of hearings, with over 300 private
sector witnesses from the major business sectors, such as medical, banking, insurance,
and credit testifying.69 Additionally, questionnaires regarding the handling of private
sector information and the perceived costs and problems that firms would encounter in
complying with proposed private sector privacy legislation were sent to 500 firms.
Business and data processing firms were alerted to the importance of communicating
their concerns to the PPSC by numerous articles that were authored in business journals
and trade publications.70 The activities of the PPSC stimulated the privacy epistemic
community and provided continued growth and development opportunities. Many
privacy epistemic community members who had been associated with the earlier hearings
and committees, which led to the Privacy Act, were attracted to, and participated in, the
PPSC hearings.
The 654 page PPSC report, Personal Privacy in an Information Society,71 which
was released in July of 1977, contains 162 recommendations and “ . . . constitutes one of
the most far-reaching inquiries into organizational uses of personal data ever
assembled.”72 However, the considerable effort by the PPSC, its support staff, and
witnesses in producing the report generated no new privacy legislation. Although the
privacy epistemic community was energized by the two years of concerted interest in
personal privacy, they proved unable to motivate additional action on privacy from
Congress. In its report, the PPSC echoed the earlier HEW report and suggested that a
voluntary approach would be the best near-term means of effecting private-sector privacy
protection. They reasoned that: “ . . . if individuals had the right to assert their interests,
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organizations would find it more attractive to comply voluntarily.”73 Members of the
privacy epistemic community felt that the report placed too much emphasis on voluntary
self-regulation by organizations and too much reliance on individual initiative in
elevating privacy abuses.
The recommendations of the PPSC were forwarded to, and considered by, many
congressional subcommittees. While some hearings were held on the recommendations
of the PPSC, no action resulted. The “window of opportunity” for additional substantive
privacy legislation had passed. Watergate and the surveillance excesses of the Nixon
Administration had receded from the consciousness of the American public, and also
from the immediate consciousness of congressmen.
Following passage of the Privacy Act and the recommendations of
the Privacy Protection Study Commission, congressional interest in
privacy was overshadowed by congressional and executive interest
in the efficiency and effectiveness of programs. Consequently, the
terms of debate shifted from an emphasis on individual rights to an
emphasis on the detection of fraud, waste, and abuse.74
Thus the privacy interests of the public and Congress evolved to the next issue,
improving efficiency and effectiveness by eliminating fraud, waste and abuse using
sophisticated computer matching programs to compare personal data. The privacy
epistemic community turned its attention to the next threat to privacy, Project Match,
which was to compare the computerized files of federal employees with the computerized
files of those who were receiving benefits through programs such as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC). The privacy epistemic community moved on to confront
this next challenge to individual privacy, a challenge that most thought was contrary to
the recent Privacy Act of 1974, for which they had such high hopes.
124

Thus, the U.S. continued in its tradition of enacting narrow, sectoral, privacy laws
that were directed to specific issues, problems, or sectors of society only after they were
widely and clearly identified. This sectoral approach reacts to the threat or issue of the
present instead of proactively responding to the larger threats that loom on the horizon;
threats that can be seen by many technologists and privacy epistemic community
members. The reasons for this narrow, sectoral, reactive approach to privacy protection
will be addressed in the final chapter as part of the analysis of why, with a common
privacy epistemic community working to protect the privacy of individuals, the United
States and the European Union have arrived at such different privacy legislation.

Chapter Summary
This case study traces the influence of key members of the privacy data-protection
epistemic community on the evolution of privacy policy and legislation in the United
States from the late 1950s to the late 1970s. Scientific and technical members of the
computer and database community working for government and industry, such as Willis
Ware, were the first to recognize the threats posed to the privacy of the individual by
these new technologies. Academic and technical papers authored for computer
conferences were the first publications to alert the public to the new privacy problems.
By the mid-1960s congress, lawyers, and academics were actively engaged in hearings,
studies, and publications that sought to define, educate, and legislate bounds on
computers, databases, and surveillance technologies. The privacy epistemic community
grew with new members such as Alan Westin, Arthur Miller, Lewis Branscomb, Robert
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Gellman, James Rule, Marc Rotenberg, David Flaherty, George Trubow, David
Burnham, and Robert Ellis Smith began writing, testifying, and educating Congress and
the public regarding the inherent dangers to privacy posed by the new technologies.
Through the late 1960s and early 1970s numerous congressional hearings and studies
were conducted on privacy issues in which members of the privacy epistemic community
actively participated. However, it was not until 1974, following the Watergate scandal
and the resignation of President Richard Nixon, that Congress finally acted--in the short
time of a few months--to pass the Privacy Act of 1974, the benchmark privacy legislation
of the United States.
The next chapter, Chapter Five, will present the European case study describing
the growth and influence of the privacy data protection epistemic community in Europe
which resulted in the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of
personal data.
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Chapter Five
The Privacy Epistemic Community
and the
Legislation of Data Protection in the European Union
A Case Study
Introduction
A factor of considerable influence was the development of data
protection on the American scene. Almost every issue that
arose in Europe was also an issue in the United States, but at an
earlier time and on a more dramatic scale. It should be
remembered that the modern notion of privacy, around which
the debate on computers and personal freedom was centered, is
basically American in origin.1
Frits Hondius, Emerging Data Protection in Europe
The privacy epistemic community played a critical role in the complex process by
which the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC came into being.2 The following
case study highlights the creation and role of the privacy epistemic community in
influencing and defining the data protection and privacy guidelines, conventions, and
legislation of non-governmental organizations (NGO), States, and the European Union.
As in the United States, the privacy epistemic community in Europe consisted of
individuals who had knowledge of computers and automatic data processing (ADP)
technology, lawyers, academics, businesspersons and politicians who became aware of
the threat to privacy that such technology posed, and then took an active role in the data
protection debates. Unlike in the United States, where the period of time from
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introduction of privacy legislation to enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974 could be
counted in months, the gestation period for the European Union’s Data Directive can be
counted in decades. From the creation of the first data protection law in Germany in
1970, it was twenty-five years to the enactment of European Data Protection Directive in
1995 (and another three years to full implementation in 1998).
This case study describes the process by which data protection awareness
developed and grew in Europe and identifies the role that key members of the privacy
epistemic community that influenced the significant national data-protection legislation
that culminated in European Union Data Protection Directive in 1995.
While in the United States, the awareness of the threat of technology to individual
privacy was first perceived by the technical computer personnel who created the
computer programs and operated the automatic data processing machinery for
government, in Europe the first sense of a privacy threat — or “data threat” as the
Europeans characterized it---came primarily from the privacy epistemic community and
the congressional hearings that took place in the United States in the mid-1960s. The
early recipients of the incipient threat to individual privacy were the lawyers, academics,
and bureaucrats, who were closest to the government data processing systems in the
European nations.
By the end of the 1970s, the privacy epistemic community had expanded to
include influential lawyers, academics, and elected government officials across Europe.
Most of the privacy epistemic community members regularly met under the aegis of the
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Council of Europe (C of E) Committee of Experts and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Committee of Experts. As this chapter will
describe, the initial impetus for data protection evolved in a multi-step process from the
epistemic community formed of C of E and OECD privacy experts, to the national data
protection officials (who participated in national data protection debates, and thus grew to
be part of the larger data protection epistemic community)--and then to the enactment of
the EU Data Protection Directive itself. Finally, the institutionalization of the privacy
epistemic community networking and policy definition through literature, organizations,
conferences, and Internet sites has served to extend the EU Data Protection Directive and
its principles to non-EU governments around the world, and the institutionalization of the
global privacy epistemic community is addressed in closing.
Response to the Privacy Threat
From the early 1950s, the perspective of Europeans regarding the threat of
computers and databases to their personal privacy was somewhat less developed than in
the United States. In the 1950s and 1960s, the great bulk of the data processing computer
technology employed in Europe was of U.S. manufacture. The Europeans thus did not
have the indigenous infrastructure of computer automation specialists found in the United
States. Europeans found themselves as followers of the United States in not just the
technology, but also in the problems, issues, and concerns surrounding security and
privacy dimensions of the end-to-end automatic data processing system. While the actual
privacy concerns in the European Union were much the same as those that produced
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privacy activism in the United States, the Europeans had the advantage of learning from
the experience of the nascent security-privacy epistemic community in the United States.
In the early 1960s, European governments and businesses, with the intent of making their
operations fast and efficient, began installing and employing the then state-of-the-art
computer ADP technologies available. “Some governments envisaged the establishment
of large integrated databases in order to obviate the proliferation of computers in separate
public offices.”3 Early plans to automate government lists, registers, and databases were
often overly ambitious in their descriptions and raised concerns regarding the balance of
power in democratic governments and the increasing power of administrative
bureaucracies.4 In response to these perceived threats to individuals and society,
concerned individuals emerged---joined with others, who like them, recognized the
threat---and over time coalesced into the privacy epistemic community to address the
threat.
When exploring the role of the privacy epistemic community that influenced data
protection and privacy legislation in Europe that led to the ultimate creation of the EU
Data Protection Directive of 1995, two international non-governmental organizations and
three European nations stand out in the literature because of the unique circumstances
surrounding their path to national privacy and data protection legislation. The early, and
continuing, awareness that privacy was threatened by technology---and particularly
information collection and data processing---made the Council of Europe, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Germany, Sweden,
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and the United Kingdom important actors in the creation of what became the European
Union Data Protection Directive of 1995.
Germany is the first of these three nations to respond to the technological threat to
privacy. Germany created the first general data protection law in response to concerns
about the social and individual implications of automated data processing by the state--even though this first data processing law was enacted by the Land, or state, of Hesse in
1970. Sweden, the second of the three, was the first nation to enact broad privacy and
data protection legislation in 1973. Sweden’s approach to data protection has been
unusual and therefore was instructive to other European nations. The third nation, the
United Kingdom, took a long and arduous path in enacting a data protection law, and -some suggest—was forced to act only when the economic disadvantage of not having a
data protection law was fully recognized in the early 1980s.
When considering the data protection movement in Europe, Frits Hondius, an
early member of the privacy epistemic community notes that: “A factor of considerable
influence was the development of data protection on the American scene. Almost every
issue that arose in Europe was also an issue in the United States, but at an earlier time and
on a more dramatic scale. It should be remembered that the modern notion of privacy,
around which the debate on computers and personal freedom was centered, is basically
American in origin.”5
A number of events in the United States motivated the Europeans to become
aware of their own need for data protection legislation. “The writings by American
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authors about privacy and computers (e.g. Westin and Miller), the 1966 congressional
hearings, and the examples set by federal and state legislation, such as the U.S. Fair
Credit Reporting Act of 1970 and the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974, have made a deep impact
on data protection legislation in Europe.”6 Thus not only did privacy events and positive
activities in the United States promote awareness of the nascent need for privacy
protection of the individual in Europe, but publications by Alan Westin7 and Arthur
Miller,8 two early members of the privacy epistemic community discussed in the previous
chapter, were credited with early influence on the European privacy movement. This
influence not only continued, but grew significantly as the Europeans evolved their
concepts of privacy and data protection. As will be seen in the following pages, the
influence of the privacy epistemic community in the United States informed and
motivated the nascent privacy epistemic communities in Europe to seek a similar vision
of the right to privacy---but ultimately led to a significantly different path to achieving
that right of privacy.
Germany
German history created a paradox in German society regarding the issues of
privacy and data protection. While “ . . . order is characteristic of the German mentality,
leading to a regimented society in which it is normally considered desirable for the state
to manage without the direct participation of the citizens . . .”9 the experience of the
repressive governments of the Nazis and the Communists over the previous several
generations conditioned the German people to be wary of state surveillance and state
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power.10 The use of data processing technology by the Nazis to identify and apprehend
German citizens in the 1930s and 1940s was a reminder of the dark side of the power of
data processing by the government.11 Thus, the trust in the state as a source of order has
been tempered with strong skepticism on the part of the German people when it comes to
data collection.
The German Land of Hesse is recognized as being the first government to enact a
general data protection law in response to concerns regarding the impact of automated
data processing by the government.12 This first Data Protection13 Act of the Land of
Hesse was passed in 1970. Because in Germany most federal government administrative
activities are decentralized and conducted at the Land level, it was natural that the
individual Laender were aggressive in automating their administrative processes with
computer automatic data processing technology. Several Laender created their first
automated data processing facilities in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including
Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, and Baden-Wuerttemberg, and in each case rules,
regulations, and general protections for the rights of individuals were incorporated in
guidance regarding the operations of the processing facilities. Hesse, however, was the
first Land to create a separate data protection law that was not directly associated with the
establishment of the data processing facility. The Data Protection Law of Hesse was not
limited to just the data processing facility, but applied to all data collection and
processing in the Land of Hesse. The Hessian Data Protection Law even established a
Hessian Data Protection commissioner who was responsible for data protection
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compliance oversight within the Land.14 Dr. Sprios Simitis, became the first Data
Protection Commissioner (DPC) of the Land of Hesse in 1975. Simitis subsequently
became an internationally recognized expert and advocate for privacy and data protection
whose influence in the privacy epistemic community spread throughout Europe and to the
United States. Although several additional Laender created data protection laws similar
to Hesse, the German Federal Government was not moved to create a data protection law
for several years. Only when proposals for computerization of population registers and
creation of personal identification numbers for each individual in the country were
advanced in 1973 was the need for a federal data protection law recognized in Germany.
The process of creating the federal data protection law was complicated and took
almost four years. Flaherty notes that: “Popular debate in West Germany was low key in
comparison to discussion of the U.S. Privacy Act in the circumstances surrounding
Watergate.”15 There were no study commissions, no open hearings, and no public
recommendations.
The German Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG) was enacted in January 1977
and Professor Hans Peter Bull was appointed as the first federal Data Protection
Commissioner (DPC) in 1978. Spiros Simitis attributed the position of DPC established
by the BDSG to the influence of German lawyers, “ . . . whose National Conference of
Lawyers (Deutsche Jurisentag) instituted a data protection commission in 1972 that set
forth a series of principles for computer regulation.16 Once established in law, however,
the influence of the BDSG was to be found within Professor Bull who, by not being an
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elected politician or a life-long civil servant, took an aggressive position in defining both
the office and the duties of the federal DPC. Bull later observed that, “One of the main
reasons for creating an independent external supervisory authority was that a special
ombudsman would be necessary to whom people could address their complaints about
inadequate processing, and this should be an trustworthy person (or commissioner) not
too much involved in administration itself.”17 At the end of Bull’s five-year term as DPC
the opposition Free Democratic Party (FDP) had come to power. The FDP “ . . . wanted
data protection to pose fewer hindrances to police and security work.” And thus Bull was
not reappointed as DSPC. Bull returned to teaching and the law, but remained a strong
privacy epistemic community voice for data protection in Germany as well as
contributing to the data protection debates and negotiations over the five years (19901995) needed to draft and enact the EU Data Protection Directive. Flaherty suggests that
the success of the German data protection system was attributable to the skills of Hans
Peter Bull.18
Sweden
In 1973, Sweden became the first nation to pass national data protection
legislation. Because it was first, Sweden did not have the advantage of insight, debate,
and experience from other nations on the privacy-data protection issue. Sweden therefore
became an early experiment or “test-bed” for privacy concepts and legislation which
subsequently ” . . . had an enormous and direct influence on the development of data
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protection in Western European countries, even though the exact details of the Swedish
model have not been widely imitated.”19
In addition to being the first nation to implement privacy legislation, two
characteristics acted to propel the privacy-data protection debate to early resolution in
Sweden. First, Sweden employed a policy problem-solving style that has been
characterized as “prospective and preventive” rather than “retrospective and remedial.” 20
In support of this proactive policy creation process, Swedish royal commissions have
long been formal institutional mechanisms that act as policy analysis and evaluation fora,
while the inclusive remiss procedure of including all affected groups and organizations
early in the policy making process ensures that there is agreement and compliance with
the final policy.21 Second, although having a relatively small population, Sweden
employed computer data processing earlier, and in more applications, than other
countries did. Jan Freese, who was Director General of the Swedish Data Inspection
Board (DIB) from 1975-1986,22 estimated in the late 1970s that: “On the average, the
name of every adult, unmarried and conscientious Swede appears in at least 100 personal
files . . . With a population of roughly eight million, Sweden is one of the most
computerized countries in the world.”23
In addition to being a small, highly computerized society, Sweden has also had a
unique history of openness that led naturally to recognition of the need for data
protection. This history of openness, however, accentuated the tension between the
principle of accessible and open information for both government and society, and the
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perils of aggregated personal data in what was becoming an increasingly integrated,
globalized world.
A key influence in the development of the Swedish data protection model, and
one of the most influential members of not only the Swedish data protection epistemic
community, but also the European, was Jan Freese.
Jan Freese, who was a senior staff member of the DIB from its
inception and director general from 1977 to 1986, played a crucial
role as a publicist and activist for data protection. He appeared
regularly in the media to warn about the consequences of record
linkages for increased surveillance in an automated society. Since
high-quality, articulate, and activist leadership is essential to the
success of data protection, Freese exemplifies one path to success.24
Flaherty suggests that the success of the Swedish data protection system was
attributable to the skills of Jan Freese.25 Ultimately, however “Freese’s strong leadership
also contributed to his departure from the DIB, when conflicts of ideology and practice
with the elected government became counterproductive.”26 However, Freeses’s influence
in the larger European data protection epistemic community continued after his departure
from Sweden’s DIB in 1986 through his participation in the Council of Europe
Committee of Experts, the OECD privacy-related working groups, and in debates and
discussions leading to the European Data Protection Directive in the early 1990s.
Bennet also identifies Freese as the central actor in spreading the Swedish data
protection model when he says that:

143

The 1973 Swedish Data Act had a more widespread impact because of
the efforts of a single person, Jan Freese, the Chair of the DIB from
1974 until 1986, who ensured that the Swedish approach was widely
known. Other countries were naturally eager to learn of the early
Swedish experiences of implementation. The Swedish Data Act was
translated into English, French, and German. Delegations of British,
German, French, and other European officials visited Stockholm in the
first years of the act’s existence. Even though its enactment came too
late to influence the deliberations of the Younger and HEW committees,
it aroused keen interest as the first national attempt to regulate data
processing. The Swedish Data Act was regarded as far less relevant in
the United States, however. For many experts its concentration on the
technology rather than on the information as well as its comprehensive
licensing approach to both the public and private sectors rendered the
Swedish approach inapplicable to American conditions.27
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom (UK) had the longest time period between the first
consideration of the privacy-data protection issues and actually passing national privacy
and data protection legislation. In all probability, this was the result of several
dimensions of the UK legal and social system: 1) the UK has no constitution or basic law
that specifically guarantees a right of privacy; 2) privacy-related issues were commonly
addressed under areas of common law such as the laws of confidence, trespass, or
defamation, to which privacy is loosely related; 3) in the 1950s and 1960s privacy issues
were focused on activities of the British press, which indulged in then rakish exposé
journalism of film stars, celebrity personalities, and members of the Royal Family; and,
4) computers and databases were not immediately seen as problems in these early years
of technological implementation.28
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Several parliamentary member’s bills were introduced in the late 1960s that
highlighted a growing interest in, and awareness of the concept of privacy, but none
received recognition or substantial public debate until “Justice,” the British Section of the
International Commission of Jurists, published Privacy and the Law in 1970.29 Nearly
coincident with the “Justice” report, a “Right of Privacy” bill was introduced by Brian
Walden in the House of Commons30 that had been authored by the Committee on Privacy
of the Justice Society. As a result of this bill, the issue of personal privacy of citizens
was debated in the House of Commons, and was thus opened to public discussion for the
first time.31
The broad scope of Walden’s bill and the possible implications of privacy
legislation led to opposition on the part of some business organizations. The press,
seeing possible limitations on their activities, raised freedom of speech issues and
influenced the Labor Government to sideline the Walden Bill by creating a committee to
study the privacy issue and the need for legislation. Thus, in May 1970, one month
before the Labor Government fell in the general election, the Committee on Privacy was
appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Younger.
The terms of reference for the Committee on Privacy were in some ways rather
general as the charter did not specifically identify computers, automatic data processing,
or technology as areas upon which to focus. It merely called upon the committee:
“To consider whether legislation is needed to give further protection to
the individual citizen and to commercial and industrial interests against
intrusion into privacy by private persons and organizations, or by
companies, and to make recommendations.”32
145

Perhaps because of the broad, general nature of the study, the Report of the
Committee on Privacy, presented to Parliament in July 1972, carried greater relevance
and impact than it might otherwise have had. The Committee sought broad input from
across British business and society, and fully one-third of the final report consists of
appendices of contributions from subject-matter-experts in the areas of privacy,
computer, and law. The Report made recommendations that addressed perceived privacy
problems in business sectors such as the press, broadcasting, credit rating agencies,
banks, employment, students and teachers, medicine, private detectives, as well as for
areas of technology such as technical surveillance and computers.33 However, the
Committee stopped short of calling for the creation of a general “right to privacy,”
claiming that additional new laws were not needed, that such a right could compromise
freedom of speech, and that it would be dangerous to enter into adjudication between the
right to privacy and claims of “public interest.”
Regarding the threat of computers to privacy, the Younger Committee felt that the
use of computers in the private sector was not at that time a threat to society, but it did
recommend “ . . . the immediate voluntary adoption by computer users of certain
principles for handling personal information on computers.”34 Additionally, the
Committee identified ten principles for handling personal information (See Appendix
D).35 These ten principles for handling personal information were submitted to the
Committee by the British Computer Society.36 Hondius suggests that: “The Report had a
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great moral effect on computer users, particularly owing to the fact that computer
practitioners were organized in an influential organization, the British Computer Society
(BCS). Its members were bound by a Code of Conduct adopted in 1971 and to computer
users it recommended for consideration a Code of Good Practice, published in 1972.”37
In this case the BCS was part of a wider privacy-data protection epistemic community
that influenced subsequent legislation, not only in the UK but well beyond, by
contributing their expertise in the form of principles for handling personal information.
The ten principles for handling personal information enumerated in the Younger
Report “was the first concise and comprehensive set of such principles to be published
anywhere in the world” according to Paul Sieghart, a key privacy epistemic community
figure in the promotion of data protection legislation in the 1970s and early 1980s.38 The
Younger Principles comprise one of four fair information practice statements that were
promulgated in the 1970s and early 1980s by the UK (1972), the United States (1973),
the OECD (1980), and the Council of Europe (1981). (See Appendix D) Although the
number of “fair practices” and the detail embedded in each varies greatly, the underlying
similarity in basic privacy concepts suggests that common influences, or a common
epistemic community, contributed to their collective creation.39
It appears hard to overestimate the importance of the Younger Committee, for as
Hondius commented:
Outside the United Kingdom, the Younger Report served as a basic
document to many governmental and inter-governmental bodies dealing
with data protection. Several proposals contained in the Report
subsequently made their way into foreign legislation. Moreover, they
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formed the basis for European common rules on the subject. The
Resolutions which the Council of Europe adopted on data protection in
1973 (private sector) and in 1974 (public sector) received a great deal of
inspiration from the Younger Report. The Chairman of the first Council
of Europe committee of experts, which dealt with the matter in
November 1971, Mr. Gerald Pratt, had been Secretary of the Younger
committee. Since the Council of Europe’s Resolutions ((73)22 and
(74)29) were also addressed to the United Kingdom, they did not fail to
bring back as it were via Strasbourg, some of the viable ideas contained
in the famous 10 points.40
However, while the Younger Report was well received and widely respected in
government as a benchmark in the privacy-data protection debate, there was no
immediately forthcoming privacy legislation proposed in Parliament. It was almost three
years later, in December 1975, that the government issued two white papers that
responded to the Younger Report recommendations on computers: the first entitled
Computers and Privacy and the second Computers: Safeguards for Privacy. These
reports “found no evidence of improper use of computers in the public sector,” but at the
same time identified the need for regulation and identified five aspects of computer
operations that could pose a threat to privacy.41
In July 1976, the Data Protection Committee (DPC) or Lindop Committee, was
formed under the chairmanship of Sir Norman Lindop. In the course of its work, the
DPC conducted several studies with the help of more than 300 organizations and
individuals.42 The DPC studies were the first to look at all dimensions of public
(government) and private (business and industry) use of personal data. In their report of
July 1978, the DPC made distinctions between data protection and privacy rights and
148

suggested flexible legislation that would cover all forms of data collection and
manipulation (automated as well as manual). Warren and Dearnley suggest that an
important and lasting impact of the Lindop Committee was that, “Former members of the
DPC continued to lobby the government . . . .“43 Two in particular, Paul Sieghart and
Charles Read, had a significant impact in keeping the pressure on for legislation.
Sieghart was a barrister, a human rights advocate and the primary author
of the Computers and Privacy White Paper. He was involved in
bringing together the members of the Committee other than the
chairman. Read, Director of the Inter-Bank Research Organization, was
described by Lindop as ‘an excellent Committee man.’ In the years
following the publication of the (Lindop) report, both lobbied the
government extensively.”44
Once again, following the DPCs Lindop Report, there was no action for
legislation and a three-year period of “entropy” ensued in which no substantive action
was taken on privacy and data protection in Parliament. However, with the introduction
of the OECD Guidelines in 1980 and the Council of Europe Convention in 1981, pressure
was being applied to the UK to based on the fears “ . . . that UK companies would be at a
disadvantage when competing in the international data processing market without
legislation.”45 Warren and Dearnley note that “ . . . the role of dedicated former members
of the DPC was significant. In addition to Sieghart, Read, representing the banking
community, had been vigorous in campaigning for legislation in the wake of the Council
of Europe Convention.”46 As in the United States, the experience of serving on privacy
committees or commissions conditioned many members to continue to act as part of the
privacy epistemic community.
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Finally, on December 22, 1982, the first Data Protection Bill was introduced in
the House of Lords. Few were happy with the content of the bill. Newspaper accounts
characterized the bill as being motivated by commerce and losing markets instead of
defending individual privacy against computer intrusions.47 Although the bill was
challenged by the Labour Party in standing Committee debates on many points, the
overwhelming Conservative Party victory the previous year allowed the bill to be passed
out of Committee. The Bill was reintroduced in the House of Lords in July 1983, and
with minor modifications voted into law, receiving “Royal Assent on 12 July 1984.”48
In the Data Protection Act of 1984, the UK opted for a minimalist privacy data
protection solution that applied only to automatic data processing and created an isolated
Registrar without an advisory committee to oversee the implementation of the law. There
is good reason to agree with many observers who suggested that in spite of an inordinate
number of well conceived and well documented privacy-data protection studies, reports,
and white papers, the government had settled for a law privileging business, commerce,
and industry over the privacy rights of the individual. Bennet confirms this view when he
says:

“The Council of Europe Convention allows data protection authorities to
refuse the transborder flow of data to countries that do not have adequate
data protection legislation; it thus had a direct impact on those nations
that legislated late. It was generally assumed in Britain that the final
passage of the 1984 Data Protection Act took place for economic rather
than libertarian reasons. Britain feared that personal data protection
could be come a legal pretext for trade protectionism, and would lead to
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the isolation of the country’s data processing industry as well as other
service sectors of the economy that rely on unimpeded communications.
The Conservative government admitted as much in its white paper of
April 1982.”49
The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe (CoE) was the first European institution to become
interested in the privacy of individuals and data protection. Shortly after the founding of
the CoE in 1949, the CoE adopted the first international legal instrument safeguarding
human rights, a Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.50 Thus, from its inception, the CoE has had a primary mission of protecting
the freedoms and rights of its member populations. Since 1968 the CoE has involved
itself with wide-ranging activities regarding the use and influence of computers, with two
primary objectives: 1) to encourage the use of computers and computer science to benefit
the people of Europe, and 2) To assist member states in assessing the impact of
computers on man, society, civil rights, and liberty in Europe.51 In 1971, a CoE
Committee of Experts was established by the Council to focus on problems and issues of
protecting privacy against the threat of electronic computer data banks.52 The Committee
of Experts, all highly informed and knowledgeable on the issues of privacy and data
protection in their respective countries, noted that the issue of protecting privacy from
computer electronic data banks was already a subject of interest in several member-nation
governments, and that the member states should work together on a common position in
order to avoid divergent laws on electronic data processing and the protection of
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privacy.53 The Committee of Experts therefore set about creating a set of principles that
might be applied generally across member nations. Over the past four decades the
Committee of Experts has become a locus of expertise regarding the many convoluted
issues surrounding privacy and data protection. Bennett notes that: “The members of this
committee (Committee of Experts) served a critical role in disseminating expertise and
advice, as they were key actors in domestic data protection efforts at the time.”54
Based on recommendations of the Committee of Experts, in 1973 and 1974 the
Committee of Ministers adopted two resolutions on data protection. The first, Resolution
(73) 22, established principles of data protection for the private sector and the second,
Resolution (74) 29, established principles of data protection for the public sector.55
These two Resolutions led directly to the CoE Convention for the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Treaty 108),
which was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1980, opened for ratification in January
1981, and entered into force on October 01, 1985.56 Bennett notes that:
The committee of Experts . . . served in the critical role of disseminator of
fair information policy. Indeed, the members of this committee were both
the core of the European policy community and the key actors in the
domestic data protection efforts. Every subsequent national commission
report, proposal, or bill has made reference to these two resolutions.57
It must be noted that: “European Conventions and Agreements, however, are not
statutory acts of the Organisation; they owe their legal existence simply to the expression
of the will of those States that may become Parties thereto, as manifested inter alia by the
signature and ratification of the treaty.” 58 Thus the Convention served most European
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nations primarily as a guide to action regarding privacy and data protection as well as a
subsequent template for enactment of national data protection legislation. As was soon
discovered, this led to a lack of uniformity of law as well as enforcement across those
nations that responded to the Convention, and ultimately prompted data protection action
by the European Union.
The CoE Committee of Experts on Data Protection (CJ-PD), later renamed the
Project Group on Data Protection, has continued to have an important investigative,
reporting, and educating role over the past two decades in the extended CoE data
protection community.59 Not only have the studies and reports of the group been
important in defining and clarifying major European privacy and data issues from use of
data by the police sectors, transfer of personal data to third party nations, to biometrics,
smart cards, and smart passports, but many of the CJ-PD members are long time privacy
and data protection subject-matter experts within their home nations.60 Many members
hold, or have held, key positions within CoE member-state privacy organizations and
thus truly qualify as experts in both technical knowledge and privacy-data protection
experience. For example, of special interest regarding the influence of this epistemic
community of data protection experts is the participation of Dr. Spiros Simitis. Dr.
Simitis has had a long history of being an influential member of the Council of Europe
Committee of Experts on privacy and data protection issues as well as a participant in a
broader epistemic community of privacy and data protection experts in the international
legal community. In 1999, Dr. Spiros Simitis, a Professor at Johann Wolfgang Goethe
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University of Frankfurt am Main and Director of the Research Centre for Data Protection
(Germany), authored a CoE report entitled “Revisiting Sensitive Data,” which reviewed
and analyzed responses to the Questionnaire of the Consultative Committee of the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data (ETS 108) held in Strasbourg from 24-26 November 1999.61
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Composed of 20 countries when the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) was founded in 1960, the OECD consists of 30 member-nations in
2009.62 The OECD brings together the governments of countries committed to
democracy and the market economy from around the world to support sustainable
economic growth, boost employment, raise living standards, maintain financial stability,
assist other countries' economic development, and contribute to growth in world trade. 63
The OECD played a leading role from the late 1960s in influencing a broad array
of computer policies, and by extension, privacy and data protection policies. In the
context of this broad mission, the emerging problems of data security, privacy, and data
protection became important issues for member-states. Initially, the broader issues
surrounding the employment of computers in business and international trade dominated
the OECD agendas---privacy was not the central issue. Only after Council of Europe
efforts had clarified the issues surrounding privacy and data protection in the
international context did the OECD become proactive and make privacy a principal
effort.64
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Based on the hypothesis that post-industrial society would depend upon
information as a production factor, the OECD created a Computer Utilization Group in
1969 that, working in concert with the Information Policy Group and the Committee for
Science Policy, studied a wide variety of computer-related issues, including: “electronic
data banks, interaction of computers and telecommunications, computer manpower
education, computer utilization surveys, efficiency audits for computer systems, and
potential of information technology in urban and regional planning.”65 The OECD
focused specifically upon the problems associated with privacy and data protection by
creating a Data Bank Panel that conducted seminars on issues such as trans-border data
flows, personal identifiers, and data protection guidelines. By 1975, the several OECD
computer and privacy-data protection groups had documented their reports and
recommendations by publishing more than ten volumes of the OECD Informatics
Studies.66 This early work was subsequently incorporated into the current OECD
guidance on privacy policy and practice for OECD members.67
The influence of the OECD in framing privacy and data protection issues,
sponsoring conferences, working groups and panels, and creating a set of guidelines
available to members and non-members alike has had a significant impact on privacy
legislation in Europe. Hondius suggest that there have been three reasons for the success
of the OECD regarding computer-related problems:
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First, the OECD is the only international organization which has
tackled studies of informatics in their broadest sense, in conjunction
with the study of policies for future society. Secondly, OECD is the
only platform for regular exchange of information between countries
in four continents having a similar political, economic, and social
system. For example there is a close affinity between data protection
problems and solutions in Europe and North America. Via OECD
ideas have been exchanged between American and European
Legislators. In the future the transfrontier data flow problems between
the United States and Canada will be relevant case studies for similar
transfrontier data flows in Europe. Eventually, a point may be reached
where such problems will arise also between America and Europe.
In the third place, the working methods of the OECD have been
particularly conducive to fruitful results. Consequently, OECD
documents are widely used also by other international organizations.68
The OECD responded to privacy-data protection threats posed by advances in
computer-communications technology through Committees of Experts, studies, and
conferences that address nascent privacy-data protection issues. The OECD thus served
as a crossroads for the privacy-data protection epistemic community of its membernations, expanding privacy-data protection related knowledge throughout its membership.
The European Union Data Protection Directive of 1995
Through the efforts of the data protection epistemic community previously
described, by the late 1980s seven of the twelve nations of the European Community had
created data protection legislation.69 However, even though there was a general
consensus on the need for data protection among these nations, the actual data protection
laws of the seven varied widely.
The Council of Europe Conventions and OECD Guidelines on data privacy had
been only partially effective in motivating member states to create data protection laws.
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There was no uniformity across the seven states that had such laws--and no uniformity of
enforcement. The five member nations that did not have data privacy laws showed no
inclination to pass data protection laws anytime soon.
It was in this climate that the European Commission decided that there were
critical economic issues at stake associated with the harmonization of data protection law
among member nations that required the Commission to act. The creation of the Internal
(Common) Market, which was scheduled to be instituted in 1992, would require the
unimpeded flow of personal information throughout the EU. Obviously, the conflict in
data protection laws would create a significant obstacle to the smooth and unobstructed
flow of trade across the EU — a primary goal of the Internal Market movement.
There were three major “interests” that collided in 1990 to 1995 in the search for
an EU-wide data protection standard in the face of impending completion of the common
Internal Market: 1) interests in the EU common Internal Market that sought to achieve a
common, level, unobstructed integration of all member-nation economies; 2) interests of
a uniformly high standard of personal privacy-data protection across the EU; and,
3) busin

ess interests that feared obstacles to customer data processing and

significant increases in costs as a result of data protection legislation. Each of these three
interests attempted to advance their positions in the course of the five years of negotiation
necessary to finally enact the EU Data Protection directive of 1995.70
Representatives of the seven countries that already had data protection laws in
place, all of whom were members of the privacy epistemic community by virtue of their
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close and continued association with their national and transnational data protection
community, argued for community-wide data protection legislation in the late 1980s.
They pointed out that citizens of those member-countries that already had data protection
in place could find their privacy rights violated in nations that had little or no regulation.
Three data protection events occurred in late 1989 that clearly demonstrated the
problems associated with transborder data flows in an environment of uneven (or no) data
protection law. In July 1989 the French Data Protection Authority (Commission
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés or CNIL) threatened to block data transfers of
employees between Fiat’s corporate offices in France and in Italy. The CNIL argued that
Italy’s data privacy rules were inadequate to protect the data, and therefore personal
information about French citizens could not be transferred. Fiat Italy was forced to find a
solution to the refusal of the CNIL to allow the transfer of data. Resolution of the
impasse came when Fiat Italy signed a data protection contract in which it agreed to
protect personal data coming from Fiat France in accordance with CNIL rules. This first
episode clearly demonstrated how conflicting national data protection rules could perturb
routine business activities between nations.71
A second data transfer event took place just two months later, in September 1989,
when the CNIL blocked the plans of the Gustave Roussay Institute, a French cancer
research center, to join the Belgian-based European Organization for Research and
Treatment of Cancer (EROTC). The CNIL pointed out that Belgium did not have
national data protection legislation in place, and therefore the Gustave Roussay Institute
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could not send sensitive medical data to Belgium until such legislation was enacted by
Belgium.72
A third imbroglio took place over the Schengen Agreement for free movement of
persons and labor among Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
In order to secure the new external border encompassing these members to the
agreement, a Schengen Information System (SIS) was proposed to network the existing
border control and national customs databases so as to allow mutual policing of national
borders. The Germans and French raised the issue that Belgium did not have a data
protection law with the result that data protection experts from France, Germany, and
Luxembourg objected to the violation of their national data privacy laws by sharing
sensitive police information with Belgium. Only after Belgium bowed to pressure from
the data protection community and pledged to expedite data protection legislation, were
the data protection clauses and monitoring authority for the SIS developed.73
With the increasing frequency of data protection issues arising within the
community, the European Commission was forced to act. In 1990, with the impending
creation of the EC Internal Market in 1992, the European Commission’s Internal Market
Directorate drafted the first data protection directive. Over almost five years the data
directive legislation was debated and modified in response to three powerful
constituencies: 1) The EC Commission and Internal Market Directorate that sought a
level and unobstructed internal common market and trade environment; 2) the privacydata protection epistemic community that represented the goals of data protection
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commissions of seven nations, the OECD, and the Council of Europe, and data protection
human rights; and, 3) the European business and trade community, that wanted no
increase in business regulation, trade restrictions, or costs related to privacy and data
protection legislation.
Efforts by the data protection authorities to draft a common data protection
position for the EC began at the Eleventh International Conference of Data Protection
Officials held in Berlin in 1989.74 The strongest argument for a common EC data
protection law was premised on the experience of Germany, which had already had
several data processing companies relocate outside of Germany in order to avoid the
strict German data protection laws. Obviously, businesses that depended on consumer
data would relocate to data privacy havens where there were few or no restrictions on
their collection and use of personal data. Data commissioners from the seven nations that
had passed data protection laws pointed out that if the remaining five nations did not
institute data protection laws by the time of the creation of the common Internal Market
in 1992, that the five nations would have to be treated as if they were outside of the EC
and the common market.
Recognizing that the Internal Market could never be achieved without uniform
data protection law across all member nations, the Internal Market Directorate became
the focal point for the creation of the first draft of EC data privacy legislation. Data
protection commissioners took an active part in drafting and amending data protection
legislation. After review, oversight, and amendment of proposals by data protection
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commissioners---through three major revisions---accommodation among the parties was
finally reached on the structure of data protection legislation.
After almost five years of long and difficult negotiations, Directive 95/46/EC, on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data of the European Parliament and of the Council was passed on
24 October 1995. As a directive, 95/46/EC addresses only the member states, and is not
legally binding on citizens. Each member state was required to transpose the directive
into internal law by the end of 1998. All member states have enacted their own data
protection legislation.
A significant feature of the European Data Protection directive has proven to be
Article 29, which created a standing committee of national data protection experts
consisting of one member from each EU member country, called the Article 29 Working
Party. The effect of Article 29 has been to formally institutionalize the nucleus of a
European privacy-data protection epistemic community. Article 30 identified the duties
and tasks required of the Article 29 Working Party such as studying emerging data
protection issues, advising the European Commission on data protection issues
concerning the internal market, evaluating and making recommendations regarding the
privacy protection in non-EU countries that desire to do business with citizens and
businesses of the EU, and creating an annual public report “on protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data in the Community and in third
countries.”75
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The role of the Article 29 Working Party in evaluating and coordinating data
protection throughout the EU, as well as beyond the borders of the EU, has greatly
expanded in the past decade. Because the Working Party authors’ opinions,
recommendations, and working documents are based on the expertise of data protection
experts from each EU member nation, their influence has increased as organizations and
nations external to the EU have realized that they could seek the guidance of the Working
Party and preclude confrontation with the European Commission.76 The Article 29
Working Party thus represents a significant node of the privacy-data protection epistemic
community in communicating, educating, and influencing privacy-data protection issues
globally.
Two developments of the past several decades have influenced the growth and
maintenance of the global privacy-data protection epistemic community. The first is the
development and expansion of the Internet as a global communications tool, and the
second has been the creation of periodic privacy and data-protection conferences held
around the world. These two developments within the privacy-data protection epistemic
community act as catalysts in informing, educating, and influencing privacy-data
protection members from diverse academic, business, technical and social backgrounds
regarding basic principles and rights regarding privacy and data protection. Appendices
A and B identify some of the prominent privacy-data protection organizations that have a
permanent Internet presence and authority in privacy-data protection issues. By having a
permanent presence on the Internet, these organizations transcend the original life-cycle
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limitations of the epistemic community as described by Haas, Adler, and others. The
Internet provides a ubiquitous, physical presence and connectivity for the global privacydata protection community in which they can participate in nascent and evolving issues
on a daily, if not minute-to-minute basis. Thus, members of the privacy-data protection
epistemic community are no longer limited to single-events, but continue developing
their knowledge and expertise in the evolving privacy data protection issue-area by being
constantly informed by other epistemic community members worldwide.
The second development that has influenced the growth and maintenance of the
global privacy data protection epistemic community is the proliferation of the conference.
The first annual International Data Protection Commissioners Conference was held in
1979. The 31st annual International Data Protection Commissioners Conference will be
held in Madrid in November 2009.77 Over the past three decades these conferences have
provided opportunities for networking, education, and debate on salient privacy-data
protection issues. Newman says that trans-governmental cooperation in privacy-data
protection intensified across the EC starting with the first annual International Data
Protection Commissioners Conference and, “Over a ten-year period, the
transgovernmental network of data protection agencies built up their credibility as data
privacy experts and developed a coherent proposal for action at the EU level.”78
Newman thus believes that the International Data Protection Commissioners Conferences
played an important role in the development of the common proposal of the EU data
privacy epistemic community of experts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Continued
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participation by privacy-data protection epistemic community experts will continue to
inform the evolution of privacy–data protection legislation, not only in the EU but
globally.
Chapter Summary
The privacy-data processing epistemic community in Europe evolved in response
to the perceived need for national legislation to protect the privacy of the individual
citizen from automated data processing (ADP) systems instituted by the government as a
means of increasing efficiencies in state-run social programs.
Following the early creation of several national privacy-data protection laws, two
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Council of Europe and the OECD,
recognized the nascent problems both public and private ADP posed and created
committees of experts, working groups, and conferences to study privacy-data processing
problems and make recommendations. These committees, working groups, and
conferences became networking opportunities for members of the privacy-data protection
epistemic community, most of whom were already privacy-data protection subjectmatter-experts in their respective European nations. The OECD adopted Privacy
Guidelines in 1980, and the Council of Europe issued its data protection Convention in
1981. Both the OECD Guidelines and Council of Europe Convention allowed
considerable variation in both the execution and the enforcement of data protection law—
which resulted in great variation in privacy-data protection laws in the seven of twelve
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member nations that legislated data protection laws. Five of the twelve EC nations chose
not to create data protection law.
Following several data protection events in the late 1980s that demonstrated the
problems associated with transborder data flows in an environment of uneven (or no) data
protection law; the European Commission was forced to act. In 1990, with the
impending creation of the EC Internal Market in 1992, the European Commission’s
Internal Market Directorate drafted the first data protection directive. Over almost five
years the data directive legislation was debated and modified in response to three
powerful constituencies: 1) The EC Commission and Internal Market Directorate that
sought a level and unobstructed internal common market and trade environment; 2) the
privacy-data protection epistemic community that represented the goals of data protection
commissions of seven nations, the OECD, and the Council of Europe, and data protection
human rights; and, 3) the European business and trade community, that wanted no
increase in business regulation, trade restrictions, or costs related to privacy and data
protection legislation.
After almost five years of long and difficult negotiations, Directive 95/46/EC, on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data of the European Parliament and of the Council was passed on
24 October 1995. As a directive, 95/46/EC addresses only the member states, and is not
legally binding for citizens. Each member state was required to transpose the directive
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into internal law by the end of 1998. All member states have enacted their own data
protection legislation.
In the following Chapter Six, the privacy-data protection models of the United
States and the European Union will be analyzed and compared. Though both the United
States and the European Union share similar perceptions of the privacy-data protection
problem, a similar privacy-data protection epistemic community of literature, subjectmatter-experts, conferences, and internet Web sites, the privacy-data protection models or
“regimes” of the two are very different. While the European Union chose a
comprehensive or “omnibus” privacy-data protection approach, covering all aspects of
the economic, political and social environments, the United States chose a limited or
“sectoral” approach that addresses only specific issues and problems as they arose.
Chapter Six will explore, among other issues, how and why the United States and the
European Union chose such dramatically different responses to the common privacy-data
protection problem.
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Chapter Six
Analysis and Conclusion
At an early stage in the (privacy data-protection) debate, when
the problems of computerization in government were first
being recognized, the motivation to draw lessons from the early
adopters (Sweden and the US) was strong, and thus the same
transnational policy community emerged and coalesced.
Conceptually, this process is little different from the “epistemic
communities” identified in the international political economy
literature (of Peter Haas).
By the mid-1970s, however, this policy community, working
within the forums of the OECD and the Council of Europe also
recognized the interdependence of global communications, the
incipient problem of transborder flow and the consequent need
to harmonize (privacy data protection legislation).1
Colin J. Bennett, Understanding Ripple Effects
Introduction
This dissertation journey began with a discussion of the concept of privacy,
describing how the concept of privacy had evolved and grown from antiquity to the postCivil War era, when technological advances in newspapers, telegraph, telephone, and
individual box cameras brought changes in the concept of privacy that resulted in Warren
and Brandeis “inventing privacy law”2 through their essay The Right to Privacy.3 For
more than a half-century the privacy concepts enunciated by Warren and Brandeis grew,
expanded, and were tested in courts across the United States.
The U.S. Privacy Case Study found in Chapter Four describes the burst of
technological innovation in computers, databases, and surveillance that followed the
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Second World War and created a threat to individual privacy that galvanized privacy
concerns across the nation and promoted the creation of the nascent privacy dataprotection epistemic community. It is the existence, growth, and influence of that privacy
data-protection epistemic community, first in the United States and then in the European
Union, that has been the focus of this research. In the remainder of this chapter I will
analyze evidence from the two case studies and the epistemic community literature and
respond to the three research questions posed in Chapter One:
1) Does a (single) privacy epistemic community exist?
2) Did the privacy epistemic community influence privacy legislation in the United
States and the European Union?
3) With the influence of a single privacy epistemic community, why was the
resulting policy and legislation so dramatically different in the United States
(Privacy Act of 1974) and the European Union (Directive 95/46/EC On the
Protection of Personal Data)?
Evidence Addressing the First Research Question:
Does a single privacy epistemic community exist?
Employing the criteria identified in Chapter Three and evidence found in the
Chapter Four and Chapter Five Privacy Case Studies regarding process, influence, and
U.S.-EU policy-legislative outcomes we find both direct and indirect evidence of the
existence of the privacy data-protection epistemic community.
Based on the six objective criteria identified in Chapter Three, a single privacy
epistemic community has existed for at least four decades. Our six objective criteria
were: 1) Recognized professional/technical expertise or “standing” in privacy issues;
2) Privacy publications; 3) National and international organizations with a privacy
component; 4) Privacy websites on the Internet (after the Internet was established);
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5) Periodic privacy conferences; and, 6) Participation in government hearings, testimony,
and other legislative meetings.
The U.S. Privacy Case Study in Chapter Four and the EU Privacy Case Study in
Chapter Five provide the following evidence regarding the six criteria by which I confirm
the existence of the privacy data-protection epistemic community.
1) Recognized Professional/Technical Expertise or “Standing” in Privacy Issues
From the late 1950s, individuals can be identified who were recognized for their
professional/technical expertise or “standing” in privacy issues, and who subsequently
became active participants in the privacy data-protection epistemic community.
Identified in the U.S. Privacy Case Study in Chapter Four were individuals such as Willis
Ware of the RAND Corporation, who was one of the first to recognize and write about
the threats of computers, databases, and surveillance to the citizen. Other privacy
epistemic community members introduced in the two case studies who established their
professional/technical credentials and played important roles in influencing privacy dataprotection policy and legislation include Alan Westin, Arthur Miller, Lewis Branscomb,
Robert Gellman, James Rule, Marc Rotenberg, David Flaherty, George Trubow, David
Burnham, Robert Ellis Smith, Evan Hendricks, Spirios Simitis, Frits Hondius, Hans Peter
Bull, Jan Freese, and Paul Sieghart.
2) Privacy Publications
Privacy publications have been authored by most privacy epistemic community
members as a means of establishing their professional and technical expertise or
“standing” on privacy issues within the community. For example, as noted in Chapter
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Four, Willis Ware authored 77 studies and reports between 1953 and 2008, of which 33
contain the words security or privacy in the title, and most address both security and
privacy.4 Alan Westin has been a prolific author of privacy literature and studies,5 to
include classics in the privacy literature such as Privacy and Freedom,6 and Databases in
A Free Society. Arthur Miller secured his privacy credentials with The Assault on
Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers, in 1971.7 Robert Gellman has been a
prolific author and commentator on privacy issues in journal articles, essays, and
Congressional Legislative Reports.8 The sociologist James Rule has authored books on
privacy such as Private Lives and Public Surveillance: Social Control in the Computer
Age,9 The Politics of Privacy,10 Privacy in Peril,11 and Global Privacy Protection: The
First Generation.12 Marc Rotenberg, a law professor at Georgetown Law School and
Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), has co-authored
and edited privacy books with other privacy epistemic community members such as
Daniel Solove, Paul Schwartz, and Phillip Agre to include Information Privacy Law,13
Privacy, Information, and Technology,14 and Technology and Privacy: The New
Landscape.15 David Flaherty authored two classics in the privacy literature, Privacy in
Colonial New England,16 and Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal
Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States.17 Professor
George Trubow was the director of the Center for Information Technology & Privacy
Law and oversaw publication of the Journal of Computer & Information Law at The John
Marshall Law School.18 David Burnham covered privacy issues as a journalist and
became a privacy epistemic community member, authoring The Rise of the Computer
State.19 Robert Ellis Smith, lawyer, expert witness on privacy, and publisher of Privacy
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Journal has authored numerous journal articles and books, to include the privacy history:
Ben Franklin’s Website: Privacy and Curiosity from Plymouth Rock to the Internet.20
Since 1981, Evan Hendricks has been the Editor/Publisher and founder of Privacy Times,
a Washington, D. C.-based newsletter and has published nearly 3,000 pages covering a
wide range of privacy and information law subjects. Spirios Simitis, German jurist, Data
Protection Commissioner, and Chairman of the Council of Europe’s Experts Committee
on data protection has authored numerous essays on privacy issues.21 The life-long
German privacy expert Frits Hondius authored the earliest survey of privacy in Europe,
Emerging Data Protection in Europe, in 1975.22 Jan Freese, Director General of the
Swedish Data Inspection Board, authored The Computerization of Society,23 describing
the growing reliance on computers by all sectors of society. This overview of some of
the key privacy epistemic community members supports the finding that publication of
privacy books and essays has been an important means of establishing professional and
technical expertise or “standing” on privacy issues within the community.
3) National And International Organizations With a Privacy Component
As noted in the case studies in Chapters Four and Five, the central organizations
with a privacy component that facilitated networking for the privacy data-protection
epistemic community were the Council of Europe and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The privacy components within these two
organizations were the Committee of Experts on Data Protection24 and the Working Party
on Information Security and Privacy (under the auspices of the Committee for
Information, Computer and Communications Policy25) respectively. Additionally,
dozens of organizations facilitate networking, communication, and education on privacy
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issues, problems, policies, and legislation. See Appendix A for an overview of key
organizations with a privacy component.
4) Privacy Websites on the Internet
Privacy websites on the Internet are an important tool for communication,
education, and networking among members of the privacy epistemic community. The
Internet has enabled a multitude of permanent privacy epistemic community fora to
network, educate, and inform the global privacy epistemic community on a nearly infinite
list of privacy-data protection topics, issues, and events.26 Through the Internet, the
privacy epistemic community has become a truly permanent and ubiquitous presence at
dozens of highly developed and active sites that focus on privacy-data protection issues.27
See Appendix B for privacy websites associated with dozens of privacy organizations.
5) Privacy Conferences
Privacy conferences are important networking opportunities for members of the
privacy data-protection epistemic community. Members of the single trans-Atlantic
privacy data-protection epistemic community regularly network at international
conferences such as the Annual Conference of Data Protection Commissioners, initiated
in 1979 and now in its 31st year28, the British sponsored International Conference on
Privacy Laws and Business29, and the Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conferences held
in the United States.30 Bennett notes that: “Scholars of international relations would
conclude that a cross-national epistemic community had coalesced by the end of the
1980s.”31 Academic institutions of higher learning and law schools also frequently
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sponsor conferences and symposia on privacy.32 See Appendix C for selected privacy
data-protection conferences.
6) Participation in Government Hearings, Studies, Testimony, and Other Legislative
Meetings
As noted in the case studies in Chapters Four and Five, members of the privacy
epistemic community regularly participate in government hearings, studies, and
legislative meetings, providing their expertise in privacy issues to decision makers and
legislators. For example, Willis Ware chaired the Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Personal Data Systems in 1972; Arthur Miller was a
member of the same Secretary’s Advisor Committee, as well as a subject matter expert in
many other privacy hearings; Alan Westin testified at numerous privacy hearings and
chaired several privacy studies, to include Databanks in a Free Society, National
Academy of Sciences Study on Computers, Record-Keeping and Privacy33; and David
Flaherty, likewise has testified at privacy hearings. Specific privacy epistemic
community members’ participation in key privacy hearings and studies are discussed in
more detail in the case studies found in Chapters Four and Five.
Evidence Addressing the Second Research Question:
Did the privacy epistemic community influence privacy policy and legislation
in the United States and the European Union?
As shown in the case studies in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, the influence of
privacy data-protection epistemic community members was woven throughout the
studies, hearings, reports, and discussions preceding the adoption of privacy legislation in
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the United States and the European Union. Beyond the involvement in important privacy
hearings and critical privacy studies described in the two case studies, evidence of their
influence comes from statements attesting to their influence. For example, the influence
of the U.S privacy data-protection epistemic community in sensitizing Europeans to the
issues of privacy was professed by Frits Hondius, when he observed that:
A factor of considerable influence was the development of data
protection on the American scene. Almost every issue that arose
in Europe was also an issue in the United States, but at an earlier
time and on a more dramatic scale. It should be remembered that
the modern notion of privacy, around which the debate on
computers and personal freedom was centered, is basically
American in origin.34
Additional recognition for the influence of the privacy data-protection epistemic
community on the privacy policy and legislative process is found in the literature of
privacy data-protection epistemic community members such as Bennett, who states:
At an early stage in the (privacy data-protection) debate, when the
problems of computerization in government were first being
recognized, the motivation to draw lessons from the early adopters
(Sweden and the US) was strong, and thus the same transnational
policy community emerged and coalesced. Conceptually, this process
is little different from the “epistemic communities” identified in the
international political economy literature (of Peter Haas).
By the mid-1970s, however, this policy community, working within
the forums of the OECD and the Council of Europe also recognized
the interdependence of global communications, the incipient problem
of transborder flow, and the consequent need to harmonize (privacy
data protection legislation).35
While Bennett actually identifies the process by which privacy data-protection
experts coalesced into an epistemic community, other such as Burkert, describe rather
specifically how members of the privacy epistemic community acted to influence the
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privacy data-protection policy and legislation. As this influence was described by
Burkert:
Epistemic communities are—in the words of Braithwaite and
Drahos—“loose collections of knowledge-based actors who share
certain attitudes and values and substantive knowledge, as well as
ways of thinking about how to use that knowledge.” It had been a
relatively small group of such actors—their names are now inscribed
in the hall of fame of data protection—who had helped to transform
data protection from a scholarly concept into an operational
regulatory concept. These persons appeared and re-appeared
whenever a national government or international institutions were
discussing data protection. In their testimonies they could mutually
reinforce their arguments, refer to each other’s authority and
succeeded in establishing an international state of the art for data
protection regulation.36
Fair Information Practices
One of the indirect indicators of the influence of a privacy epistemic community
on privacy policies can be found by examination of the similarities or common concepts
found in declarations of “first principles” of individual privacy data-protection, often
expressed as fair information practices (or principles) (FIP).37 Codes of fair information
practice were advanced by U.S. and European privacy study groups and NGO expert
committees as guides to the principles that underlie individual privacy in an age of
advancing digital technology. Privacy scholars find a remarkable similarity and
consistency in the ‘basic rules’ of privacy data-protection principles found in these FIP.38
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1972
1973
1973

1974
1980
1981

Table 6.1 Fair Information Practices/Principles (FIP) Sources
Report on the Younger Committee on Privacy39 (First FIP)
Council of Europe Resolution (73) 22 On The Protection Of The
Privacy Of Individuals Vis-Àvis Electronic Data Banks In The
Private Sector, 26 September 1973.40
Code of Fair Information Practice and Rights of Individual Data
Subjects in Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens: Report
of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems.41
Privacy Act of 1974 (Incorporated FIP)42
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, 23 September 1980.43
Council of Europe Convention No. 108, 1981, Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data.44

The United States and the EU have both subscribed to very similar FIP concepts
of privacy safeguards and privacy outcomes that are needed to protect the privacy of their
citizens. See Appendix D to compare FIP text from key privacy documents of the 1970s
and 1980s and note the similarities. Many scholars observe that, although the language
and the number of individual items in these fair information practice collections vary, the
content of the fair information practice codes are all remarkably similar.45 This broad
consistency in fair information practice may be attributed to the presence of the privacy
epistemic community that informed and educated policymakers across the North Atlantic
community.46
Finally, although not specifically employing the phrase “privacy data-protection
epistemic community,” the influence of epistemic community members has been
identified by scholars though the process was described in other terms:
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. . . privacy has over time assumed the characteristics of a policy
sector: a set of statutory instruments; a community of privacy agencies
that possess a range of regulatory, advisory, educational, and quasijudicial responsibilities; a circle of legal experts; a group of journalists
ready to publicize abuses of personal information; a small but
important network of private sector lobbyists and consultants; a
growing academic community from law, social science, computer
science, and business faculties; and public officials in national
governments and international arenas such as the European Union
(EU), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), Council of Europe, and others.47
Evidence Addressing the Third Research Question:
Why did the influence of the privacy epistemic community result in dramatically
different privacy legislation in the United States (Privacy Act of 1974) and the
European Union (Directive 95/46/EC On the Protection of Personal Data)?
The U.S. Privacy Case Study in Chapter Four and the EU Privacy Case Study in
Chapter Five focus on the influence of the privacy epistemic community in privacy
policy and legislation. However, since the policy and legislative results were so different
in the U.S. and the EU, it is necessary to determine what other intervening variables
could be at work in influencing decision makers. The epistemic community literature
suggests that there are three additional intervening variables that enter into policy and
legislation decisions: 1) economic considerations;48 2) socio-cultural considerations;49
and, 3) political considerations. I will review each of these intervening variables in turn.
A Framework for Analysis
As an aid in analyzing the economic, socio-cultural, and political factors that have
been put forth in the literature attempting to explain why, given the common antecedents
and understanding of the technological threat to privacy, that privacy legislation in the
United States and the European Union have evolved so differently, I have adapted for my
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discussion the graphic of a four-sided “diamond” similar to those often invoked in
analysis of comparative politics. These four dimensions are best visualized in the foursided graphic below, depicting the influence of the Privacy Data-Protection Epistemic
Community, Economic, Social-Cultural, and Political considerations on the privacy dataprotection policy and legislative process in the United States and the European Union.

Figure 6.1: A Framework for Analysis50
Privacy Data-Protection Legislation Influences
Privacy Data-Protection
Epistemic Community

Economic

Policy

Political

Socio-Cultural
Intervening Variables in the Public Policy Process
The importance of intervening variables has been recognized in comparative
policy studies for more than four decades. Policy studies across the states of the United
States as well as in cross-national studies, have suggested that: “policy differences . . .
might be more strongly influenced by “environmental” variations (those outside the
political system, such as economic conditions) than by various aspects of politics.”51
Prominent models of the policy process all include outside intervening variables in the
form of “external conditions,”52 “Socioeconomic variables,”53 Environmental (inputs),”54
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or “historic-geographic conditions” and “Socioeconomic Composition.”55 Blomquist
notes that the models of the policy process “ . . . are variants on systems theory: An
external model influences a political system that produces policies that feed back into the
environment.”56 Thus, the external influences, or intervening variables, become
important determinants of policy outcomes in the public policy decision models.
Numerous comparative policy studies have shown that “ . . . policymakers are
constrained by a host of conditions over which they have limited control . . .” and that
“ . . . a valid account of the policy process will have to be more complex than might have
otherwise been anticipated.”57 The complexity of the policy process recognizes the many
“attributes of the community” involved in policy making, as well as the fact that many
empirical studies show “ . . . that culture and economic conditions affect the possibilities
in and constraints upon policymaking.”58
In spite of the significant role attributed to environmental intervening variables in
the policy process, Blomquist observes that: “an empirical theory of the policy process
that does not center upon human agency is unlikely to be able to explain much of what
transpires.” 59 In this study the “human agency” dynamic focuses on the privacy dataprotection epistemic community, and the different policy outcomes achieved in the
United States and the European Union when confronting different economic, sociocultural, and political intervening variables.
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Evidence of Economic Intervening Variables
Economic Impact of the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974
In the United States, concerns were voiced over the economic impact of privacy
legislation on business and economic activity from the earliest consideration of privacy
legislation by Congress. As described in Chapter Four, a strong U.S. business
community voiced concern over the time and money resource costs of complying with
restrictive privacy laws with government oversight. Such concerns helped to blunt the
efforts of the privacy epistemic community to achieve a broader privacy protection law
that they generally advocated. The U.S. enacted a narrow, “sectoral” law in the Privacy
Act of 1974 that focused on government computer and database practices while trusting
business and the private sector to self-regulate in accordance with fair information
practices/principles. The effect of the Privacy Act of 1974 on business and the U.S.
economy was therefore minimal because:
The North American response to private sector data protection
issues has so far been to rely on an assumption that if consumers
are concerned about personal privacy, their concerns will be
reflected in complaints and a preference for businesses with more
privacy-friendly practices. Voluntary codes of practice (based on
the OECD Guidelines of 1981) have been the typical manifestation
of the corporate response.60
Economic Aspects of EU Data Protection Directive
Arguments regarding economic motivations that may have influenced the
European Union to adopt an omnibus data-protection law have been offered ever since
the European Data Protection Directive was enacted. Most criticism is based on the
perceived business advantages that would accrue to European firms in the computer188

based database market if the United States were shown to offer inadequate protection of
personal data.61
For the past six decades the United States has been the dominant presence in the
global computer services market, and “ . . . information services and products are either
the first or second largest sector of the U.S. economy, accounting for between ten and
twelve percent of Gross Domestic Product.”62 The European nations have been at a
disadvantage in both the technology of computers and the application of computer
technology in database management in such business areas as banking, finance, and
marketing. “The EU data protection Directive threatens U.S. leadership in the
information economy and is heightening U.S. concern over protecting that so-called
dominance. Some critics see the Directive as merely the newest in a series of European
attacks on profitable U.S. information and programming industries.”63 Imposition of a
restrictive privacy directive that privileged the EU nations at the expense of the United
States would be a powerful equalizer in the international competition for computer and
computer-related data business. At the very least, the EU Data Protection Directive
would exclude the United States firms from the EU computer services market by virtue of
the United States electing to take a looser, sector-oriented response to data privacy that
was not deemed “adequate” for protection of individual data by the EU.
Privacy scholars point to the economic factors that allegedly gave the British the
impetus for enacting their Data protection Act of 1984. The British computer industry
presented a compelling argument that in the absence of British data protection legislation
computer hardware and software manufacturers and the computer-based service sector
would be adversely affected. “Personal data protection could become a legal pretext for
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trade protectionism, leading to the isolation of the British data processing industry and of
other service sectors of the economy that rely on unimpeded communications.”64 Bennett
concludes that: “In the final analysis, the British Data Protection Act of 1984 was passed
for economic rather than for civil libertarian reasons.”65
Some scholars suggest that the EU has established a privacy data-protection law
in 95/46/EC that effectively creates a de facto information and data-services “regime”
that will “create extra benefits that can be divided amongst EU member states, and thus
there is a strong economic incentive to become more effective in projecting EU
preferences in international regimes.”66 The chief concern is that the EU Data Protection
Directive becomes a vehicle for computer and data services trade protectionism that
could restrict competition from the United States and other countries based on what the
EU would claim to be inadequate privacy data-protection.67
More that a decade after the 95/46/EC EU Data Protection Directive entered into
force the economic impacts of the law are still the subject of discussion in academic
literature, but there is no significant evidence that economic disruptions in the U.S.
computer and data services industries have taken place.68 The Safe Harbor Agreements
have become the procedural “fix” by which individual U.S. firms agree to abide by the
privacy data-protection requirements of the European Union.69 Thus, it appears that
economic influences, while a cause for concern, have not materialized as a significant
motivation for the 95/46/EC European Data Protection Directive.70
Evidence of Socio-Cultural Intervening Variables
Although there are many similarities between the social and legal systems of the
United States and the European Union, and both the U.S. and the EU agreed on similar
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fair information practices/principles and the same CoE convention and OECD guidelines,
some privacy scholars suggest that different social and cultural traditions were the source
of the conflict between privacy policies and legislation between the two.71 These socialcultural differences are cast in different terms based on the perspective of the authors, but
generally they revolve around 1) privacy as an aspect of dignity versus privacy as an
aspect of liberty;72 or 2) the social protection approach versus the liberal philosophy of
privacy.73
That the Europeans focus on dignity, while the American focus on liberty, is not
unique to the rather recent discussion of privacy, but has been identified for more than a
century as based on inherently different views of the world. Whitman suggests that these
basic differences in social, political, and legal traditions condition citizens of the United
States and citizens of the European nations to value much different dimensions of
privacy. For example, Whitman says:
Continental privacy protections are, at their core, a form of
protection of a right to respect and personal dignity. The core
continental privacy rights to one’s image, name and reputation, and
what Germans call the right to informational self-determination--the right to control the sorts of information disclosed about oneself.
These are closely linked forms of the same basic right: they are all
rights to control your public image—rights to guarantee that
people see you the way you want to be seen . . . . The prime
enemy of our privacy, according to this continental conception, is
the media, which always threatens to broadcast unsavory
information about us in ways that endanger our public dignity . . .
On the Continent, the protection of personal dignity has been a
consuming concern for many generations.74
The European focus on dignity, Whitman suggests, is significantly different than
the American focus on liberty, and especially liberty against the state. This, he says,
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accounts for the different policies and laws created in Europe after decades of agreement
on the first principles of privacy. America, Whitman says:
. . . is much more oriented toward values of liberty, and especially
liberty against the state. At its conceptual core, the American right
to privacy still takes much the form that it took in the eighteen
century: It is the freedom from intrusions by the state, especially
in one’s own home . . . . American anxieties thus focus
comparatively little on the media. Instead they tend to be anxieties
about maintaining a kind of private sovereignty within our own
walls.75
Reidenberg also argues that socio-cultural differences between the United States
and the European nations account for differences in implementation of privacy policy and
law. Both the United States and the European nations agreed to essentially the same
“first principles” of privacy, or fair information practices. These fair information
practices (or principles) were cooperatively drafted by privacy epistemic community
members from the United States and the European nations in the Council of Europe
Convention and the OECD Guidelines. Yet he too notes that the policies and laws that
form the regulatory structure for privacy in the United States and the European Union
focus on much different dimensions of individual privacy.
Like Whitman, Reidenberg identifies American law as based on a liberal
philosophy, but characterizes the European philosophy as based on a social protection
paradigm. The American liberal philosophy “emphasizes limits on government power
and is characterized by its hostility toward regulation of private relations . . . For privacy,
the liberal approach prefers private rights and regards the state with suspicion.”76
Because the liberal philosophy focuses on the power and intrusion of the state, the power
of the state is to be restricted as much as possible, and therefore the sectoral approach to
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privacy law is naturally chosen. “Sectoral rather than omnibus laws minimize state
intrusions on information processing. Sectoral laws . . . react to specific problems and
provide only narrow state intervention to protect privacy. For information privacy, this
also means that the public sector and police powers, rather than private conduct, are
suspect.”77 This liberal American sentiment is echoed by Bennett, who asserts that the
U.S. choice of a limited or sectoral response to the threat to privacy can be attributed to a
long-standing culture based on distrust of government. “Fear of over powerful
government is deeply ingrained in the American political experience. This fear is
reflected in the fragmented and decentralized distribution of authority in American
government, in the Madisonian tradition of checking the power of “faction,” and in the
“Lockean liberal consensus.”78
The contrast to the American liberal philosophy, under the European social
protection philosophy:
. . . public liberty derives from the community of individuals and law
is the fundamental basis to pursue norms of social and citizen
protection. This vision of governance generally regards the state as
the necessary player to frame the social community in which
individuals develop, and information practices must serve individual
identity. Citizen autonomy, in this view, effectively depends on a
backdrop of legal rights.79
Thus, there are dramatic differences in the regulatory socio-cultures of the United
States and Europe that are far broader than the different information cultures displayed in
privacy data-protection policy and legislation conflict. The privacy-data-protection is
just one of several areas in which the United States and Europe have a conflict of visions
regarding the roles of the state and the private sector. Scholars in environmental, safety,
and industrial regulatory disciplines echo observations regarding American and European
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philosophical differences that have influenced the creation of dramatically different
regulatory policies, practices, and laws.80 In their study, Controlling Chemicals,
Brickman, Jasanoff, and Ilgen suggest that there has been a long history of policymaking, legislative process, and regulatory enforcement differences between Europe and
the United States.81 Others, such as Lofstedt and Vogel, descriptively note the
differences in consumer and environmental regulation between the United States and
Europe in their analyses, but do not attribute those differences to socio-cultural factors.82
Based on the observations of scholars from several disciplines in identifying
different socio-cultural visions of the role of the state relative to the citizen in the United
States and European nations, the role of the socio-cultural intervening variable in
influencing privacy data-protection policy and legislation appears to have validity. In the
words of Wright: “What we must acknowledge . . . is that there are, on the two sides of
the Atlantic, two different cultures of privacy, which are home to different intuitive
sensibilities, and which have produced two significantly different laws of privacy.”83
Evidence of Political Intervening Variables
In seeking evidence of a political intervening variable one must entertain the
following two questions: 1) What political factors may have prompted the United States
to enact the Privacy Act of 1974 at the time that it did? And, 2) What political factors
may have prompted the European Union to enact the European Data Privacy Directive
95/46/EC at the time that it did?
Evidence of Political Factors in the United States:
As discussed in the Chapter Four case study, the political environment of the early
1970s conditioned politicians to see the need for immediate enactment of privacy
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legislation.84 The Watergate scandal of the Nixon Administration, which began in June
of 1972 and ended with the resignation of President Nixon in August, 1974, sensitized the
nation to the issues of government surveillance, eavesdropping, and burglary and
generated numerous bills in Congress to restrict wiretapping and surveillance. Congress
and the public were shaken by the revelations of Executive Branch involvement in
patently illegal activities and were concerned that the press was revealing only the “tip of
the iceberg.” Hearings into privacy abuses of the Nixon Administration revealed a “trend
toward privacy invasions” and the need to “reassert the right of the individual to be free
of Government surveillance.”85 Thus, the investigations and hearings of the Watergate
Scandal created a powerful political expedient to enact legislation to limit government
ability to intrude into the privacy of individual citizens and opened a policy window for
privacy legislation. After nine years of privacy hearings, studies, reports, and bills,
public concern and a motivated Congress expedited privacy legislation. In just a few
months in Fall 1974, the Privacy Act moved through Congress and was signed into law
by President Gerald Ford on January 1, 1975. As the first, and broadest, of much
subsequent privacy legislation passed over the subsequent decade, the Privacy Act of
1974 became an important benchmark in U.S. privacy legislation.86
Evidence of Political Factors in the European Union
As described in the Chapter Five case study, the political environment of the early
1990s put political pressure on the European Community to harmonize data-protection by
means of a uniform data-protection law. Three data-protection events occurred in late
1989 that clearly demonstrated the problems associated with transborder data flows in an
environment of uneven (or no) data protection law that would preclude the planned
195

integration of European nations in the Internal Market. In July 1989, the French Data
Protection Authority (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés or CNIL)
threatened to block data transfers of employees between Fiat’s corporate offices in France
and in Italy. The CNIL argued that Italy’s data privacy rules were inadequate to protect
the data, and therefore personal information about French citizens could not be
transferred. Fiat Italy was forced to find a solution to the refusal of the CNIL to allow the
transfer of data. Resolution of the impasse came when Fiat Italy signed a data protection
contract in which it agreed to protect personal data coming from Fiat France in
accordance with CNIL rules. This first episode clearly demonstrated how conflicting
national data protection rules could perturb routine business activities between nations.87
A second data transfer event took place just two months later, in September 1989,
when the CNIL blocked the plans of the Gustave Roussay Institute, a French cancer
research center, to join the Belgian-based European Organization for Research and
Treatment of Cancer (EROTC). The CNIL pointed out that Belgium did not have
national data protection legislation in place, and therefore the Gustave Roussay Institute
could not send sensitive medical data to Belgium until such legislation was enacted by
Belgium.88
A third imbroglio took place over the Schengen Agreement for free movement of
persons and labor among Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
In order to secure the new external border encompassing these members to the
agreement, a Schengen Information System (SIS) was proposed to network the existing
border control and national customs databases so as to allow mutual policing of national
borders. The Germans and French raised the issue that Belgium did not have a data
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protection law with the result that data protection experts from France, Germany, and
Luxembourg objected to the violation of their national data privacy laws by sharing
sensitive police information with Belgium. Only after Belgium bowed to pressure from
the data protection community and pledged to expedite data protection legislation, were
the data protection clauses and monitoring authority for the SIS developed.89
With the increasing frequency of data protection issues arising within the
community, the European Commission was forced to act if the creation of the EC Internal
Market was to be realized in 1992. Recognizing that the Internal Market could never be
achieved without uniform data protection law across all member nations, the Internal
Market Directorate became the focal point for the creation of the first draft of EC data
privacy legislation. Data protection commissioners took an active part in drafting and
amending data protection legislation. After review, oversight, and amendment of
proposals by data protection commissioners---through three major revisions--accommodation among the parties was finally reached on the structure of data protection
legislation. Thus, the timing of the integration of nations into the European Internal
Market in 1992 put political pressure on the EC and individual nations to create a
uniform data-protection law but has little effect on the content of the law.90
Influence of the Three Intervening Variables
While each of the three intervening variables, economic, socio-cultural, and
political, obviously influenced the privacy data-protection legislation of the United States
and the European Union, it appears that the socio-cultural variable offers the most
powerful explanation of why the United States opted for a narrow sectoral approach to
privacy regulation in the Privacy Act of 1974, while the European Union enacted broad
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omnibus legislation in the 95/46/EC European Data Protection Directive. The liberal
philosophy, privileging the individual and the market over the state, predisposed the
United States to enact narrow legislation that primarily restricted the ability of the state to
invade the privacy of the individual. In Europe, the socio-cultural focus on dignity and
social protection inclined legislation that broadly protects the individual citizen’s image,
name, and reputation.
As shown in the case studies, economic motives and influences in the United
States were supported by the limited impact of the Privacy Act of 1974 in that the
legislation did not impose significant new requirements or costs on business and industry.
In Europe, business interests opposed broad data-protection legislation because of the
obstacles to customer data processing and the significant increases in costs that dataprotection would entail. However, the lessons of the several data-transfer problems
among nations, and the pressure to create a uniform information environment prior to
national integration into the Internal Market prompted their concerns to be subordinated
to the common enterprise of market integration and unification. More than a decade after
the 95/46/EC European Data Protection Directive went into force, it is probably safe to
say that concerns that Europe was creating a “regime” based on restrictive data-protection
law that would economically disadvantage U.S. international information services was
ill-founded. Data-transfer under the Safe Harbor agreements has ameliorated most
economic impacts to the U.S. computer and information service industries.
Evidence of political intervening variables shows that in the cases of both the
United States and the European Union, political influences determined the “when” but
not the “what.” In both cases political pressures and influences accelerated policy
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decision processes that were already underway, but moving slowly. In the United States,
the pressures of the Watergate Scandal and the revelations regarding government
burglary, wiretapping, and surveillance prompted immediate legislation. In Europe, the
need for common, harmonized, data-protection law prior to national integration into the
Internal Market prompted action to enact the 95/46/EC European Data Protection
Directive.
Implications for Further Research
This comparative analysis of the influence of the global privacy epistemic
community on the privacy data-protection policy/legislative responses of the United
States and the European Union leaves several important questions unanswered. The wide
divide between the legislation enacted by the United States and the European Union
suggests follow-on research regarding the constraints and benefits inherent in each of
these two approaches to protecting the privacy data-protection of citizens.
Of interest would be the identification and analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of these two policy/legislative approaches to ensuring individual privacy.
Can the limitations of privacy data-protection be shown to privilege or impair the
information service industry of either the United States or the European Union? Are
other nations choosing to emulate the policies and legislation of the United States or the
European Union? Now that more than a decade has passed since the European Data
Protection Directive entered into force (1998), are perceptible privacy data-protection
alliances or allegiances identifiable that could be characterized as a privacy dataprotection “regime?”
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Conclusion
This, the first comparative study of the influence of the privacy data-protection
epistemic community on privacy policy and legislation in the United States and the
European Union, is important because it validates the epistemic community approach as
an important method of analyzing policy processes and outcomes. As noted in Chapter
One, the epistemic community approach is one of several policy approaches that offers
strong explanatory power in policy and legislative realms requiring expert knowledge.
However, several problems in the application of Haas’ epistemic community
approach require the researcher to rely on other attributes of epistemic community
members in order to render them externally observable. Criticisms of the Haas definition
of the epistemic community are correct when they identify the imputed attributes of
“shared normative and principled beliefs,” “shared causal beliefs,” and “shared notions of
validity” that are effectively impossible to operationalize in a research program. The lack
of documentation, evidence, or the inability to ascertain these imputed “inter-subjective,
internally defined criteria” and characteristics of epistemic community members, as well
as the inability to gain insight into the networking activities of specific privacy dataprotection epistemic community members all lead one to depend upon more objective
characteristics that can be externally identified. In this study, these externally observable
objective criteria are the six criteria identified in Chapter Three, that identify
professional/technical expertise and competence, privacy organizations that promote the
networking of the epistemic community, and opportunities to influence policy makers
and legislation.
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It is impossible to analyze and assess the role of the privacy data-protection
epistemic community without taking into consideration the economic, socio-cultural, and
political intervening variables in both the United States and the European Union. The
limited success of the privacy data-protection epistemic community in achieving uniform
privacy-data protection policy and legislation in both the United States and the European
Union can be attributed to the economic, socio-cultural, and political intervening
variables. Often characterized as environmental, external, or socio-economic by the
classic comparative policy theorists, these intervening variables have been recognized as
important determinants of policy and legislative outcomes in more than four decades of
comparative policy studies.
The growth of the Internet over the past two decades has helped to institutionalize
the privacy data-protection epistemic community by providing an ever-present global
communications networking presence through which members can share, educate, and
cooperate on all dimensions of privacy and data-protection. This institutionalization
process promotes self-awareness among privacy epistemic community members that was
not possible in the days before the Internet, and promises a stronger, more cohesive, and
more dynamic privacy data-protection epistemic community in the future.
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Appendix A
Privacy Epistemic Organizations
The privacy epistemic community in the United States is made up of a diverse
collection of organizations with members who profess to have an interest in, or focus on,
one or more of the many ever-multiplying and evolving issues or topics associated with
privacy. Individually, these organizations do not necessarily constitute an epistemic
community---but as we explicated in Chapter Three---in the aggregate---and especially
when acting in concert on a specific issue or problem area related to privacy---they come
together to create a multi-faceted epistemic community of interest. Colin Bennett uses
the generic phrase privacy advocates to characterize the multitude of individuals and
organizations that can be found in a quick Google search for privacy advocates. In his
global survey of privacy advocates, Bennett lists twenty-nine major privacy organizations
that make their headquarters in the United States. (See Appendix B for a listing of these
and other privacy organizations.) A quick perusal of just the organizational titles of these
privacy advocacy organizations makes it obvious that, while some are very broad in their
purview, others are extremely focused on one, or just a few, narrow privacy issues.
These privacy groups are an amorphous collection of academics, professionals,
and laymen who generally have strong interest, knowledge, and expertise in one or more
of the many privacy issue-areas. (See Table 2 below of a listing of the many issue-areas
subsumed under the topic of privacy.) They come together when motivated by their
common interest in influencing the landscape of legislation for a specific privacy issuearea or problem. For example, on Wednesday, 31 October 2007, NPR Marketplace
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broadcast reported that nine privacy organizations were supporting do-not-track
legislation to preclude commercial tracking of computer users online. 1 Subsequent
research showed that these nine organizations coalesced in advance of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Town Hall, “Ehavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and
Technology,” held November 1-2, 2007 in Washington, D.C., and offered coordinated
expert guidance supporting national computer “do-not-track” legislation for computer
Internet users that would be similar to the national do-not-call legislation that has proven
so successful in limiting telemarketer calls to individual’s homes.2 This type of concerted
spontaneous organization from a diverse, distributed community of privacy advocates is
at the heart of the privacy epistemic community concept. But how diverse and
distributed is this community of privacy advocates? A survey of the recent history,
missions or goals, and activities of the key privacy organizations identified by Bennett
reveals significant differences in size, breadth, depth, and impact of these organizations,
as well as differences in their individual abilities to participate as a member in a privacy
epistemic community, seeking to influence privacy regulations or legislation.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is the oldest of the privacy
advocates identified by Bennett. Founded as a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization by
several civil liberties activists in 1920 to focus on limiting the power of government and
ensuring individual rights, privacy is today one of the four key freedoms that the ACLU
seeks to protect and guarantee, along with First Amendment rights, the right to equal
protection under the law, and the right to due process under the law.3 Today the ACLU
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boasts of a physical presence in every state of the United States, one-half million
members and supporters as well as involvement in over six thousand civil libertiesrelated court cases annually. While the ACLU website presents a wide collection of civil
liberties issues in which the organization is involved, this study is specifically interested
in privacy issues that the ACLU finds compelling. Under Privacy and Technology the
ACLU website lists ten major privacy issue areas, to include: Anonymity on the Web;
Biological Technologies; Consumer Privacy; Internet Free Speech; Internet Privacy;
Medical Privacy; Scientific Freedom; Students (Privacy); Surveillance & Wiretapping;
Workplace Privacy; and General (Privacy). In addition to privacy subject-matter areas,
the ACLU provides privacy publications, fact sheets, legal documents, legislative
documents, and other privacy-related resources as a means of educating and recruiting
support for privacy issues. Clearly the size and diversity of the ACLU makes the
organization a important participant in educating, supporting and influencing privacy
issues and privacy legislation in the United States.
Californians Against Telephone Solicitations (CATS)
Californians Against Telephone Solicitations (CATS) represents itself to be a
single-issue privacy organization that focuses on stopping telemarketers from invading
the privacy of California state citizens by telephone calls and junk faxes.4 The web site
provides contact information for the National Do Not Call Registry, copies of Federal
Laws regulating telemarketers, selected court decisions having to do with violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), extracts of the TCPA as well as FCC
regulations that augment and operationalize the TCPA, and personal blogs and
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information provided by visitors to the CATS site regarding their success or failure in
thwarting telemarketers.5 This particular privacy advocacy site focuses on how to defeat
telemarketers and telephone solicitors and would presumably only join an epistemic
community it its narrow field of interest.
The CATO Institute (CATO)
The CATO Institute (CATO) advertises “Individual Liberty, Free Markets, and
Peace” as the focus of its organization.6 Founded in 1977 as a not-for-profit public policy
research foundation, the CATO Institute lists five issue-areas under the heading of
Telecom, Internet and Information Policy. These five issue-areas are Free Speech and
Technology; Internet Governance and Regulation; Telecom Regulation; Intellectual
Property; and Privacy Issues.7 Although privacy issues appear to be embedded in many
of the studies, white papers, articles, and speeches found under the first four issue-areas,
the Privacy Issues page presents a collection of book extracts, articles, studies and
speeches on privacy issues dating as far back as 1995.8 While many of the studies and
articles found under Privacy Issues are attributed directly to the CATO Institute and its
Director, Jim Harper, many others indicate that they were written by the extended CATO
staff for publication in popular print media. The diversity of privacy subjects and issues
appears to indicate that the CATO Institute has a long-standing interest in, and
commitment to, contributing to the dialogue and education of the broader privacy
community as well as the general public’s desire to be informed on privacy issues. The
speeches and congressional testimony files found under Privacy Issues show that the
CATO Institute has played a role in educating and influencing both federal and state
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congressional decision-makers regarding a wide variety of privacy issues from REAL ID
to government data mining, genetic privacy, and the registered traveler program.9 The
CATO Institute is thus positioned to be an important participant in several privacy
epistemic community issue areas.
Center for Digital Democracy (CDD)
The Center for Digital Democracy (CDD) was founded in 2001 to ensure that the
public, and public interest, were an integral part of the new evolving “digital landscape.”
The founders migrated CDD from an organization they had founded ten years earlier
called the Center for Media Education (CME), which focused on promoting public
participation in nascent media and telecommunications issues. 10 CME was a participant
in the passage of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. CDD has played a major
role in influencing the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to institute new policies
governing online consumer privacy and more responsible online marketing practices.11
Since its founding CDD has specialized in monitoring and analyzing emerging media
marketplace developments and alerting the public, policymakers, and the media to
nascent issues and problems in the digital marketplace. Thus CDD has a history of
educating and influencing policymakers and decision makers on privacy issues
participating in an epistemic community of organizations influencing the FTC, the FCC,
and Congress regarding legislation and regulations affecting privacy and the digital
marketplace.
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Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT)
The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), founded in December 1994,
has a history of almost 14 year of promoting Internet openness and individual privacy.
Originally founded as a spin-off of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the CDT was
created in response to the need to participate in a new type of advocacy role in protecting
civil liberties while informing and influencing emerging legislation. The initial issue was
the addition of privacy safeguards to the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) that led to a rift over process and methods and the creation of
CDT. CDT is one of the larger privacy advocacy organizations on the Internet as
evidenced by both the breadth of privacy issues it represents and the number of
professional or expert persons associated with the organization. The CDT declares its
mission “to promote democratic values and constitutional liberties in the digital age” 12
and brings together broad expertise in law, technology, and policy.
Attesting to the expertise and non-partisan advice (central to the epistemic
community approach) was Senator Patrick Lehey’s (D-VT) statement that: “You can
accept Jerry Berman’s advice and CDT’s as being more expert than partisan—very
important, and too rare in this town.”13 CDT appears to be one of the best examples of
an organization that was formed to provide expert advice to policymakers and decision
makers on privacy issues and appears to come closest to being an epistemic community
organization of any of the privacy advocate organizations reviewed in this study.
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Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (CAUCE)
The Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (CAUCE) for North
America (NA) was founded in March 2007 through merger of the earlier CAUCE US and
CAUCE Canada organizations in order to better coordinate implementation of anti-spam
and junk-FAX laws for all Internet users.14 The original CAUCE organizations were
formed in 1997 and 1998 respectively as an anti-spam law group that desired to petition
Congress for change of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) to include email and junk-FAX. The CAUCE organization went global with the formation of
CAUCE International, or iCAUCE, in 2002.15 A Google search on the term “CAUCE”
shows that CAUCE now has a network of affiliate organizations around the world,
including India (Asia-Pacific), several in Europe, South America, and Australia. In
additional to its history of working with legislators to expand anti-spam and junk-FAX
laws, CAUCE provides information and tools that help Internet users and consumers on
the World Wide Web to identify and respond to spam and junk-FAX. CAUCE thus
appears to serve not only the day-to-day mission of informing and assisting Internet
users, but also the larger mission of influencing future Internet law by joining epistemic
communities focused on enhancing the privacy of Internet consumers/users in the face of
growing Web-based commercial mass marketing.
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR)
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) 16 describes itself on its
website as:
“ . . . a global organization promoting the responsible use
of computer technology. Founded in 1981, CPSR educates
policymakers and the public on a wide range of issues. CPSR
has incubated numerous projects such as Privaterra, the
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Public Sphere Project, EPIC (the Electronic Privacy
Information Center), the 21st Century Project, the Civil
Society Project, and the CFP (Computers, Freedom & Privacy)
Conference. Originally founded by U.S. computer scientists,
CPSR now has members in 26 countries on six continents.” 17
The CPSR shows a history of cooperation with other like-minded organizations in
promoting a significant agenda of education, information, and influence to direct the
future of information and communications technology and use around the world.
Recognizing that in the present age digital communications and information technology
is a global phenomena that connects all peoples via the Internet, the CPSR declares the
following broad mission:18
CPSR is a public-interest alliance of people concerned about the impact of information and communications
technology on society. We work to influence decisions regarding the development and use of computers
because those decisions have far-reaching consequences and reflect our basic values and priorities. As experts
on ICT issues, CPSR members provide realistic assessments of the power, promise, and limitations of computer
technology. As concerned citizens, we direct public attention to critical choices concerning the applications of
computing and how those choices affect society.
By sponsoring international, national, and local projects, CPSR serves as a catalyst for in-depth discussion
and effective action in key areas.
Every project we undertake is based on five principles:
We foster and support public discussion of, and public responsibility for decisions involving the use of
technology in systems critical to society.
We work to dispel popular myths about the infallibility of technologies.
We challenge the assumption that technology alone can solve political and social problems.
We critically examine social and technical issues within the information technology profession, both
nationally and internationally.
We encourage the use of information technology to improve quality of life.

An example of the CPSR operating within a privacy epistemic community to
educate and influence was the following announcement found on the CPSR Homepage19
on 09 October 2008 that announced:
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International Action Day "Freedom not fear-Stop the surveillance mania!" 11 October 2008
On October 11, 2008, a broad movement of organizations around the world is calling on everybody to join
action against excessive surveillance by governments and businesses. In recognition of October 11,
Freedom not Fear Day, many organizations in the United States set out the following recommendations:
End Watch Lists, Fusion Centers and other data profiling programs that fail to comply
with the full requirements of the federal Privacy Act;
Affirm international human rights, including freedom of expression and privacy protection
so as to strengthen democratic institutions and protect the rights of individuals;
Repeal the Patriot Act and other legal authorities that permit warrantless surveillance and
unconstitutional monitoring and tracking of individuals;
End the culture of secrecy that allows government officials to hide mismanagement, fraud,
and incompetence behind the veil of "homeland security";
Establish comprehensive data protection legislation that will safeguard personal information
and reduce the risk of identity theft and security breaches.
(Continued)

The following organizations join the Freedom and Not Fear Statement for October 11, 2008:
American Policy Center
Center for Financial Privacy and Human Rights
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility
Consumer Federation of America
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
Fairfax County Privacy Council
Identity Project
IP Justice
Liberty Coalition
Patient Privacy Rights
Privacy Times
Privacy-Activism
U.S. Bill of Rights Foundation

Clearly, the CPSR organization and membership appear to exhibit the
characteristics of a privacy epistemic community member that one would expect to see
regarding a collusion of activity on a common topic or issue of interest. The fourteen
organizations that join with CPSR in the 11 October 2008 Freedom Not Fear Day appear
to form a common privacy epistemic community of interest for these issues.
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Consumer Action (CA)
Consumer Action (CA), founded in 1971, is a non-profit consumer education and
advocacy organization that identifies privacy as one of its core areas of interest along
with credit, banking, insurance and utilities. Of interest to this study are the CA activities
in: 1) Advocacy and Media; and 2) Coalition Activism.
Under the heading of Advocacy and Media, CA describes its advocacy activities
as: “ . . . promoting pro-consumer policy, regulations and legislation and helping
consumers be heard by those in power—is an important part of Consumer Action’s work.
In 2004, the organization established an office in Washington, D.C., a strategic decision
to create a constant presence in front of lawmakers and the national media. D.C. staff
focus on credit card business practices, privacy rights, predatory lending, and
telecommunications rights and access.”20 Describing its broad network of community
organizations and their coordinated efforts, CA says: “In an effort to mobilize
widespread support for the passage of pro-consumer legislation, regulation and policy,
Consumer Action is tapping its 9,000-member network of community-based
organizations. Working as members of diverse coalitions, Consumer Action and
participating groups amplify the voice of the consumer.”21
Describing their activities in Coalition Activism, CA says: “As an active member of
many formal and informal coalitions of like-minded organizations working to promote
social change, Consumer Action works on a wide variety of issues including privacy,
telecommunication rights, fraud prevention, fair access to financial services, proconsumer changes to the credit card industry, anti-predatory lending, civil rights and the
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needs of multicultural communities.”22 Their web links depict a long history of coalition
building and common positions across a wide spectrum of consumer issues over previous
years. Review of these coalition–building activities over the years demonstrates an
epistemic community approach to educating and influencing the creation of legislation
and regulations on diverse consumer issues including privacy.
Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN)
Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN) is
an organization that focuses on rather narrow consumer privacy interests within the much
broader privacy arena. CASPIAN educates and advocates against loss of consumer and
individual privacy based on market segmentation, identification, and tracking of
consumer purchases over time. The use of “marketing” supermarket membership cards
that establish an electronic link to individuals or families allows the collection of highly
detailed purchasing, use, financial, and geographic data over time by not only the
supermarket chains, but also any other organization given access to the collected data.
Through the use of these supermarket cards, along with associated credit cards or bank
checks, enables the collection of personal information detailing the choices, lifestyle, use
patterns, financial means, and geographic locations of individuals and families.
CASPIAN anticipates a growing problem with the widespread introduction and use of
radio frequency identification (RFID) for all products in coming years. RFID will allow
infinitely detailed automatic collection of data on individual consumer purchases,
disposition, and geographic location within the next decade. The CASPIAN crusade
against RFID chips is described on their recently launched Spychips site that alerts
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consumers, lawmakers and companies on the inherent dangers to individual privacy
posed by this new technology.23
While CASPIAN provides significant information and education for consumers,
media, and lawmakers visiting their site, there is no indication of coordinated or
concerted action with other privacy organizations that would constitute membership in a
privacy epistemic community. There are no apparent links to other organizations or sites
other than those created by CASPIAN such as the Spychips site.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a civil liberties organization founded
in July of 1980 as a result of a specific intrusion on civil rights that presaged growing
civil liberties problems in the evolving digital computer-based telecommunications
world. Privacy is listed as one of the six major issue-areas upon which EFF focuses.24
Under the Privacy issue-area, EFF declares that:25
New technologies are radically advancing our freedoms,
but they are also enabling unparalleled invasions of privacy.
Your cell phone helps you keep in touch with friends and
families, but it also makes it easier for the feds to track
your location.
Your Web searches about sensitive medical
information might seem secret, known only to you and
search engines like Google. But by logging your online
activities, these companies are creating a honeypot of
personal information, potentially available to any party
wielding a subpoena.
EFF fights in the courts and Congress to extend
your privacy rights into the digital world, and supports
the development of privacy-protecting technologies.
Donate to EFF to help support our efforts.
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And the next time you try to board a plane, watch
out— you might be turned away after being mistakenly
placed on a government watch list based on erroneous data.
Technology isn't the real problem, though; rather,
the law has yet to catch up to our evolving expectations of
and need for privacy. In fact, new government initiatives
and laws have severely undermined our rights in recent years.
Privacy rights are enshrined in our Constitution for a reason — a thriving
democracy requires respect for individuals' autonomy as well as anonymous speech and
association. These rights must be balanced against legitimate concerns like law
enforcement, but checks must be put in place to prevent abuse of government powers.
The EFF description of their privacy educational and advocacy activities clearly
emphasizes the role of law and congressional legislation in protecting the privacy rights
of citizens in the face of growing technology that permits abridgement of privacy with
ever-increasing ease. EFF is one of those fourteen organizations that came together to
promote the 11 October 2008 Freedom not Fear campaign aimed at increasing awareness
of the increasing surveillance of all aspects of life by both government and business. EFF
appears to be a significant and active member of the privacy epistemic community in the
United States.
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
As indicated by its title, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is a
public research center established in 1994 to promote public awareness of emerging civil
liberties issues surrounding privacy in the digital-electronic future and other related civil
liberties. The mission of EPIC includes policy research, public education, conferences,
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litigation, publications, and advocacy. EPIC explicates or links to more than 130 unique
privacy topics and issues under its umbrella of privacy.26
EPIC lists eleven coalitions of which it is a member to include the Global Internet
Liberty Campaign, In Defense of Freedom, Internet Free Expression Alliance, National
Committee for Voting Integrity, On the Identity Trail, Privacy Coalition, Privacy
International, The Privacy Site, The Public Voice, Security Framework Project, and
Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue.27 Two of these that focus specifically on privacy
issues have a considerable membership: Forty-two members in the Privacy Coalition, 28
while Privacy International boasts more than a hundred privacy experts and Human
Rights organizations from forty countries.29 The significant networks to which EPIC is
linked imply an unusual interconnectedness that can only make the organization one of
the more influential privacy organizations and an important member of privacy epistemic
communities focused on specific privacy issues or topics.
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC)
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) was established in 1992 with a mission of
providing consumer privacy information and advocating for consumer privacy. PRC
provides a variety of consumer services in educating consumers regarding the link
between technology and personal privacy, assisting consumers in asserting their privacy
rights, as well as assisting consumers in elevating their concerns to appropriate venues.
For the purposes of this study, the most important activities in which PRC engages are to:
“Advocate for consumers' privacy rights in local, state, and federal public policy
proceedings, including legislative testimony, regulatory agency hearings, task forces, and
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study commissions as well as conferences and workshops.”30 PRC frequently joins with
other privacy advocates to promote a common front in educating law-makers and
advocating for important privacy issues of mutual interest. Because PRC grew out of a
University of San Diego privacy project that was initially funded by the state of
California, PRC has been most involved with California privacy issues and privacy
legislation.31 However, PRC has occasionally joined with other privacy advocates to
support changes to privacy legislation and regulation at the federal level.32 Further
instances of PRC involvement with coalitions on significant privacy issues over the past
decade, both within the state of California and the national level, will be provided by
Beth Givens (Director) and Paul Stevens (Director of Policy and Advocacy).
Privacy Activism
Privacy Activism is a non-profit organization that seeks to educate and inform the
public about the right of privacy and therefore create public demand for greater privacy
safeguards in society. The Privacy Activism Front Page provides instances of Privacy
Activism joining with other privacy organizations to influence regulators and legislators
regarding privacy issues such as the Federal Trade Commission hearings on the “The Do
Not Track List” that is intended to protect Internet users from having their online web
activities tracked, stored, and used by marketers and advertising networks.33 No
information on Privacy Activism activities has been posted to their web site since 31
October 2007 so there may be some question regarding the status of their organization.
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The Privacy Journal
The Privacy Journal was founded in November 1974 in response to increasing
public and privacy community interest in privacy as a result of the Federal Privacy Act
and the Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act that were receiving much attention in
Congress. The Privacy Journal subsequently began to publish privacy-related reference
books in 1976 and began to sponsor privacy conferences to network and educate
individuals and organizations interested in privacy issues.34 The Privacy Journal staff
regularly communicates with many other privacy organizations regarding privacy issues,
regulations and legislation including the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, World Privacy
Forum, ACLU, Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), the CIPICC Ontario,
Canadian privacy commissioners; the British Columbia Freedom of Information and
Privacy Association, Privacy International, Dr. Alan Westin, University of British
Columbia, University of Ottawa, Privacy Times, Robert Gellman, and individuals in 10
state capitals working for privacy reform. Privacy Journal has supported the Polygraph
Protection Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), state laws on protection of Social Security Numbers (SSNs), Caller ID privacy,
and ID theft over the past decade; published two rankings of the states in privacy and
sponsored a gathering in Providence of all privacy activists. Privacy Journal has
published a variety of privacy-related reference books for the privacy movement,
including a history of privacy, a directory of privacy professionals, a basic guide to
privacy law, and a collection of state privacy laws.
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Privacy Journal co-sponsors business-oriented privacy conferences and training
sessions, have provided speakers on more than 500 occasions to trade associations and
conferences, and has provided expert witnesses more than 25 privacy-related court cases.
Additionally, Privacy Journal personnel routinely instruct university privacy courses in
the Washington D.C. area, and brief an average of 10 news reporters a month on privacy
issues. Finally, Privacy Journal participates in the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) hosted monthly privacy strategy conferences and information exchanges. These
many networking and coalition-building privacy activities give the Privacy Journal
entrance into several privacy epistemic communities.35
Privacy Times
Privacy Times, edited by Evan Hendricks since 1981, is a commercially published
“Subscription-only newsletter covering privacy & Freedom of Information Law and
policy. It is read largely by attorneys and professionals who must stay abreast of the
legislation, litigation, and executive branch activities, as well as consumer news,
technology trends and business developments. Since 1981, Privacy Times has provided
its readers with accurate reporting, objective analysis and thoughtful insight into the
events that shape the ongoing debate over privacy and Freedom of Information.”36 The
Privacy Times web site provides links to Congressional testimony that was given by
Evan Hendricks on eight occasions over the past five years but offers no indication that
the Privacy Times, in the person of Evan Hendricks, enters into coalitions or epistemic
communities to forward a common vision of privacy.37
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Private Citizen, Inc.
Private Citizen, Inc. is a commercial membership service that promises to stop
junk telemarketing telephone calls for a fee of twenty dollars and stop junk mail for a fee
of ten dollars. Although there are links on the Private Citizen site to several privacy
advocacy sites, there is no indication that Private citizen is actually an advocate of
improved privacy or acts in concert with other organizations as an epistemic community.
Public Interest Computing Association (PICA)
The Public Interest Computing Association (PICA) could not be found as a standalone site through an Internet search. References to PICA, and PICA activities, dating to
as early as 1987 were extant, but a web site home page was not found after several search
attempts.
The Utilities Commission Action Network (UCAN)
The Utilities Commission Action Network (UCAN) is a utility “watchdog”
organization located in San Diego, California whose goal is to educate, inform, and
advocate for consumer rights.38 Although the “utilities” focus of UCAN has been on
energy, gasoline, water, and telecommunications abuses, UCAN is the umbrella not-forprofit 501(C)(3) under which the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) is hosted.39
The World Privacy Forum (WPF)
The World Privacy Forum (WPF) “ . . . is a nonprofit, non-partisan 501(C)(3)
public interest research group. The organization is focused on conducting in-depth
research, analysis, and consumer education in the area of privacy. It is the only privacyfocused public interest research group conducting independent, longitudinal work. The
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World Privacy Forum has had notable successes with its research, which has been
groundbreaking and consistently ahead of trends. World Privacy Forum reports have
documented important new areas, including medical identity theft. Areas of focus for the
World Privacy Forum include health care, technology, and the financial sector. The
Forum was founded in 2003 and works both nationally and internationally.”40
Building the Epistemic Community
This survey of key privacy organizations reveals the diversity of organizations--diversity in size, experience, size, goals and missions. Based on this diversity, one would
expect that only a limited number of privacy organizations would find common interests
and goals to surround any specific privacy issue, regulation, or legislation. Examples of
coordinated privacy activity such as the 11 October 2008 International Action Day
"Freedom not fear-Stop the surveillance mania!" and the 1-2 November 2007 Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) Town Hall Meeting that focused on the privacy topic of
“Ehavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology,” each elicited
participation by only14 and 10 privacy organizations respectively. These 10-14
participating organizations are certainly sufficient to constitute an epistemic community
for the purposes of a specific privacy issue or event. In fact, if only half that number
came together to support the creation or modification of a privacy regulation or
legislation it would suggest a solid case of privacy epistemic community formation.
Several characteristics related to the diversity of the privacy advocacy
organizations surveyed argues for the absence of frequent formation of privacy epistemic
communities to support specific privacy issues or problems. The several single-issue (or
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limited-issue) privacy organizations---especially those that deal with rather concrete
consumer marketing issues such as Private Citizen, Inc.---are not deeply concerned with
the broader, more ethereal privacy issues that assume center-stage on the agendas of the
larger privacy community members. Some privacy organizations, such as the Privacy
Times, provide detailed privacy information to “attorneys and professionals who must
stay abreast of the legislation, litigation, and executive branch activities, as well as
consumer news, technology trends and business developments.”41 No mention is found at
the Privacy Times website of advocacy or coalition-building for specific privacy issues,
regulations or legislation---although the site does advertise Evan Hendricks as an
individual expert witness in trials and before the U.S. Congress. At the same time, other
privacy organizations, such as the Privacy Journal, are strong in information, education,
networking, and join privacy coalitions that may occasionally be privacy epistemic
communities, and advocate for improved privacy regulation or legislation. Robert Ellis
Smith, publisher of the Privacy Journal, characterized the changing support within the
privacy community for specific privacy issues as a case of “shifting coalitions” based on
the multitude of privacy issues or concerns that have been created by new technology
(and are still evolving), and the attempts by the changing coalitions to bound them by
regulation or legislation.42
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Appendix B
Privacy Epistemic Community Organization
Internet Network Presence
The following organizations are illustrative of the global web that supports the
networking of the privacy epistemic community. While some organizations have privacy
issues as their primary mission, other organizations have a variety of missions, of which
privacy may be only one. Privacy epistemic community members communicate, publish,
research, and share information via these many organizations, promoting common
privacy knowledge, beliefs, and policy enterprise. The Internet presence of privacy
organizations also educates and influences the public, policy analysts, and decisionmakers on privacy issues.
Organization
URL
_______________________________________________________________________
1. American Civil Liberties Union (US)
www.aclu.org
2. Amnesty International (International)

www.amnesty.org

3. Australian Privacy Foundation (Australia)

www.privacy.org.au

4. BBBOnline, Inc. (US)

www.bbbonline.org

5. Californians Against Telephone Solicitations (US)

www.stopjunkcalls.com

6. Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CAN)

www.ccla.org

7. CATO Institute (US)

www.cato.org

8. Center for Digital Democracy (US)

www.democraticmedia.org

9. Center for Democracy and Technology (US)

www.cdt.org

10. Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email (US) www.cauce.org
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Organization

URL

11. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (US) www.cpsr.org
12. Consumer Action (US)

www.consumeraction.gov

13. Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion
and Numbering (US)

www.nocards.org

14. Derechos Digitales (Chile)

www.derechosdigitales.org

15. Electronic Frontier Foundation (US)

www.eff.org

16. Electronic Privacy Information Center (US)

www.epic.org

17. European Civil Liberties Network (Europe)

www.ecln.org

18. Federal Trade Commission (US)

www.ftc.gov

19. Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights (US)

http://cwd.grassroots.com

20. Global Internet Liberty Campaign (International)

www.gilc.org

21. Health Privacy (US)

www.healthprivacy.org

22. ID Theft Resource Center (US)

www.IDTheftCenter.org

23. International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (CAN) www.priv.gc.ca
24. Institute for the Study of Privacy Issues (CAN)

www.privacynews.com

25. Junkbusters (US)

www.junkbusters.com

26. Liberty Coalition (US)

www.tlcontheweb.com

27. Medical Privacy Coalition (US)

www.libertycoalition.net

28. National Association of State Public Interest

www.uspirg.org

29. National Consumer League (US)

www.nclnet.org

30. New York Surveillance Camera Players (US)

www.notbored.org

31. Patient Privacy Rights Coalition (US)

www.patientprivacyrights.org
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Organization

URL

32. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (US)

www.privacyrights.org

33. Privacy Activism (US)

www.privacyactivism.org

34. Privacy Exchange (US)

www.privacyexchange.org

35. Privacy International (UK)

www.privacyinternational.org

36. Privacy Journal (US)

www.privacyjournal.net

37. Privacy Laws and Business (UK)

www.privacylaws.com

38. Privacy Mongolia (Mongolia)

www.mongolia-property.com

39. Privacy Rights Clearing House (US)

www.privacyrights.org

40. Privacy Times (US)

www.privacytimes.com

41. Privacy Ukraine (Ukraine)

www.privacyinternational.org

42. Private Citizen, Inc. (US)

www.private-citizen.com

43. Public Interest Computing Association (US)

www.acm.org

44. Seguridad en Democracia (Guatemala)

www.seguridadcondemocracia.org

45. TRUST.e (US)

www.truste.com

46. Utilities Commission Action Network (US)

www.ucan.org

47. W3C World Wide Web Consortium (US)

www.w3.org

48. World Privacy Forum (US)

www.worldprivacyforum.org
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Appendix C
Selected Privacy Conferences
The policy community associated with privacy attends, and has always
attended, an enormous number of conferences, workshops, symposia,
forums, and other events. These more traditional forms of networking
have historically been the principal means by which privacy advocates
have connected and shared information. There is no evidence that the
scope and frequency of conferencing has decreased as online methods
of networking have proliferated. Conferences may be organized by
government agencies, by the private sector, by academic institutions,
or by a combination. Privacy advocacy groups have played significant
roles in all.1
Colin J. Bennett, The Privacy Advocates
The International Conference Of Data Protection And Privacy Commissioners
has been conducted annually since 1978 and brings together data protection and privacy
commissioners, and the privacy epistemic community from around the globe. 2
The Computers Freedom & Privacy Conference has been held annually since
1991 in the United States and Canada.3
The Computers, Privacy, and Data Protection Conference is an international
privacy conference organized by European universities.4
The International Association of Privacy Professionals bills itself as the world's
largest association of privacy professionals with more than 7,000 members in 52
countries. The IAPP conducts a conference in Washington D.C. each spring.
Law Schools and academic journals occasionally sponsor conferences or symposia that
focus on privacy, and invite well-known privacy experts, faculty, and students to author
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essays on privacy issues, and then publish journal editions devoted to privacy. The
following are illustrative:
San Diego Law Review, Volume 44, Number 4, November-December 2007, Editors’
Symposium, Nine Essays on Privacy.
The Journal of Social Issues, Volume 59, Number 2, July 2003, Special Issue on Privacy,
10 Essays on Privacy.
Stanford Law Review, May 2000, Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal
Paradigm? 16 Essays on Privacy.
Iowa Law Review, Symposium: Data Protection Law and the European Union’s
Directive: The Challenge for the United States, Volume 80, Number 3, March 1995,
Nine Essays on Privacy.
Case Western Law Review, Privacy Symposium: The Right to Privacy 100 Years Later,
Volume 91, Number 3, 1991, 15 Essays on Privacy.
Northern Illinois University Law Review, Volume 10, Number 3, 1990, Symposium on
the Right to Privacy, Five Essays on Privacy.
Library Trends, Summer 1986, Privacy, Secrecy, and National Information Policy,
Robert H. Burger, Issue Editor.
The Journal of Social Issues, Volume 33, Number 3, Summer 1977, Special Issue on
Privacy as a Behavioral Phenomenon, 11 Essays on Privacy.
Duke University School of Law, Volume 31, Spring 1966, Law and Contemporary
Problems, 10 Essays on Privacy.
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1

Colin J. Bennett, The Privacy Advocates: Resisting the Spread of Surveillance
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008), 171.
2

For information on the 2010 International Conference Of Data Protection And Privacy
Commissioners see: http://www.privacyconference2010.org/ (Last accessed 07
September 2010).
3

See the Computers Freedom & Privacy Conference site at: http://www.cfp.org/ (Last
accessed 07 September 2010).
4

See http://www.cpdpconferences.org/organisation.html (Last accessed 07 September
2010).
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Appendix D
Fair Information Principles/Practices (FIP)
Similarities in the core fair information principles found in the United States,
Europe, the Council of Europe, and the OECD suggest the influence of “debates in the
United States in the late 1950s and early 1970s among the small number of data
experts.”1 Members of the nascent privacy epistemic community actively educated
policy makers and new privacy epistemic community members in the Council of Europe
and the OECD in the 1970s and 1980s.2
.

Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens (1973)3
Subsequently Incorporated into the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974
1. Openness – Data policies should be open and clear and the entity or person
controlling the data should be easily identifiable.
2. Collection Limitation - Collection of personal data should be limited and
obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or
consent of the data subject.
3. Purpose Specification - The purpose for which personal data are collected should
be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use
limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible
with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.
4. Use Limitation - Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or
otherwise used for purposes other than those specified as described above, except
with the consent of the data subject or by the authority of law.
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5. Data Quality - Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they
are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate,
complete, relevant and kept up-to-date.
6. Individual Participation - An individual should have the right: a) to obtain from
a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller
has data relating to him; b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him
within a reasonable time; at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; in a reasonable
manner; and in a form that is readily intelligible to him; c) to be given reasons if a
request is denied and to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to challenge data
relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to have the data erased,
rectified, completed or amended.
7. Security Safeguards - Personal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification or disclosure of data.
8. Accountability - A data controller should be accountable for complying with
privacy measures.
Younger Committee Report, 1973 (UK)4
1. Information should be regarded as held for a specific purpose and not to be used,
without appropriate authorization, for other purposes.
2. Access to information should be confined to those authorized to have it for the
purposes for which it was supplied.
3. The amount of information collected and held should be the minimum necessary
for the achievement of a specified purpose.
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4. In computerized systems handling information for statistical purposes, adequate
provision should be made in their design and programs for separating identities
from the rest of the data.
5. There should be arrangements whereby the subject could be told about the
information held concerning him.
6. The level of security to be achieved by a system should be specified in advance
by the user and should include precautions against the deliberate abuse or misuse
of information.
7. A monitoring system should be provided to facilitated the detection of any
violation of the security system.
8. In the design of information systems, periods should be specified beyond which
the information should not be retained.
9. Data held should be accurate. There should be machinery for the correction of
inaccuracy and the updating of information.
10. Care should be taken in coding value judgments.

Council of Europe
Resolution (73) 22 on the protection of the privacy of individuals vis-à-vis electronic
data banks in the private sector5
1. The information stored should be accurate and should be kept up to date. In
general, information relating to the intimate private life of persons or information
that might lead to unfair discrimination should not be recorded or, if recorded,
should not be disseminated.

285

2. The information should be appropriate and relevant with regard to the purpose for
which it has been stored.
3. The information should not be obtained by fraudulent or unfair means.
4. Rules should be laid down to specify the periods beyond which certain categories
of information should no longer be kept or used.
5. Without appropriate authorisation, information should not be used for purposes
other than those for which it has been stored, nor communicated to third parties.
6. As a general rule, the person concerned should have the right to know the
information stored about him, the purpose for which it has been recorded, and
particulars of each release of this information.
7. Every care should be taken to correct inaccurate information and to erase,
obsolete information or information obtained in an unlawful way.
8. Precautions should be taken against any abuse or misuse of information.
Electronic data banks should be equipped with security systems which bar access
to the data held by them to persons not entitled to obtain such information, and
which provide for the detection of misdirection of information, whether
intentional or not.
9. Access to information stored should be confined to persons who have a valid
reason to know it. The operating staff of electronic data banks should be bound
by rules of conduct aimed at preventing the misuse of data and, in particular, by
rules of professional secrecy.
10. Statistical data should be released only in aggregate form and in such a away that
it is impossible to link the information to a particular person.
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Resolution (74) 29 on the protection of the privacy of individuals vis-à-vis electronic
data banks in the public sector6
1. As a general rule the public should be kept regularly informed about the
establishment, operation and development of electronic data banks in the public
sector.
2. The information should be: a) obtained by lawful and fair means; b) accurate and
kept up-to-date; and c) appropriate and relevant to the purpose for which it has
been stored. Every care should be taken to correct inaccurate information and to
erase inappropriate, irrelevant or obsolete information.
3. Especially when electronic data banks process information relating to the intimate
private life of individuals or when the processing of information might lead to
unfair discrimination,
a. Their existence must have been provided for by law, or by special
regulation or have been made public in a statement or document, in
accordance with the legal system of each member state;
b. Such law, regulation, statement or document must clearly state the purpose
of storage and use of such information, as well as the conditions under
which it may be communicated either within the public administration or
to private persons or bodies;
c. That data stored must be used for purposes other than those which have
been defined unless exception is explicitly permitted by law, is granted by
a competent authority or the rules for the use of the electronic data bank
are amended.
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4. Rules should be laid down to specify the time limits beyond which certain
categories of information may not be kept or used. However, exceptions from
this principle are acceptable if the use of the information for statistical, scientific
or historical purposes requires its conservation for an indefinite duration. In that
case, precautions should be taken to ensure that the privacy of the individuals
concerned will not be prejudiced.
5. Every individual should have the right to know the information stored about him.
Any exception to this principle or limitation to the exercise of this right should be
strictly regulated.
6. Precautions should be taken against any abuse or misuse of information. For this
reason:
a. Everyone concerned with the operation of electronic data processing
should be bound by rules of conduct aimed at preventing the misuse of
data and in particular by a duty to observe secrecy;
b. Electronic data banks should be equipped with security systems which bar
access to the data held by them to persons not entitled to obtain such
information and which provide for the detection of misdirections of
information, whether intentional or not.
7. Access to information that may not be freely communicated to the public should
be confined to the persons whose functions entitle them to take cognizance of it in
order to carry out their duties.
8. When information is used for statistical purposes it should be released only in
such a way that it is impossible to link information to a particular person.
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OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data7
1. Collection Limitation Principle: There should be limits to the collection of
personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and,
where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
2. Data quality Principle: Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for
which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should
be accurate, complete, and kept up-to-date.
3. Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for which personal data are
collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the
subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are
not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of
change of purpose.
4. Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should not be disclosed, made available
or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with
Paragraph (3) except: a) with the consent of the data subject; or b) by the
authority of law.
5. Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data should be protected by reasonable
security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modification or disclosure of data.
6. Openness Principle: There should be a general policy of openness about
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should
be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and
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the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the
data controller.
7. Individual Participation Principle: An individual should have the right: a) to
obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the
data controller has data relating to him; b) to have communicated to him, data
relating to him: i) within a reasonable time; ii) at a charge, if any, that is not
excessive; iii) in a reasonable manner; and iv) in a form that is readily intelligible
to him; c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is
denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to challenge data relating
to him and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified,
completed or amended.
8. Accountability Principle: A data controller should be accountable for
complying with measures, which give effect to the principles stated above.
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